Author: Theodore Sedgwick
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Constitutional history
Languages : en
Pages : 770
Book Description
A Treatise on the Rules which Govern the Interpretation and Application of Statutory and Constitutional Law
Author: Theodore Sedgwick
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Constitutional history
Languages : en
Pages : 770
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Constitutional history
Languages : en
Pages : 770
Book Description
A Treatise on the Rules which Govern the Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law
Author: Theodore Sedgwick
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Constitutional law
Languages : en
Pages : 750
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Constitutional law
Languages : en
Pages : 750
Book Description
A Treatise on the Rules which Govern the Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law
Author: Theodore Sedgwick
Publisher: BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN: 3368853899
Category : Fiction
Languages : en
Pages : 746
Book Description
Reprint of the original, first published in 1874.
Publisher: BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN: 3368853899
Category : Fiction
Languages : en
Pages : 746
Book Description
Reprint of the original, first published in 1874.
A Treatise on the Rules Which Govern the Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law
Author: Theodore Sedgwick
Publisher: Theclassics.Us
ISBN: 9781230282022
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 368
Book Description
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1874 edition. Excerpt: ...that where an instrument contains a clause or provision in contravention of a statute, it renders the whole instrument invalid. I may here remark that the rule is in its nature arbitrary, and calculated to work injustice, and that it appears to be subject to exceptions. So, where there are different and independent covenants in the same instrument, part may be good and part bad. So, a personal covenant to pay a rent charge may be good, and the security of the rent charge on the living may be bad.f Cumulative Remedies and Penalties.--Where a precise remedy for the violation of a right is provided by statute, it often becomes a matter of interest to know whether the statutory remedy is the only one that can be had, or whether it is to be regarded as merely cumulative, the party aggrieved having also a right to resort to his redress for the injury sustained, at common law, or independently of the statute.(a) In regard to Wetherell v. Jones, 3 Barn. & Ad. 221. Mouys v. Leake, 8 T. R. 411; Kerrison t Mohney v. Cook, 26 Penn. 842. v. Cole, 8 East, 234; Dwarris, p. 638. See Ante, p. 73. Chitty on Contracts, p. 536. (a) When Statutory liemedies Exclusive.--For cases holding such remedies exclusive, see Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutch. 398 (taxes); Victory v. Fitzpatrick, 8 Ind. 281 (Eminent domain); McCormack v. Terre Haute, &c. R. R. 9 Ind. 283 (Eminent domain). A statute prescribing a method of investigating elections takes away the common-law remedy in cases covered by it., Commonwealth v. Garrigues, 28 Penn. St. 9. When a pecuniary obligation is created by statute, and a remedy is given by this we have already noticed the rule that where a statute does not vest a right in a person, but only prohibits the doing of some act under a penalty, in such a...
Publisher: Theclassics.Us
ISBN: 9781230282022
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 368
Book Description
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1874 edition. Excerpt: ...that where an instrument contains a clause or provision in contravention of a statute, it renders the whole instrument invalid. I may here remark that the rule is in its nature arbitrary, and calculated to work injustice, and that it appears to be subject to exceptions. So, where there are different and independent covenants in the same instrument, part may be good and part bad. So, a personal covenant to pay a rent charge may be good, and the security of the rent charge on the living may be bad.f Cumulative Remedies and Penalties.--Where a precise remedy for the violation of a right is provided by statute, it often becomes a matter of interest to know whether the statutory remedy is the only one that can be had, or whether it is to be regarded as merely cumulative, the party aggrieved having also a right to resort to his redress for the injury sustained, at common law, or independently of the statute.(a) In regard to Wetherell v. Jones, 3 Barn. & Ad. 221. Mouys v. Leake, 8 T. R. 411; Kerrison t Mohney v. Cook, 26 Penn. 842. v. Cole, 8 East, 234; Dwarris, p. 638. See Ante, p. 73. Chitty on Contracts, p. 536. (a) When Statutory liemedies Exclusive.--For cases holding such remedies exclusive, see Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutch. 398 (taxes); Victory v. Fitzpatrick, 8 Ind. 281 (Eminent domain); McCormack v. Terre Haute, &c. R. R. 9 Ind. 283 (Eminent domain). A statute prescribing a method of investigating elections takes away the common-law remedy in cases covered by it., Commonwealth v. Garrigues, 28 Penn. St. 9. When a pecuniary obligation is created by statute, and a remedy is given by this we have already noticed the rule that where a statute does not vest a right in a person, but only prohibits the doing of some act under a penalty, in such a...
A Treatise on the Rules which Govern the Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law
Author: Theodore Sedgwick
Publisher: Fred B Rothman & Company
ISBN: 9780837711157
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 692
Book Description
Considered a legal classic. At one point, this text was considered a guide for American judges, & lawyers found it to be extremely useful in arguments. Pound referred to this title as one of the titles of the nineteenth century that went far to shape the law.
Publisher: Fred B Rothman & Company
ISBN: 9780837711157
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 692
Book Description
Considered a legal classic. At one point, this text was considered a guide for American judges, & lawyers found it to be extremely useful in arguments. Pound referred to this title as one of the titles of the nineteenth century that went far to shape the law.
