Airpower's Master Tenant and Anti-Access/Area Denial

Airpower's Master Tenant and Anti-Access/Area Denial PDF Author: U S Military
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781089375821
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 82

Get Book Here

Book Description
Two decades of conflict in the Middle East have shaped the USAF's cultural habits for a specific type of enemy: one who has offered minimal opposition to air, space, and cyber supremacy. The nature of these conflicts has encouraged a creeping centralization of command and control (C2). This shift has been out of convenience. Emerging peer competitors signal the need to decentralize out of necessity. This paper argues that unless the USAF leads a doctrinal shift to centralized command, adaptive control, and decentralized execution, it will suffer increasing paralysis due to A2/AD lines of operation specifically designed to exploit today's centralized control paradigm. In the near future, technological peers will be focused on hitting the USAF where it hurts most. The A2/AD focus on C2 denial portends a formidable challenge to U.S. C2. These changes in the character of war, coupled with a shrinking U.S. defense budget will require adaptive control. USAF culture is well suited for centralization, but a rebalance toward decentralization will be necessary to employ this model. In addition to bolstering our communication and network security, the USAF should use the C2 concepts presented in this paper to commit to the mission command philosophy instead of maintaining the hope that a technophile, brute-force network defense will hold against a technological peer. Hope is not a course of action.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Airpower's Master Tenant and Anti-Access/Area Denial: Hope is Not a Course of Action * 1. Introduction * 2. Elemental Determinants of Centralization/Decentralization Balance * 3. Battle Networks and Their Impact on Control in Air Defense * 4. A Search For Elemental Determinants of the Centralization/Decentralization Balance * 5. Relationships of the Elemental Determinants and Impact on Adaptive Control * 6. Future Peer in Asia-Pacific Forces Decentralized Control * 7. Recommendations * 8. ConclusionLike the French military which relied upon climbing out of the trenches at Verdun to win World War One and hoped that the next war would be carried out the same at the Maginot Line, the American military which won a victory in the Gulf War also hopes to continue the "Desert Storm" type addiction during the 21st century... It was little imagined that the blind spot in the visual field of the Americans would just appear [as blind faith in technology to solve all political problems].

Airpower's Master Tenant and Anti-Access/Area Denial

Airpower's Master Tenant and Anti-Access/Area Denial PDF Author: U S Military
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781089375821
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 82

Get Book Here

Book Description
Two decades of conflict in the Middle East have shaped the USAF's cultural habits for a specific type of enemy: one who has offered minimal opposition to air, space, and cyber supremacy. The nature of these conflicts has encouraged a creeping centralization of command and control (C2). This shift has been out of convenience. Emerging peer competitors signal the need to decentralize out of necessity. This paper argues that unless the USAF leads a doctrinal shift to centralized command, adaptive control, and decentralized execution, it will suffer increasing paralysis due to A2/AD lines of operation specifically designed to exploit today's centralized control paradigm. In the near future, technological peers will be focused on hitting the USAF where it hurts most. The A2/AD focus on C2 denial portends a formidable challenge to U.S. C2. These changes in the character of war, coupled with a shrinking U.S. defense budget will require adaptive control. USAF culture is well suited for centralization, but a rebalance toward decentralization will be necessary to employ this model. In addition to bolstering our communication and network security, the USAF should use the C2 concepts presented in this paper to commit to the mission command philosophy instead of maintaining the hope that a technophile, brute-force network defense will hold against a technological peer. Hope is not a course of action.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Airpower's Master Tenant and Anti-Access/Area Denial: Hope is Not a Course of Action * 1. Introduction * 2. Elemental Determinants of Centralization/Decentralization Balance * 3. Battle Networks and Their Impact on Control in Air Defense * 4. A Search For Elemental Determinants of the Centralization/Decentralization Balance * 5. Relationships of the Elemental Determinants and Impact on Adaptive Control * 6. Future Peer in Asia-Pacific Forces Decentralized Control * 7. Recommendations * 8. ConclusionLike the French military which relied upon climbing out of the trenches at Verdun to win World War One and hoped that the next war would be carried out the same at the Maginot Line, the American military which won a victory in the Gulf War also hopes to continue the "Desert Storm" type addiction during the 21st century... It was little imagined that the blind spot in the visual field of the Americans would just appear [as blind faith in technology to solve all political problems].

