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Author: Agha Humayun Amin
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781493624744
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 216
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Book Description
ForewordMajor (retd) Agha Humayun Amin is a rare type of army officer. He is a philosopher, debater and a very keen scholar of military affairs. His writings are prolific. He does not hesitate to call into question received wisdom and dares to explode sacred myths behind which military establishments generally hide their blunders and failures. I have benefited a great deal from his scholarly contribution on the Pakistan Army and have cited and quoted him in my book, Pakistan: The Garrison State – Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011). I particularly found his work very useful to understand the Kashmir War of 1947-48 and the 1965 war. I am therefore truly privileged to note that he has now presented a detailed analysis of the 1965 War in which he explains the reasons why neither India nor Pakistan made much headway in that conflict that lasted 17 days (6 – 23 September 1965). He writes with clarity not mincing words and therefore it is easy even for the general reader to follow his reasoning. However, he writes with an authority that comes only through a long and dedicated commitment to understanding the nature and purpose of war, the sociological and psychological underpinnings of warfare, the quality and competence needed to establish credible armed forces and above all the role and purpose of training for warfare. His knowledge is encyclopedic with regard to military philosophy. Since I have no background in military science or the art of modern warfare I am in no position to comment with authority on his evaluations of the reasons why the 1965 War ended in a stalemate. However, there is no doubt that he brings to bear his vast erudition on his analysis with great skill and persuasion. The roots of the problem are traced to the origins of the British Indian Army from whom both the Indian and Pakistani armies descend. The author argues that the Indians – Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were recruited into that army essentially with the purpose of maintaining the status quo in the volatile tribal areas. They were never trained to be modern armies capable of independent responsibility to fight national wars. Famously, the British put little trust in the Indians with regard to leadership roles. Even when entry to the officer class or commissioned officers was granted to the Indians in 1919 they were not promoted to command positions beyond the rank of colonels. There were hardly one or two brigadiers when British rule ended in mid-August 1947. Amin asserts that the selection of officers and ordinary ranks was from amongst those sections of society which were traditionally known to have mercenary tendencies. British imperial policy conferred respectability upon them with the dubious “martial races theory”. In reality it was people from the least politically and socially aware sections of society who were employed in the Indian Army. In these circumstances, the partition of India and the division of the Indian Army resulted in sudden quick promotions. Men with little command experience and much less knowledge of strategic planning took over on both countries. While on the Indian side, Mahatma Gandhi's non-violence known as the doctrine of ahmisa resulted in the army being neglected and not being prepared to take upon the task of maintaining a credible defence of that huge country – something Nehru realized to his great horror during the 1962 Sino-Indian boundary war in which his men suffered humiliating defeat. In Pakistan, the military boss General Ayub Khan was content with the acquisition of weapons from the United States as sufficient to safeguard Pakistan. However, the problem was more serious than just two diametrically opposite philosophies on war. It was a lack of perspective on the tasks which devolve upon independent states and their armed forces. Quite simply national armies had to be fully prepared to take up the tasks commensurate with the realities of the territorial state.The author undertakes a detailed and
Author: Agha Humayun Amin
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781493624744
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 216
Get Book Here
Book Description
ForewordMajor (retd) Agha Humayun Amin is a rare type of army officer. He is a philosopher, debater and a very keen scholar of military affairs. His writings are prolific. He does not hesitate to call into question received wisdom and dares to explode sacred myths behind which military establishments generally hide their blunders and failures. I have benefited a great deal from his scholarly contribution on the Pakistan Army and have cited and quoted him in my book, Pakistan: The Garrison State – Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011). I particularly found his work very useful to understand the Kashmir War of 1947-48 and the 1965 war. I am therefore truly privileged to note that he has now presented a detailed analysis of the 1965 War in which he explains the reasons why neither India nor Pakistan made much headway in that conflict that lasted 17 days (6 – 23 September 1965). He writes with clarity not mincing words and therefore it is easy even for the general reader to follow his reasoning. However, he writes with an authority that comes only through a long and dedicated commitment to understanding the nature and purpose of war, the sociological and psychological underpinnings of warfare, the quality and competence needed to establish credible armed forces and above all the role and purpose of training for warfare. His knowledge is encyclopedic with regard to military philosophy. Since I have no background in military science or the art of modern warfare I am in no position to comment with authority on his evaluations of the reasons why the 1965 War ended in a stalemate. However, there is no doubt that he brings to bear his vast erudition on his analysis with great skill and persuasion. The roots of the problem are traced to the origins of the British Indian Army from whom both the Indian and Pakistani armies descend. The author argues that the Indians – Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were recruited into that army essentially with the purpose of maintaining the status quo in the volatile tribal areas. They were never trained to be