Auctions With Type-Dependent and Negative Externalities PDF Download

Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Auctions With Type-Dependent and Negative Externalities PDF full book. Access full book title Auctions With Type-Dependent and Negative Externalities by Isabelle Brocas. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.

Auctions With Type-Dependent and Negative Externalities

Auctions With Type-Dependent and Negative Externalities PDF Author: Isabelle Brocas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 43

Get Book Here

Book Description
We analyze optimal auction design in the presence of negative externalities. We assume that externalities are a function of both the valuation of the agent who suffers it and the valuation of the agent who obtains the good. This introduces two different sources of countervailing incentives: the reservation utility of each bidder becomes type-dependent and the equilibrium utility is not necessarily increasing in the agent's valuation. We characterize the properties of the optimal mechanism when externalities are quot;strongly decreasingquot;, quot;weakly decreasingquot; and quot;increasingquot; in the agent's valuation. Last, we discuss its implementation with sealed-bid auctions. Interestingly, bidding strategies are not necessarily increasing in valuations, and the optimal mechanism can be implemented by setting a price ceiling instead of a reserve price.