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Author: Miguel A. Fonseca
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Miguel A. Fonseca
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Sander Onderstal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Author: Mun Chui
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 202
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Author: Murat Atlamaz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 116
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Author: Mr.Robert Alan Feldman
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 145184283X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
A major effort is taking place in many parts of the world to establish market-oriented institutions, a development that is particularly evident in the context of the transforming economies in Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet Union. Against this background, this paper assesses various auction techniques to price and allocate government securities, refinance credit, foreign exchange, and state assets in the context of privatization programs. Before making our recommendations on the appropriate format for auctioning these items, the paper explains basic auction formats and assesses the advantages and disadvantages of these formats drawing on the existing, and mostly theoretical, literature.
Author: United States. Congress
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781977550149
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 126
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Crafting a successful incentive auction : stakeholders' perspectives
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Paul R. Milgrom
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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A "core-selecting auction mechanism" is a direct mechanism for a multi-item allocation problem that selects a core allocation with respect to the bidders' reported values and the auctioneer's exogenously given preferences. For every profile of others' reports, a bidder has a best reply that is a truncation report. For every "bidder optimal" core imputation, there exists a profile of truncation reports that is a full-information Nash equilibrium for every core-selecting auction with those payoffs. Among core-selecting auctions, the incentives to deviate from truthful reporting are minimal at every preference profile if and only if the auction always selects a bidder optimal allocation with respect to the reported preferences. Finally, a core-selecting auction that selects a minimum revenue core allocation is a bidder optimal auction and make the seller's revenue a non-decreasing function of the bids, which eliminates distortions that can otherwise occur in the process of bidder application and qualification. All these results have analogues in two-sided matching theory.
Author: United States. Congress
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781981490127
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 126
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Crafting a successful incentive auction : stakeholders' perspectives : hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, first session, December 10, 2013.
Author: Murat Atlamaz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 232
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Book Description
