Author: Roger D. Lagunoff
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
An "anti-Folk Theorem" for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games
Author: Roger D. Lagunoff
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
Markets, Games, and Organizations
Author: Tatsuro Ichiishi
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 354024784X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 315
Book Description
We are pleased to help celebrate Roy Radner's 75th birthday, by issuing in one volume the papers that originally appeared in his honor in two special issues of Review of Economic Design (Vol. 6/2 and 6/3-4, 2001). Through his truly original ideas and lucid writing, Roy has influenced and guided the theory community for decades. Many colleagues and students have found their own work shaped and improved by Roy's wide-ranging curiosity, his encouragement, and his keen insights. In soliciting contributions to the Review of Economic Design Radner issues, we decided to approach his former students at the University of California, Berke ley, his former post-doctoral fellows at Bell Laboratories, and his published co authors. We express our sincere apology to any potential authors who fit these categories and whom we may have unintentionally failed to approach. Our job as editors of the Review of Economic Design Radner issues turned out to be easy, thanks to the enthusiastic response we received from authors and the quality of their submissions.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 354024784X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 315
Book Description
We are pleased to help celebrate Roy Radner's 75th birthday, by issuing in one volume the papers that originally appeared in his honor in two special issues of Review of Economic Design (Vol. 6/2 and 6/3-4, 2001). Through his truly original ideas and lucid writing, Roy has influenced and guided the theory community for decades. Many colleagues and students have found their own work shaped and improved by Roy's wide-ranging curiosity, his encouragement, and his keen insights. In soliciting contributions to the Review of Economic Design Radner issues, we decided to approach his former students at the University of California, Berke ley, his former post-doctoral fellows at Bell Laboratories, and his published co authors. We express our sincere apology to any potential authors who fit these categories and whom we may have unintentionally failed to approach. Our job as editors of the Review of Economic Design Radner issues turned out to be easy, thanks to the enthusiastic response we received from authors and the quality of their submissions.
Non-Cooperative Game Theory
Author: Takako Fujiwara-Greve
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 4431556451
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 263
Book Description
This is a textbook for university juniors, seniors, and graduate students majoring in economics, applied mathematics, and related fields. Each chapter is structured so that a core concept of that chapter is presented with motivations, useful applications are given, and related advanced topics are discussed for future study. Many helpful exercises at various levels are provided at the end of each chapter. Therefore, this book is most suitable for readers who intend to study non-cooperative game theory rigorously for both theoretical studies and applications. Game theory consists of non-cooperative games and cooperative games. This book covers only non-cooperative games, which are major tools used in current economics and related areas. Non-cooperative game theory aims to provide a mathematical prediction of strategic choices by decision makers (players) in situations of conflicting interest. Through the logical analyses of strategic choices, we obtain a better understanding of social (economic, business) problems and possible remedies. The book contains many well-known games such as the prisoner’s dilemma, chicken (hawk–dove) game, coordination game, centipede game, and Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg models in oligopoly. It also covers some advanced frameworks such as repeated games with non-simultaneous moves, repeated games with overlapping generations, global games, and voluntarily separable repeated prisoner’s dilemma, so that readers familiar with basic game theory can expand their knowledge. The author’s own research is reflected in topics such as formulations of information and evolutionary stability, which makes this book unique.
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 4431556451
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 263
Book Description
This is a textbook for university juniors, seniors, and graduate students majoring in economics, applied mathematics, and related fields. Each chapter is structured so that a core concept of that chapter is presented with motivations, useful applications are given, and related advanced topics are discussed for future study. Many helpful exercises at various levels are provided at the end of each chapter. Therefore, this book is most suitable for readers who intend to study non-cooperative game theory rigorously for both theoretical studies and applications. Game theory consists of non-cooperative games and cooperative games. This book covers only non-cooperative games, which are major tools used in current economics and related areas. Non-cooperative game theory aims to provide a mathematical prediction of strategic choices by decision makers (players) in situations of conflicting interest. Through the logical analyses of strategic choices, we obtain a better understanding of social (economic, business) problems and possible remedies. The book contains many well-known games such as the prisoner’s dilemma, chicken (hawk–dove) game, coordination game, centipede game, and Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg models in oligopoly. It also covers some advanced frameworks such as repeated games with non-simultaneous moves, repeated games with overlapping generations, global games, and voluntarily separable repeated prisoner’s dilemma, so that readers familiar with basic game theory can expand their knowledge. The author’s own research is reflected in topics such as formulations of information and evolutionary stability, which makes this book unique.
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games
Author: Dilip Abreu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 11
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 11
Book Description
An Evolutionary 'folk Theorem' for Finitely Repeated Games
Author: Jack Robles
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
Book Description
Essays on Repeated Games and Double Auctions
Author: Kiho Yoon
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 180
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 180
Book Description
A Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring
Author: Johannes Hörner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games and Continuous Decision Rules
Author: James W. Friedman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting and with Incomplete Information
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
Book Description