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Languages : en
Pages : 5
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Fissile materials, e.g. 235U and 239Pu, can be detected non-invasively by active neutron interrogation. A unique characteristic of fissile material exposed to neutrons is the prompt emission of high-energy (fast) fission neutrons. One promising mode of operation subjects the object to a beam of medium-energy (epithermal) neutrons, generated by a proton beam impinging on a Li target. The emergence of fast secondary neutrons then clearly indicates the presence of fissile material. Our interrogation system comprises a low-dose 60-keV neutron generator (5 x 106/s), and a 1 m2 array of scintillators for fast neutron detection. Preliminary experimental results demonstrate the detectability of small quantities (370 g) of HEU shielded by steel (200 g/cm2) or plywood (30 g/cm2), with a typical measurement time of 1 min.
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Languages : en
Pages : 5
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Fissile materials, e.g. 235U and 239Pu, can be detected non-invasively by active neutron interrogation. A unique characteristic of fissile material exposed to neutrons is the prompt emission of high-energy (fast) fission neutrons. One promising mode of operation subjects the object to a beam of medium-energy (epithermal) neutrons, generated by a proton beam impinging on a Li target. The emergence of fast secondary neutrons then clearly indicates the presence of fissile material. Our interrogation system comprises a low-dose 60-keV neutron generator (5 x 106/s), and a 1 m2 array of scintillators for fast neutron detection. Preliminary experimental results demonstrate the detectability of small quantities (370 g) of HEU shielded by steel (200 g/cm2) or plywood (30 g/cm2), with a typical measurement time of 1 min.
Author: P. Kerr
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Languages : en
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We are developing a new active interrogation system based on a kinematically focused low energy neutron beam. The key idea is that one of the defining characteristics of SNM (Special Nuclear Materials) is the ability for low energy or thermal neutrons to induce fission. Thus by using low energy neutrons for the interrogation source we can accomplish three goals, (1) Energy discrimination allows us to measure the prompt fast fission neutrons produced while the interrogation beam is on; (2) Neutrons with an energy of approximately 60 to 100 keV do not fission 238U and Thorium, but penetrate bulk material nearly as far as high energy neutrons do and (3) below about 100keV neutrons lose their energy by kinematical collisions rather than via the nuclear (n,2n) or (n, n') processes thus further simplifying the prompt neutron induced background. 60 keV neutrons create a low radiation dose and readily thermal capture in normal materials, thus providing a clean spectroscopic signature of the intervening materials. The kinematically beamed source also eliminates the need for heavy backward and sideway neutron shielding. We have designed and built a very compact pulsed neutron source, based on an RFQ proton accelerator and a lithium target. We are developing fast neutron detectors that are nearly insensitive to the ever-present thermal neutron and neutron capture induced gamma ray background. The detection of only a few high energy fission neutrons in time correlation with the linac pulse will be a clear indication of the presence of SNM.
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Languages : en
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The identification of special nuclear material (SNM) diversion is necessary if SNM inventory control is to be maintained at nuclear facilities. (Special nuclear materials are defined for this purpose as either 235U of 239Pu.) Direct SNM identification by the detection of natural decay or fission radiation is inadequate if the SNM is concealed by appropriate shielding. The active neutron interrogation technique described combines direct SNM identification by delayed fission neutron (DFN) detection with implied SNM detection by the identification of materials capable of shielding SNM from direct detection. This technique is being developed for application in an unattended material/equipment portal through which items such as electronic instruments, packages, tool boxes, etc., will pass. The volume of this portal will be 41-cm wide, 53-cm high and 76-cm deep. The objective of this technique is to identify an attempted diversion of at least 20 grams of SNM with a measurement time of 30 seconds.
