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Author: F. Vollmer
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 940159225X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 188
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Book Description
We act for reasons. But, it is sometimes claimed, the mental states and events that make up reasons, are not sufficient conditions of actions. Reasons never make actions happen. We- as agents (persons, selves, subjects) - make our actions happen. Actions are done by us, not elicited by reasons. The present essay is an attempt to understand this concept of agent causality. Who -~ or what - is an agent ? And how - in virtue of what - does an agent do things, or refrain from doing them? The first chapter deals with problems in the theory of action that seem to require the assumption that actions are controlled by agents. Chapters two and three then review and discuss theories of agent cau sality. Chapters four and five make up the central parts of the essay in which my own solution is put forth, and chapter six presents some data that seem to support this view. Chapter seven discusses how the theory can be reconciled with neuro-physiological facts. And in the last two chapters the theory is confronted with conflicting viewpoints and phe nomena. Daniel Robinson and Richard Swinburne took time to read parts of the manuscript in draft form. Though they disagree with my main viewpoints on the nature of the self, their conunents were very helpful. I hereby thank them both.
Author: F. Vollmer
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 940159225X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 188
Get Book Here
Book Description
We act for reasons. But, it is sometimes claimed, the mental states and events that make up reasons, are not sufficient conditions of actions. Reasons never make actions happen. We- as agents (persons, selves, subjects) - make our actions happen. Actions are done by us, not elicited by reasons. The present essay is an attempt to understand this concept of agent causality. Who -~ or what - is an agent ? And how - in virtue of what - does an agent do things, or refrain from doing them? The first chapter deals with problems in the theory of action that seem to require the assumption that actions are controlled by agents. Chapters two and three then review and discuss theories of agent cau sality. Chapters four and five make up the central parts of the essay in which my own solution is put forth, and chapter six presents some data that seem to support this view. Chapter seven discusses how the theory can be reconciled with neuro-physiological facts. And in the last two chapters the theory is confronted with conflicting viewpoints and phe nomena. Daniel Robinson and Richard Swinburne took time to read parts of the manuscript in draft form. Though they disagree with my main viewpoints on the nature of the self, their conunents were very helpful. I hereby thank them both.
Author: Toby Handfield
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191565415
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 355
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Book Description
In recent decades, the analysis of causal relations has become a topic of central importance in analytic philosophy. More recently, dispositional properties have also become objects of intense study. Both of these phenomena appear to be intimately related to counterfactual conditionals and other modal phenomena such as objective chance, but little work has been done to directly relate them. Dispositions and Causes contains ten essays by scholars working in both metaphysics and in philosophy of science, examining the relation between dispositional and causal concepts. Particular issues discussed include the possibility of reducing dispositions to causes, and vice versa; the possibility of a nominalist theory of causal powers; the attempt to reduce all metaphysical necessity to dispositional properties; the relationship between dispositions, causes, and laws of nature; the role of causal capacities in explaining the success of scientific inquiry; the grounding of dispositions and causes in objective chances; and the type of causal power required for free agency. The introductory chapter contains a detailed overview of recent work in the area, providing a helpful entry to the literature for non-specialists.
Author: Julia Jorati
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107192676
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 236
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Book Description
A fresh and thorough exploration of Leibniz's often controversial theories, including his thought on teleology, contingency, freedom, and moral responsibility.
Author: Randolph Clarke
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780195306422
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 276
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Book Description
This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct - one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism - then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.
Author: Timothy O'Connor
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198030509
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 152
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Book Description
This provocative book refurbishes the traditional account of freedom of will as reasons-guided "agent" causation, situating its account within a general metaphysics. O'Connor's discussion of the general concept of causation and of ontological reductionism v. emergence will specially interest metaphysicians and philosophers of mind.
Author: Gianluca Manzo
Publisher: Wiley
ISBN: 9781119704478
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 208
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Book Description
Explore the issue of causal inference in agent-based computational models in a first-of-it’s-kind volume Agent-based Models and Causal Inference delivers an insightful investigation into the conditions under which different quantitative methods can legitimately hold to be able to establish causal claims. The book compares agent-based computational methods with randomized experiments, instrumental variables, and various types of causal graphs. It goes on to explain why there is no strong argument to believe that observational and experimental methods are qualitatively superior to simulation-based methods in their capacity to contribute to establishing causal claims. Organized in two parts, Agent-based Models and Causal Inference connects the literature from various fields, including causality, social mechanisms, statistical and experimental methods for causal inference, and agent-based computation models to help show that causality means different things within different methods for causal analysis, and that persuasive causal claims can only be built at the intersection of these various methods. Readers will also benefit from the inclusion of: A thorough comparison between agent-based computation models to randomized experiments, instrumental variables, and several types of causal graphs. A compelling argument that observational and experimental methods are not qualitatively superior to simulation-based methods in their ability to establish causal claims Practical discussions of how statistical, experimental and computational methods can be combined to produce reliable causal inferences Perfect for academic social scientists and scholars in the fields of computational social science, philosophy, statistics, experimental design, and ecology, Agent-based Models and Causal Inference will also earn a place in the libraries of PhD students seeking a one-stop reference on the issue of causal inference in agent-based computational models.
Author: Joseph Y. Halpern
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262035022
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 240
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Book Description
Explores actual causality, and such related notions as degree of responsibility, degree of blame, and causal explanation. The goal is to arrive at a definition of causality that matches our natural language usage and is helpful, for example, to a jury deciding a legal case, a programmer looking for the line of code that cause some software to fail, or an economist trying to determine whether austerity caused a subsequent depression.
Author: Timothy O'Connor
Publisher: Oxford University Press on Demand
ISBN: 9780195091564
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 274
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Book Description
Libertarianism, action, and self-determination / Galen Strawson -- The problem of autonomy / Thomas Nagel -- On giving libertarians what they say they want / Daniel Dennett -- Libertarianism and rationality / Richard Double -- Reason's explanation of action / Carl Ginet -- Agents, causes, and events / Roderick M. Chisholm -- Choice and indeterminism / Robert Nozick -- Two kinds of incompatibilism / Robert Kane -- Two concepts of freedom / William Rowe -- Agent causation / Timothy O'Connor -- Toward a credible agent-causal account of free will / Randolphe Clarke -- When is the will free? / Peter van Inwagen -- When the will is free / John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza
Author: Carolina Sartorio
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191063762
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 197
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Book Description
Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. Although this simple view of freedom clashes with most theories of responsibility, including the most prominent 'actual sequence' theories currently on offer, Sartorio argues for its truth. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other (counterfactual) reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways.
Author: E. J. Lowe
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191550906
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 240
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Book Description
Personal Agency consists of two parts. In Part II, a radically libertarian theory of action is defended which combines aspects of agent causalism and volitionism. This theory accords to volitions the status of basic mental actions, maintaining that these are spontaneous exercises of the will—a 'two-way' power which rational agents can freely exercise in the light of reason. Lowe contends that substances, not events, are the causal source of all change in the world—with rational, free agents like ourselves having a special place in the causal order as unmoved movers, or initiators of new causal chains. And he defends a thoroughgoing externalism regarding reasons for action, holding these to be mind-independent worldly entities rather than the beliefs and desires of agents. Part I prepares the ground for this theory by undermining the threat presented to it by physicalism. It does this by challenging the causal closure argument for physicalism in all of its forms and by showing that a dualistic philosophy of mind—one which holds that human mental states and their subjects cannot be identified with bodily states and human bodies respectively—is both metaphysically coherent and entirely consistent with known empirical facts.
