Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms PDF Download
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Author: Philippe Jehiel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 62
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Book Description
Author: Philippe Jehiel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 62
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Book Description
Author: Econometric Society. World Congress
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521871522
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 431
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Book Description
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Author: Maryann Z. Rui
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 86
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Book Description
Data is increasingly important for firms, regulators, and researchers to develop accurate models for decision-making. Since data sets often need to be externally acquired, a systematic way to value and trade data is necessary. Moreover, buyers of data often interact with each other downstream, such as firms competing in a market. In this setting, an allocation of data may not only benefit the buying firm, but also impose negative externalities on the firm’s competitors. The way data is allocated and sold should thus depend on the particulars of its downstream usage and the interaction between data buyers. We capture the problem of valuing and selling data sets to buyers who interact downstream within the general framework of auctions of digital, or freely replicable, goods. We study the resulting single-item and multi-item mechanism design problems in the presence of additively separable, negative allocative externalities among bidders. Two settings of bidders’ private types are considered, in which bidders either know the externalities that others exert on them or know the externalities that they exert on others. We obtain forms of the welfare-maximizing (efficient) and revenue-maximizing (optimal) auctions of single digital goods in both settings and highlight how the information structure affects the resulting mechanisms. We find that in all cases, the resulting allocation rules are deterministic single thresholding functions for each bidder. For auctions of multiple digital goods, we assume that bidders have independent, additive valuations over items and study the first setting of privately known incoming externalities. We show that the welfare-maximizing mechanism decomposes into multiple efficient single-item auctions using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Under revenue-maximization, we show that selling items separately via optimal single-item auctions yields a guaranteed fraction of the optimal multi-item auction revenue. This allows us to construct approximately revenue-maximizing multi-item mechanisms using the aforementioned optimal single-item mechanisms.
Author: Tilman Börgers
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 019973402X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 263
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Book Description
This book is meant for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics who have a good understanding of game theory.
Author: Marios Mavronicolas
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642046444
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 369
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Book Description
This volume contains the papers presented at the Second International Sym- sium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2009), which was held on October 18–20, 2009, in Paphos, Cyprus. This event followed the ?rst, very successful SAGT symposium, which took place in Paderborn, Germany, last year. The purpose of SAGT is to bring together researchers from computer s- ence, economics and mathematics to present and discuss originalresearchat the intersection of algorithms and game theory. It has been intended to cover all important areas such as solution concepts, game classes,computation of equil- riaandmarketequilibria,algorithmicmechanismdesign, automatedmechanism design,convergenceandlearningingames,complexityclassesingametheory,- gorithmicaspectsof?xed-pointtheorems,mechanisms,incentivesandcoalitions, cost-sharing algorithms, computational problems in economics, ?nance, decision theory and pricing, computational social choice, auction algorithms, price of - archyand its relatives, representationsof games and their complexity, economic aspects of distributed computing and the internet, congestion, routing and n- work design and formation games and game-theoretic approaches to networking problems. Approximately55submissionstoSAGT2009 werereceived.Eachsubmission was reviewed by at least three Program Committee members. The Program Committee decided to accept 29 papers. Out of these, a small number will be invited to a Special Issue of the Theory of Computing Systems journal with selected papers from SAGT 2009. The program of SAGT 2009 featured three invited talks from three outstanding researchers in algorithmic game theory: Elias Koutsoupias, Dov Monderer and Mihalis Yannakakis. We are very grateful toElias,DovandMihalisforjoiningusinPaphosandfortheirexcellentlectures.
Author: Martin Bichler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107135346
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 935
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Book Description
An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.
Author: Petyon Young
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444537678
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 1025
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Book Description
The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
Author: Gerhard Illing
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262263214
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 332
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Book Description
Leading experts in industrial organization and auction theory examine the recent European telecommunication license auction experience. In 2000 and 2001, several European countries carried out auctions for third generation technologies or universal mobile telephone services (UMTS) communication licenses. These "spectrum auctions" inaugurated yet another era in an industry that has already been transformed by a combination of staggering technological innovation and substantial regulatory change. Because of their spectacular but often puzzling outcomes, these spectrum auctions attracted enormous attention and invited new research on the interplay of auctions, industry dynamics, and regulation. This book collects essays on this topic by leading analysts of telecommunications and the European auction experience, all but one presented at a November 2001 CESifo conference; comments and responses are included as well, to preserve some of the controversy and atmosphere of give-and-take at the conference.The essays show the interconnectedness of two important and productive areas of modern economics, auction theory and industrial organization. Because spectrum auctions are embedded in a dynamic interaction of consumers, firms, legislation, and regulation, a multidimensional approach yields important insights. The first essays discuss strategies of stimulating new competition and the complex interplay of the political process, regulation, and competition. The later essays focus on specific spectrum auctions. Combining the empirical data these auctions provide with recent advances in microeconomic theory, they examine questions of auction design and efficiency and convincingly explain the enormous variation of revenues in different auctions.
Author: Econometric Society. World Congress
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 452
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Author: Xavier Vives
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 140082950X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 422
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Book Description
The ways financial analysts, traders, and other specialists use information and learn from each other are of fundamental importance to understanding how markets work and prices are set. This graduate-level textbook analyzes how markets aggregate information and examines the impacts of specific market arrangements--or microstructure--on the aggregation process and overall performance of financial markets. Xavier Vives bridges the gap between the two primary views of markets--informational efficiency and herding--and uses a coherent game-theoretic framework to bring together the latest results from the rational expectations and herding literatures. Vives emphasizes the consequences of market interaction and social learning for informational and economic efficiency. He looks closely at information aggregation mechanisms, progressing from simple to complex environments: from static to dynamic models; from competitive to strategic agents; and from simple market strategies such as noncontingent orders or quantities to complex ones like price contingent orders or demand schedules. Vives finds that contending theories like informational efficiency and herding build on the same principles of Bayesian decision making and that "irrational" agents are not needed to explain herding behavior, booms, and crashes. As this book shows, the microstructure of a market is the crucial factor in the informational efficiency of prices. Provides the most complete analysis of the ways markets aggregate information Bridges the gap between the rational expectations and herding literatures Includes exercises with solutions Serves both as a graduate textbook and a resource for researchers, including financial analysts