Airpower's Master Tenant and Anti-access/area Denial

Airpower's Master Tenant and Anti-access/area Denial PDF Author: William Betts
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Access denial (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 34

Get Book Here

Book Description
"Two decades of conflict in the Middle East have shaped the USAF's cultural habits for a specific type of enemy: one who has offered minimal opposition to air, space, and cyber supremacy. The nature of these conflicts has encouraged a creeping centralization of command and control (C2). This shift has been out of convenience. Emerging peer competitors signal the need to decentralize out of necessity. This paper argues that unless the USAF leads a doctrinal shift to centralized command, adaptive control, and decentralized execution, it will suffer increasing paralysis due to A2/AD lines of operation specifically designed to exploit today's centralized control paradigm. In the near future, technological peers will be focused on hitting the USAF where it hurts most. The A2/AD focus on C2 denial portends a formidable challenge to U.S. C2. These changes in the character of war, coupled with a shrinking U.S. defense budget will require adaptive control. USAF culture is well suited for centralization, but a rebalance toward decentralization will be necessary to employ this model. In addition to bolstering our communication and network security, the USAF should use the C2 concepts presented in this paper to commit to the mission command philosophy instead of maintaining the hope that a technophile, brute-force network defense will hold against a technological peer."--Abstract.

Airpower Projection in Anti-access/area Denial Enviornment

Airpower Projection in Anti-access/area Denial Enviornment PDF Author: Russell S. Badowski
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Access denial (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 24

Get Book Here

Book Description
"This paper examines the difficulty with traditional power projection models in an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment and offers an alternative, affordable, and practical solution to Combatant Commanders who seek to retain power projection capabilities in this new environment. The US Air Force has consolidated its global operations onto a dwindling number of forward bases that are increasingly held hostage to adversaries who are gaining precise and lethal technologies that can deny those bases the ability to generate airpower. The existing attitude that our defensive resolve will overcome the capabilities and will of potential adversaries has been supported by recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, as the US transitions to a new A2/AD operational reality, leaders must question this mentality and look at the increased risk while assessing alternative ways to project airpower within the means currently available. Moving forward, leaders must introduce technology and training that supports dispersed power projection models; Service and Combatant Commanders must ensure functional staffs understand and embrace the risks driven by a dispersal strategy, and major commands must alter how they present forces through Unit Type Codes (UTCs) to accommodate force packaging that enables a dispersal operating model. Dispersed operations present both opportunities and risks. In order to fully assess the practicality of dispersed operations as a way to project airpower, this paper breaks down a case study of the Rapid Raptor concept. The risks with executing a dispersed model are analyzed and mitigation measures are presented to ensure that the ability to project airpower is not threatened by current operational realities."--Abstract.

Integrating the Land and Air Components in an Anti-access/area Denial Environment

Integrating the Land and Air Components in an Anti-access/area Denial Environment PDF Author: Michael R. Drowley
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Close air support
Languages : en
Pages : 87

Get Book Here

Book Description
"The evolution of close air support is replete with examples of friction between the land and the air component. The joint force has struggled with the most effective way to plan and execute close air upport at the operational level. Once again, the operational environment is on the cusp of change. The combination of fiscal constraints and an anti-access/area denial threat environment are resulting in a smaller and more multi-role air component facing a robust anti-air threat. Due to these overarching factors, the joint force must plan close air support more diligently and operational component leaders must be in alignment in order to achieve success. If close air support operational planning is relegated to mere apportionment styled planning or leaders do not have a synergistic relationship, the results in the next contingency could be disastrous. In order to be successful joint planning teams must incorporate key tenets founded in the joint principles, elements of operational design, and joint functions. Just as important as the operational planning, operational leaders must have a relationship based in trust and with aligned prioritization all while accepting minor doctrinal mission degradation. If the joint force fails to implement these key factors at the operational level, history may repeat these lessons once again" -- Abstract

Open and Shut

Open and Shut PDF Author: Scott Davis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Access denial (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 48

Get Book Here

Book Description
"This study is a gap analysis comparing current Joint Force Air Base Opening (ABO) capabilities with those assessed as necessary for effective ABO operations in an Anti-Access/Area-Denial environment. The research focuses on gaps in current doctrine, command relationships, command and control, force structure of ABO forces, posture, training for ABO forces, and acquisition for ABO capabilities. The author does not delve into specific solutions for each of the assessed gaps. The focus is on identifying conceptual challenges and methodologies to address them as well as describing areas for further research. Overall the assessment is that the current construct for Joint Force ABO is too unwieldy and insufficiently agile to perform inside of an A2/AD adversary's Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop. However, improvements to doctrine, command relationships, command and control, force structure, posture, training, and acquisition will make the joint force better able to project airpower into the A2/AD threat environment."--page i.