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Languages : en
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Active interrogation (AI) has been used as a technique for the detection and identification of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) for both proposed and field-tested systems. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been studying this technique for systems ranging from small systems employing portable electronic neutron generators (ENGs) 1 to larger systems employing linear accelerators as high-energy photon sources for assessment of vehicles and cargo2. In order to assess the feasibility of new systems, INL has undertaken a campaign of Monte Carlo simulations of the response of a variety of masses of SNM in multiple shielding configurations to a pulsed neutron source using the MCNPX3 code, with emphasis on the neutron and photon response of the system as a function of time after the initial neutron pulse. We present here some preliminary results from these calculations. 1. D.L. Chichester and E.H. Seabury, "Using Electronic Neutron Generators in Active Interrogation to Detect Shielded Nuclear Material," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science 56 (2009) pp 441-447. 2. J.L. Jones et al., "Photonuclear-based, nuclear material detection system for cargo containers," Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research B 241 (2005) pp 770-776. 3. D.B. Pelowitz, "MCNPXTM User's Manual version 2.6.0," Los Alamos National Laboratory Report LA-CP-07-1473 (2008).
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Languages : en
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The goal of the work reported here is to develop a concept for an active neutron interrogation system that can detect small targets of SNM contraband in cargo containers, roughly 5 kg HEU or 1 kg Pu, even when well shielded by a thick cargo. It is essential that the concept be reliable and have low false-positive and false-negative error rates. It also must be rapid to avoid interruption of commerce, completing the analysis in minutes. A new radiation signature unique to SNM has been identified that utilizes high-energy (E{sub [gamma]} = 3-7 MeV) fission product [gamma]-ray emission. Fortunately, this high-energy [gamma]-ray signature is robust in that it is very distinct compared to normal background radiation where there is no comparable high-energy [gamma]-ray radiation. Equally important, it has a factor of 10 higher yield than delayed neutrons that are the basis of classical interrogation technique normally used on small unshielded specimens of SNM. And it readily penetrates two meters of low-Z and high-Z cargo at the expected density of H"0.5 gm/cm3. Consequently, we expect that in most cases the signature flux at the container wall is at least 2-3 decades more intense than delayed neutron signals used historically and facilitates the detection of SNM even when shielded by thick cargo. Experiments have verified this signature and its predicted characteristics. However, they revealed an important interference due to the activation of 16O by the 16O(n, p)16N reaction that produces a 6 MeV [gamma]-ray following a 7-sec [beta]-decay of the 16N. This interference is important when irradiating with 14 MeV neutrons but is eliminated when lower energy neutron sources are utilized since the reaction threshold for 16O(n, p)16N is 10 MeV. The signature [gamma]-ray fluxes exiting a thick cargo can be detected in large arrays of scintillation detectors to produce useful signal count rates of 2-4 x 104 cps. That is high enough to quickly identify SNM fission by its characteristic high energy [gamma]-ray emission and characteristic fast decay time. Fortunately, the fission product [gamma]-radiation decays with a distinctive T12 = 20-30 sec lifetime that is well matched to cargo scan speeds of about one minute per container. Experimental characterization of the {gamma}-ray fluxes exiting thick cargos has not yet been undertaken. The work reported here leads to definite requirements for the interrogation neutron source that can be met with neutron commercially available source technology. A small (6-20 ft) deuteron accelerator producing about H"1 mA, 2-5 MeV deuteron beam on a deuterium or beryllium target is required. Neutrons produced by such an accelerator are kinematically collimated in the forward direction, reducing shielding requirements while increasing the neutron flux on target to meet the intensity requirement even when there is thick intervening cargo. In addition, this technology provides a very penetrating beam in the energy range 4-8 MeV while remaining below the oxygen activation threshold. Maximum counting statistics and lowest error rates in the identification occur when the beam is pulsed with a 50 % duty cycle. The period for this pulsing must be comparable to the half-lives of the species that make up the signature, i.e. 10-60 sec. This is readily achieved with commercially available equipment and is well suited to rapid scanning of cargo containers.
