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Author: Eric Maskin
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231153287
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 164
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Book Description
Kenneth Arrow's pathbreaking Òimpossibility theoremÓ was a watershed in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book, Amartya Sen and Eric Maskin explore the implications of ArrowÕs theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theoremÕs value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, while Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the idealÑgiven that achieving the ideal is impossible. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth Arrow himself, as well as essays by Sen and Maskin outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
Author: Eric Maskin
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231153287
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 164
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Book Description
Kenneth Arrow's pathbreaking Òimpossibility theoremÓ was a watershed in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book, Amartya Sen and Eric Maskin explore the implications of ArrowÕs theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theoremÕs value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, while Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the idealÑgiven that achieving the ideal is impossible. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth Arrow himself, as well as essays by Sen and Maskin outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
Author: Kenneth J. Arrow
Publisher: Yale University Press
ISBN: 0300186983
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 347
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Book Description
Originally published in 1951, "Social Choice and Individual Values" introduced "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem" and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science. This new edition, including a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, reintroduces Arrow's seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers."Far beyond a classic, this small book unleashed the ongoing explosion of interest in social choice and voting theory. A half-century later, the book remains full of profound insight: its central message, 'Arrow's Theorem, ' has changed the way we think."--Donald G. Saari, author of "Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected "
Author: Johannes König
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3668832617
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 21
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Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2018 in the subject Politics - General and Theories of International Politics, grade: 1,7, University of Bayreuth, language: English, abstract: Accurately figuring out the cumulative ordering of preferences of an entire society as an aggregation of the orderings of preferences of many individuals would inherently simplify democratic decision processes. However, the social preference ordering is contingent on the specific procedure, or voting rule, used to aggregate the individual preference orderings. This means that different voting rules can lead to different social preference orderings under the input of the same individual preference orderings. This issue effectuates the questions which of the different possible outcomes is the most legitimate, and by extension which voting rule should be used. Arrow sought to answer these questions by demanding that voting rules satisfy a particular set of democratically desirable qualities – these are referred to as axioms or conditions. A voting rule that succeeds in complying with all the conditions could be considered democratically legitimate. The emerging issue is that no voting rule can possibly satisfy all theconditions simultaneously. The blatant preliminary conclusion of this impossibility theorem is somewhat bleak: our faith in democratic voting procedures might be entirely misguided. The aim of this paper is to ascertain, whether the implications of this impossibility theorem constitute an actual issue for the practical application of preference aggregation – or voting – in a democratic political system. Having argued that certain evasions of the impossibility can be practically justified in most cases, the paper will conclude that the impossibility is only relevant for a negligible number of scenarios. Thus, inferring that in most cases Arrow’s impossibility theorem, albeit theoretically relevant, does not constitute a profound issue for voting procedures in a democratic political system.
Author: Michel Balinski
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262545713
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 431
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Book Description
An account of a new theory and method of voting, judging and ranking, majority judgment, shown to be superior to all other known methods. In Majority Judgment, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki argue that the traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, to judge, or to rank. They find that the traditional model—transforming the "preference lists" of individuals into a "preference list" of society—is fundamentally flawed in both theory and practice. Balinski and Laraki propose a more realistic model. It leads to an entirely new theory and method—majority judgment—proven superior to all known methods. It is at once meaningful, resists strategic manipulation, elicits honesty, and is not subject to the classical paradoxes encountered in practice, notably Condorcet's and Arrow's. They offer theoretical, practical, and experimental evidence—from national elections to figure skating competitions—to support their arguments. Drawing on insights from wine, sports, music, and other competitions, Balinski and Laraki argue that the question should not be how to transform many individual rankings into a single collective ranking, but rather, after defining a common language of grades to measure merit, how to transform the many individual evaluations of each competitor into a single collective evaluation of all competitors. The crux of the matter is a new model in which the traditional paradigm—to compare—is replaced by a new paradigm—to evaluate.
