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Author: Joon S. Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Regulators have frequently expressed concerns about corporate earnings management. Audit committees are expected to monitor managers' financial reporting, including attempts to manipulate earnings numbers. The extant literature has focused on managers'incentives to manipulate earnings numbers. However, managers also have incentives to manage earnings, due to, for example, pressures to meet quarterly analyst forecasts. We test the association between audit committee characteristics and measures of quarterly earnings management. Using a sample of 896 firm-year observations for the years 1996-2000, we report three findings. First, quarterly earnings management is lower for firms whose audit committee directors have greater governance expertise. Second, the extent of stock ownership by audit committee directors is positively associated with quarterly earnings management. Third, the average tenure of audit committee directors is negatively associated with quarterly earnings management.
Author: Joon S. Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Regulators have frequently expressed concerns about corporate earnings management. Audit committees are expected to monitor managers' financial reporting, including attempts to manipulate earnings numbers. The extant literature has focused on managers'incentives to manipulate earnings numbers. However, managers also have incentives to manage earnings, due to, for example, pressures to meet quarterly analyst forecasts. We test the association between audit committee characteristics and measures of quarterly earnings management. Using a sample of 896 firm-year observations for the years 1996-2000, we report three findings. First, quarterly earnings management is lower for firms whose audit committee directors have greater governance expertise. Second, the extent of stock ownership by audit committee directors is positively associated with quarterly earnings management. Third, the average tenure of audit committee directors is negatively associated with quarterly earnings management.
Author: Joon S. Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
Regulators have frequently expressed concerns about corporate earnings management. Audit committees are expected to monitor managers' tendencies to manipulate their earnings numbers. The extant literature until now has focused on managers' incentives to manipulate annual earnings numbers. However, managers also have incentives to manage quarterly earnings, due for example, to pressures to meet quarterly analyst forecasts. We test whether audit committees with certain characteristics curb managers' ability to engage in quarterly earnings management. We examine the following characteristics of audit committees: their independence, number of meetings, financial expertise, stock ownership, outside directorships, tenure, and number of directors.Using a sample of 896 firm-year observations for the years 1996-2000, we report three findings. First, the number of outside directorships held by audit committee directors is negatively associated with earnings management behavior. This could reflect possible independence of these directors because of their desire to maintain their reputations or their expertise in dealing with financial reporting issues. Second, we find that stock ownership by independent audit committee directors is positively associated with earnings management. The monitoring benefits of independent directors seem to be eroded in situations where they are given stock ownership. Moreover, in our sample, it is mainly the independent directors that own stock. Although we do not know how generalizable this finding is, it suggests that stock ownership by audit committee directors is undesirable. Third, the average tenure of audit committee directors is negatively associated with quarterly earnings management suggesting a possible positive effect of experience with the firm and its accounting. Our results are robust to two different measures of quarterly earnings management.
Author: Joon Sun Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Audit committees
Languages : en
Pages : 192
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Book Description
Author: Frank M. Burke
Publisher: CCH
ISBN: 9780808091646
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 468
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Book Description
Author: April Klein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
This study examines whether audit committee and board characteristics are related to earnings management by the firm. The motivation behind this study is the implicit assertion by the SEC, the NYSE and the NASDAQ that earnings management and poor corporate governance mechanisms are positively related. A non-linear negative relation is found between audit committee independence and earnings manipulation. Specifically, a significant relation is found only when the audit committee has less than a majority of independent directors. Surprisingly, and in contrast to the new regulations, no significant association is found between earnings management and the more stringent requirement of 100% audit committee independence. Empirical evidence also is provided that other corporate governance characteristics are related to earnings management. Earnings management is positively related to whether the CEO sits on the board's compensation committee. It is negatively related to the CEO's shareholdings and to whether a large outside shareholder sits on the board's audit committee. These results suggest that boards structured to be more independent of the CEO may be more effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process.
Author: CPA Pathak PhD (CGA, CFF, CFE, CISA, Jag)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Book Description
Earnings management has attracted much attention in this globalized economic environment due to large accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. National governments and other market-regulation institutions are taking measures to restrain earnings management in order to ensure the reliability and transparency of financial reporting. This study explores whether audit committees and boards of directors influence earnings management using the literary review method. The findings show that both discretionary accruals and abnormal accruals are mostly used as dependent variables to detect earnings manipulation estimated by the Jones and Modified Jones Models. For the most part, evidence from previous literatures indicates that the more independent the members of the audit committee and board, the higher the quality of earnings in financial reporting. However, some opposite findings exist.
Author: Patrick Badolato
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Regulatory pressure to increase both audit committee financial expertise and board independence has resulted in lower status for audit committees relative to management. This status differential is relevant because expertise and relative status are important determinants of each party's ability to influence outcomes, particularly when parties face conflicting goals. We find that audit committees with both financial expertise and high relative status are associated with lower levels of earnings management, as measured by accounting irregularities and abnormal accruals. These results speak to benefits and limitations of financial expertise, which have been the focus of considerable debate.
