Auction design with interdependent valuations : the generalized revelation principle, efficiency, full surplus extraction and information acquisition PDF Download
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Author: Claudio Mezzetti
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Environmental policy
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
Author: Claudio Mezzetti
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Environmental policy
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
Author: Claudio Mezzetti
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Author: Chiara M. Travisi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Meta-analysis
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Author: Giuseppe Di Vita
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Natural resources
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
Author: Alberto Petrucci
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Investments, Foreign
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Author: Vijay Krishna
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 0080922937
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 337
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Book Description
Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Author: Ingo Bräuer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Biodiversity conservation
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to privately bear the cost of information acquisition. In the context of the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we establish that the equilibrium level exceeds the socially optimal level of information with positive interdependence. The individual decisions to acquire information are strategic substitutes. The difference between the equilibrium and the efficient level of information acquisition is increasing in the interdependence of the bidders' valuations and decreasing in the number of informed bidders.
Author: Elissaios Papyrakis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economic development
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Author: Paulo Augusto Lourenço Dias Nunes Nunes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumers
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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