Author: Allan M. Feldman
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 038729368X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 401
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Book Description
This book covers the main topics of welfare economics — general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, un certainty, externalities and public goods — and some of the major topics of social choice theory — compensation criteria, fairness, voting. Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones. Chapters 4, 6, 11, 15 and 16 are new, added in this edition. The first edition of the book grew out of an undergraduate welfare economics course at Brown University. The book is intended for the undergraduate student who has some prior familiarity with microeconomics. However, the book is also useful for graduate students and professionals, economists and non-economists, who want an overview of welfare and social choice results unburdened by detail and mathematical complexity. Welfare economics and social choice both probably suffer from ex cessively technical treatments in professional journals and monographs.
Author: Eric Maskin
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231526865
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 163
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Book Description
Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal—given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
Author: Michel Regenwetter
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521829682
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 21
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Book Description
Behavioral Social Choice looks at the probabilistic foundations of collective decision-making rules. The authors challenge much of the existing theoretical wisdom about social choice processes, and seek to restore faith in the possibility of democratic decision-making. In particular, they argue that worries about the supposed prevalence of majority rule cycles that would preclude groups from reaching a final decision about what alternative they prefer have been greatly overstated. In practice, majority rule can be expected to work well in most real-world settings. They provide new insights into how alternative model specifications can change our estimates of social orderings.
Author: Princeton Review
Publisher: Princeton Review
ISBN: 030794591X
Category : Study Aids
Languages : en
Pages : 513
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Book Description
THE PRINCETON REVIEW GETS RESULTS. Get all the prep you need to ace the LSAT with 3 full-length practice tests, thorough LSAT content breakdowns, and extra practice online. This eBook edition of Cracking the LSAT has been specially formatted for e-reader viewing with cross-linked questions, answers, and explanations. Inside the Book: All the Practice & Strategies You Need · 2 full-length practice tests with detailed answer explanations · Expert content reviews for all LSAT sections · Drills for each area—Arguments, Logic Games, Reading Comprehension, and Writing · Key strategies for tackling tough Games question sets · Practical information on navigating law school admissions Exclusive Access to More Practice and Resources Online · 1 additional full-length practice exam · Instant score reports for both book & online tests · Full answer explanations, plus free performance analysis · Step-by-step problem-solving guides for difficult Games and Arguments problems · Video tutorials showing you our strategies in action · Extra drills to hone your technique · Bonus resources, including law school profiles and ranking lists
Author: Princeton Review
Publisher: Princeton Review
ISBN: 0804124965
Category : Study Aids
Languages : en
Pages : 514
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Book Description
THE PRINCETON REVIEW GETS RESULTS. Get all the prep you need to ace the LSAT with 3 full-length practice tests, thorough LSAT section reviews, and extra practice online. This eBook edition has been specially formatted for on-screen viewing with cross-linked questions, answers, and explanations. Techniques That Actually Work. • Powerful strategies for tackling each section of the exam • Key tactics for cracking tough Games question sets • Tips for pacing yourself and prioritizing challenging questions Everything You Need To Know for a High Score. • Logical and Analytical Reasoning questions, many based on actual exams (with the permission of the Law School Admission Council) • Expert instruction and lessons for each LSAT section Practice Your Way to Perfection. • 2 full-length practice tests with detailed answer explanations • 1 additional full-length LSAT practice exam online • Drills for each area, including Reading Comprehension and Writing
Author: Nicholas Bunnin
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1405191120
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 788
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Book Description
The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy ???The style is fresh and engaging, and it gives a broad and accurate picture of the western philosophical tradition. It is a pleasure to browse in, even if one is not looking for an answer to a particular question.??? David Pears ???Its entries manage to avoid the obscurities of an exaggerated brevity without stretching themselves out, as if seeking to embody whole miniature essays. In short it presents itself as a model of clarity and clarification.??? Alan Montefiore