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Languages : en
Pages : 6
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Special Nuclear Material (SNM) can either spontaneously fission or be induced to do so: either case results in neutron emission. For this reason, neutron detection performs a crucial role in the functionality of Radiation Portal Monitoring (RPM) devices. Since neutrons are highly penetrating and difficult to shield, they could potentially be detected escaping even a well-shielded cargo container. If the shielding were sophisticated, detecting escaping neutrons would require a highly efficient detector with close to full solid angle coverage. In 2008, we reported the successful detection of neutrons with a 250 liter (l) gadolinium doped water Cherenkov prototype--a technology that could potentially be employed cost effectively with full solid angle coverage. More recently we have built and tested both 1-kl and 3.5-kl versions, demonstrating that very large, cost effective, non-flammable and environmentally benign neutron detectors can be operated efficiently without being overwhelmed by background. In our paper, we present a new design for a modular system of water-based neutron detectors that could be deployed as a real RPM. The modules contain a number of optimizations that have not previously been combined within a single system. We present simulations of the new system, based on the performance of our previous detectors. These simulations indicate that an optimized system such as is presented here could achieve SNM sensitivity competitive with a large 3He-based system. Moreover, the realization of large, cost effective neutron detectors could, for the first time, enable the detection of multiple neutrons per fission from within a large object such as a cargo container. Such a signal would provide a robust indication of the presence of fissioning material, reducing the frequency of false alarms while increasing sensitivity.
Author: Takehito Hayakawa
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814635464
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 379
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Nuclear nonproliferation is a critical global issue. A key technological challenge to ensuring nuclear nonproliferation and security is the detection of long-lived radioisotopes and fissionable nuclides in a non-destructive manner. This technological challenge requires new methods for detecting relevant nuclides and the development of new quantum-beam sources. For example, one new method that has been proposed and studied is nuclear resonance fluorescence with energy-tunable, monochromatic gamma-rays generated by Compton scattering of laser photons with electrons.The development of new methods requires the help of researchers from a wide range of fields, such as nuclear physics, accelerator physics, laser physics, etc. Furthermore, any new method must be compatible with the requirements of administrators and nuclear-material inspectors.
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Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Shielded special nuclear material (SNM) is very difficult to detect and new technologies are needed to clear alarms and verify the presence of SNM. High-energy photons and neutrons can be used to actively interrogate for heavily shielded SNM, such as highly enriched uranium (HEU), since neutrons can penetrate gamma-ray shielding and gamma-rays can penetrate neutron shielding. Both source particles then induce unique detectable signals from fission. In this LDRD, we explored a new type of interrogation source that uses low-energy proton- or deuteron-induced nuclear reactions to generate high fluxes of mono-energetic gammas or neutrons. Accelerator-based experiments, computational studies, and prototype source tests were performed to obtain a better understanding of (1) the flux requirements, (2) fission-induced signals, background, and interferences, and (3) operational performance of the source. The results of this research led to the development and testing of an axial-type gamma tube source and the design/construction of a high power coaxial-type gamma generator based on the 11B(p, [gamma])12C nuclear reaction.
Author: Doug Reilly
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780160327247
Category : Non-destructive testing
Languages : en
Pages : 700
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Author:
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Languages : en
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The detection and interdiction of special nuclear material (SNM) is still a high-priority focus area for many organizations around the world. One method that is commonly considered a leading candidate in the detection of SNM is active interrogation (AI). AI is different from its close relative, passive interrogation, in that an active source is used to enhance or create a detectable signal (usually fission) from SNM, particularly in shielded scenarios or scenarios where the SNM has a low activity. The use of AI thus makes the detection of SNM easier or, in some scenarios, even enables previously impossible detection. In this work the signal from prompt neutrons and photons as well as delayed neutrons and photons will be combined, as is typically done in AI. In previous work AI has been evaluated experimentally and computationally. However, for the purposes of this work, past scenarios are considered lightly shielded and tightly coupled spatially. At most, the previous work interrogated the contents of one standard cargo container (2.44 x 2.60 x 6.10 m) and the source and detector were both within a few meters of the object being interrogated. A few examples of this type of previous work can be found in references 1 and 2. Obviously, more heavily shielded AI scenarios will require larger source intensities, larger detector surface areas (larger detectors or more detectors), greater detector efficiencies, longer count times, or some combination of these.