Author: Louis Braiotta, Jr.
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 0470616075
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 415
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Book Description
The Audit Committee Handbook, Fifth Edition The Audit Committee Handbook, Fifth Edition guides you to: Understand the role and responsibilities of the audit committee with a general update and reality check on auditing cycle activities Identify the developments that impact audit committee practices and the most current techniques and strategies for committee meetings Develop a repertoire of effective strategies to help the board of directors discharge its fiduciary responsibility to shareholders Prepare a periodic assessment of professional development activities and an informed review of both audit processes and financial reporting processes A must-have for all audit committee members, board directors, corporate secretaries, CEOs, CFOs, and auditors involved in the accounting practices of their firms, The Audit Committee Handbook, Fifth Edition is the most authoritative work on audit committees in the marketplace.
Author: Nelson Milan Carrasco Abarca
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Audit committees
Languages : en
Pages : 92
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Book Description
In a recent concept release the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) highlighted concerns regarding auditor independence and auditor objectivity. They expressed concern that auditors may have a bias to accept management's views, particularly in long auditor tenure relations, and asked for public comments on the idea of mandatory auditor rotation. Prior research has focused primarily on the auditor side of the relation, however, my study considers the collaborative effect of the three parties involved in the financial reporting process (management (Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the auditor, and the audit committee). I find that longer collaborative tenure between the CEO and the auditor is associated with lower positive discretionary accruals (i.e., less earnings management). This finding is contrary to the PCAOB's concerns regarding long auditor tenure and lower financial reporting quality. I do not find that the joint tenure of the three parties (CEO, auditor and audit committee chair) is significantly associated with earnings management or accrual quality. I also find that the first year of an audit committee chair change is associated with an increase in positive discretionary accruals. This association does not differ based on different lengths of auditor tenure. However, longer collaborative tenure between the auditor and the CEO constrains earnings management and there is an even greater effect when there is an audit committee chair change (i.e., there are lower positive discretionary accruals). This study provides evidence that longer auditor tenure is not necessarily an undesirable situation, either by itself and particularly not if the long tenure is coupled with long tenure of the CEO.
Author: Chaudhry Ghafran
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This thesis examines the impact of audit committee characteristics on financial reporting quality in the context of a large sample of UK companies over the period 2007-2010. The notion of financial reporting quality is assessed by looking at the audit quality and earnings quality of the firms. This study utilises the audit fee and non-audit fee ratio as its proxies for audit quality and accruals based earnings management models as its proxies for earnings quality. The findings from the multivariate analysis show that audit committee meetings and financial expertise exert a significant positive impact on audit fees. Investigating expertise further, this study finds no support for the notion that accounting expertise influences audit fees, however a significant positive influence on audit fees is recorded for the non-accounting financial expertise. However, the holding of additional directorships has a significant negative impact on audit fees. This study also finds that audit committee members' financial expertise has a negative and significant impact on non-audit fee ratio suggesting a strong support of members with financial expertise on issues relating to auditor independence. The study also documents that audit committee members serving longer on the boards do not prefer to purchase high amount of non-audit services from the incumbent auditor. This study also records a significant positive impact of the holding of additional directorships on the provision of non-audit fee ratio, thus signifying a profound support for the busyness hypothesis which argues that overstretched directors are not very good monitors of financial reporting quality. Furthermore, this study finds broadly consistent evidence that audit committees meeting three or more times per year and fully independent audit committees exert a significant positive impact on the quality of reported earnings. This study also finds some evidence (depending on the earnings model used) that the level of ownership of audit committee members also exerts a positive impact on the quality of reported earnings, highlighting the fact that audit committee members with an equity stake in their companies are considered more effective in their oversight of the financial reporting process. On the other hand, this study finds evidence that the busyness of audit committee members (busyness defined in terms of the holding of board seats in other companies) has a significant negative impact on the quality of reported earnings. The composite variables (i.e. ACE1, ACE2, ACE3 and ACE4) representing those companies that satisfy all aspects of current best practice in terms of audit committee composition and operation, has a positive impact on the quality of reported earnings. This study covers the period 2007 to 2010 and therefore offers a contemporary analysis of the influence of audit committee characteristics on financial reporting quality. The study is very comprehensive in its scope not only in the selection of audit committee characteristics and methods employed to quantify these characteristics, but also in the use of various proxies developed to capture the true essence of financial reporting quality. The choice of multiple measurement methods both for the dependent and independent variables facilitates a much richer investigation into the relationship between governance and financial reporting quality variables. Therefore this study makes a major contribution to our understanding of the association between the various audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality in the wake of recently introduced regulatory recommendations. These findings will also have policy implications as regulators around the world continue to define and refine the desired characteristics and behaviour of audit committees. Therefore, the findings of this study will ensure future policy changes regarding audit committees are adequately informed.