Examining the "inflection Point"

Examining the Author: Kieran T. Denehan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Deployment (Strategy)
Languages : en
Pages : 31

Get Book Here

Book Description
"As it has done after previous periods of long conflicts, the military budget will contract, leaving military planners to do the same -- or more -- with less. This particular drawdown will be more challenging for the United States Air Force (USAF) than previous ones for two reasons. The first is that there were no major modernization efforts or fleet growth prior to this drawdown as in previous ones. In fact, most of the USAF's existing fleets have been constantly involved in combat, combat support, or humanitarian operations throughout the globe on the eve of the impending budget cuts. Second, these existing fleets will face new threats and challenges in the coming decades. Specifically, the USAF will have to determine how its fleets should be used to counter anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies, how to integrate them into the emerging AirSea Battle Concept, and efficiently develop new technologies and programs to deal with future near-peer adversaries using A2/AD warfare. Much has, and much more can be, written about any one of these three subjects in extreme detail and in a range of security classifications. This paper's purpose is to provide a general and unclassified overview of these three significant developments to spur further interest in US defense policy in the Western Pacific and the USAF's role (and potential limitations) in it in the coming decades."--Abstract.

Command and Control in the Anti-access/area Denial Environment

Command and Control in the Anti-access/area Denial Environment PDF Author: Max C. Weems
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Access denial (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 31

Get Book Here

Book Description
"The A2/AD battlespace will be a technologically complex, high-tempo, environment fraught with fog, friction, and chance, especially the "fog" purposely created by the enemy. In this environment, more decentralized control will be critical to success. This paper argues that forward C2 capabilities provide the best solution and proposes a concept called C2 Forward for the US Air Force, which is based on two imperatives: 1) Pushing authority and decision - making out of the AOC and other theater - level C2 agencies and moving it closer to the battle space; and 2) Utilizing multiple C2 nodes with shared situational awareness to enhance survivability, utilize all domains, and quickly gain and maintain the initiative. The paper explores the capabilities C2 Forward will need, and then recommends changes to doctrine, training, and personnel development as well as requirements for future acquisitions. The paper also points out that changes can and should be made now using existing capabilities."--Abstract.

Command Of The Air

Command Of The Air PDF Author: General Giulio Douhet
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1782898522
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 620

Get Book Here

Book Description
In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.

Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency

Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency PDF Author: Shannon Caudill
Publisher: Military Bookshop
ISBN: 9781782666851
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 444

Get Book Here

Book Description
This anthology discusses the converging operational issues of air base defense and counterinsurgency. It explores the diverse challenges associated with defending air assets and joint personnel in a counterinsurgency environment. The authors are primarily Air Force officers from security forces, intelligence, and the office of special investigations, but works are included from a US Air Force pilot and a Canadian air force officer. The authors examine lessons from Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflicts as they relate to securing air bases and sustaining air operations in a high-threat counterinsurgency environment. The essays review the capabilities, doctrine, tactics, and training needed in base defense operations and recommend ways in which to build a strong, synchronized ground defense partnership with joint and combined forces. The authors offer recommendations on the development of combat leaders with the depth of knowledge, tactical and operational skill sets, and counterinsurgency mind set necessary to be effective in the modern asymmetric battlefield.

Command in Air War

Command in Air War PDF Author: Michael W. Kometer
Publisher: www.Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
ISBN: 9781907521034
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 348

Get Book Here

Book Description
This work examines whether "centralized control and decentralized execution" is a valid doctrinal tenet, given the technological advances in the information age. Fascinating scenarios from recent operations, set in the context of a "complex air operations system," show the dilemmas presented by participants' increased access to information-and the resulting consequences of their decisions. With the uncertainty of war and the blending of diverse organizations, the author illustrates that commanders must balance empowerment with accountability by developing depth in command relationships among their subordinates. Orginally published in 2007.