A Treatise on the Rules which Govern the Interpretation and Application of Statutory and Constitutional Law
Author: Theodore Sedgwick
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Constitutional history
Languages : en
Pages : 774
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Constitutional history
Languages : en
Pages : 774
Book Description
Stempel on Insurance Contracts
Author: Jeffrey W. Stempel
Publisher: Wolters Kluwer
ISBN: 0735554366
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 3276
Book Description
Publisher: Wolters Kluwer
ISBN: 0735554366
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 3276
Book Description
Catalogue of the Wisconsin State Library
Author: Wisconsin State Library
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 504
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 504
Book Description
A Treatise on the Rules which Govern the Interpretation and Application of Statutory and Constitutional Law
Author: Theodore Sedgwick
Publisher: BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN: 3382332094
Category : Fiction
Languages : en
Pages : 766
Book Description
Reprint of the original, first published in 1857. The publishing house Anatiposi publishes historical books as reprints. Due to their age, these books may have missing pages or inferior quality. Our aim is to preserve these books and make them available to the public so that they do not get lost.
Publisher: BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN: 3382332094
Category : Fiction
Languages : en
Pages : 766
Book Description
Reprint of the original, first published in 1857. The publishing house Anatiposi publishes historical books as reprints. Due to their age, these books may have missing pages or inferior quality. Our aim is to preserve these books and make them available to the public so that they do not get lost.
A Matter of Interpretation
Author: Antonin Scalia
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691174040
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 197
Book Description
We are all familiar with the image of the immensely clever judge who discerns the best rule of common law for the case at hand. According to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a judge like this can maneuver through earlier cases to achieve the desired aim—“distinguishing one prior case on his left, straight-arming another one on his right, high-stepping away from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he reaches the goal—good law." But is this common-law mindset, which is appropriate in its place, suitable also in statutory and constitutional interpretation? In a witty and trenchant essay, Justice Scalia answers this question with a resounding negative. In exploring the neglected art of statutory interpretation, Scalia urges that judges resist the temptation to use legislative intention and legislative history. In his view, it is incompatible with democratic government to allow the meaning of a statute to be determined by what the judges think the lawgivers meant rather than by what the legislature actually promulgated. Eschewing the judicial lawmaking that is the essence of common law, judges should interpret statutes and regulations by focusing on the text itself. Scalia then extends this principle to constitutional law. He proposes that we abandon the notion of an everchanging Constitution and pay attention to the Constitution's original meaning. Although not subscribing to the “strict constructionism” that would prevent applying the Constitution to modern circumstances, Scalia emphatically rejects the idea that judges can properly “smuggle” in new rights or deny old rights by using the Due Process Clause, for instance. In fact, such judicial discretion might lead to the destruction of the Bill of Rights if a majority of the judges ever wished to reach that most undesirable of goals. This essay is followed by four commentaries by Professors Gordon Wood, Laurence Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin, who engage Justice Scalia’s ideas about judicial interpretation from varying standpoints. In the spirit of debate, Justice Scalia responds to these critics. Featuring a new foreword that discusses Scalia’s impact, jurisprudence, and legacy, this witty and trenchant exchange illuminates the brilliance of one of the most influential legal minds of our time.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691174040
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 197
Book Description
We are all familiar with the image of the immensely clever judge who discerns the best rule of common law for the case at hand. According to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a judge like this can maneuver through earlier cases to achieve the desired aim—“distinguishing one prior case on his left, straight-arming another one on his right, high-stepping away from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he reaches the goal—good law." But is this common-law mindset, which is appropriate in its place, suitable also in statutory and constitutional interpretation? In a witty and trenchant essay, Justice Scalia answers this question with a resounding negative. In exploring the neglected art of statutory interpretation, Scalia urges that judges resist the temptation to use legislative intention and legislative history. In his view, it is incompatible with democratic government to allow the meaning of a statute to be determined by what the judges think the lawgivers meant rather than by what the legislature actually promulgated. Eschewing the judicial lawmaking that is the essence of common law, judges should interpret statutes and regulations by focusing on the text itself. Scalia then extends this principle to constitutional law. He proposes that we abandon the notion of an everchanging Constitution and pay attention to the Constitution's original meaning. Although not subscribing to the “strict constructionism” that would prevent applying the Constitution to modern circumstances, Scalia emphatically rejects the idea that judges can properly “smuggle” in new rights or deny old rights by using the Due Process Clause, for instance. In fact, such judicial discretion might lead to the destruction of the Bill of Rights if a majority of the judges ever wished to reach that most undesirable of goals. This essay is followed by four commentaries by Professors Gordon Wood, Laurence Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin, who engage Justice Scalia’s ideas about judicial interpretation from varying standpoints. In the spirit of debate, Justice Scalia responds to these critics. Featuring a new foreword that discusses Scalia’s impact, jurisprudence, and legacy, this witty and trenchant exchange illuminates the brilliance of one of the most influential legal minds of our time.