modern armies capable of independent responsibility to fight national wars. Famously, the British put little trust in the Indians with regard to leadership roles. Even when entry to the officer class or commissioned officers was granted to the Indians in 1919 they were not promoted to command positions beyond the rank of colonels. There were hardly one or two brigadiers when British rule ended in mid-August 1947. Amin asserts that the selection of officers and ordinary ranks was from amongst those sections of society which were traditionally known to have mercenary tendencies. British imperial policy conferred respectability upon them with the dubious “martial races theory”. In reality it was people from the least politically and socially aware sections of society who were employed in the Indian Army. In these circumstances, the partition of India and the division of the Indian Army resulted in sudden quick promotions. Men with little command experience and much less knowledge of strategic planning took over on both countries. While on the Indian side, Mahatma Gandhi's non-violence known as the doctrine of ahmisa resulted in the army being neglected and not being prepared to take upon the task of maintaining a credible defence of that huge country – something Nehru realized to his great horror during the 1962 Sino-Indian boundary war in which his men suffered humiliating defeat. In Pakistan, the military boss General Ayub Khan was content with the acquisition of weapons from the United States as sufficient to safeguard Pakistan. However, the problem was more serious than just two diametrically opposite philosophies on war. It was a lack of perspective on the tasks which devolve upon independent states and their armed forces. Quite simply national armies had to be fully prepared to take up the tasks commensurate with the realities of the territorial state.The author undertakes a detailed and
Author: R. D. Pradhan
Publisher: Atlantic Publishers & Dist
ISBN: 9788126907625
Category : India
Languages : en
Pages : 172
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Book Description
1965 War Was The First All-Out Clash Between The Two Nations India And Pakistan, After The Partition In 1947.Y.B. Chavan, India S Former Defence Minister, Recorded In His Own Hand The 22-Day War. The Inside Story Reveals:" Utter Failure Of Intelligence On Timing Of Pak Attack." How And Why Chavan Ordered Iaf To Launch Attack Without Even Informing The Pm." Why India Attacked Across The International Border? Reasons As Per Chavan Recording, If We Fail And I Cannot Even Imagine Of It The Nation Fails ." How A Division Commander Bolted From The Theatre Of Operation. " How The Army Commander Sacrificed Over 300 Men For The Greater Glory Of His Regiment . " Why The Indian Army Did Not March Into Lahore." Occasions When The Army Chief Almost Lost His Nerve." How The Defence Minister, The Army And Air Chiefs Worked As Team." How Pm Kept His Cool And Emerged As A Great Leader In War." Was It A Futile War? Did India Lose In Tashkent What Was Won On Battle-Fields." Finally, How The Political Leadership Re-Established Its Proper Relationship With The Defence Forces Leadership And Wiped Out Bitter Memories Of The 1962 India-China War.The Book Is A Tribute To The Iaf That Was Deployed In War For The First Time After The Independence. Also To India S Armoured Regiments That Fought Valiantly And Destroyed Myth Of Superiority Of The Pattons.
Author: Agha Amin
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781546566373
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 234
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Book Description
CONCLUSION. The Pakistan Army in 1965 had the potential keeping in view its equipment, particularly tanks and artillery, vis a vis the state of Indian Armour and Artillery to inflict a decisive defeat on India.Poor Military leadership at the higher level in the final reckoning stands out as the principal cause of failure of the Pakistan Army to inflict a decisive military defeat on India.Ayub Khan was directly responsible for the leadership failure of the Pakistan Army. Conversely it was superior equipment and in particular tanks and artillery apart from the BRB in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor which enabled Pakistan to contain the Indians despite their considerable numerical superiority in infantry. Valour, Morale, Motivation played a part, but we must remember that valour alone did not save the Poles from being overrun by the Russians and Germans repeatedly during the period from late 18th Century till 1939!Valour did not save the Serbians from being over run by the German-Austrian-Bulgarian force in WW One. The tragedy of the Pakistan Army was that it failed to achieve even 50 % of what it was capable of achieving and only because of Qualitative reasons.The definite edge over equipment was lost after 1965 and in 1971 Pakistan was saved largely because of the fact that Indian superiority in infantry coupled with superior equipment was divided between the Eastern and Western Fronts. The year 1965 was crucial and Providence gave an opportunity to Pakistan to achieve something militarily.The Seeds of defeat were sowed long before partition and the seal of mediocrity was laid once the Ayub-Musa duo headed the army during the period 1951-1965! The Indian Army was handicapped because of an indifferent political leadership.Racially both the armies were largely similar and only fools can think that one was inherently braver than the other! Long ago Hobbes had rightly said; "Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body and mind;as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or quicker of mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he " . 126 The Pakistanis failed to do as well as they potentially could in 1965, keeping in view the on ground tangible realities, because in terms of intangible qualities, by virtue of a common historical experience;they were as qualitatively mediocre as the Indians! My service in Pakistan Army from 1981 to 1994, and an intense study of Sub Continental Military history, has reinforced this conviction that I first developed as a student of Forman Christian College Lahore during the period 1977-1978!The rest is Fiction!
Author: Mohammed Musa
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Generals
Languages : en
Pages : 176
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Book Description
Author: Hari Ram Gupta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : India-Pakistan Conflict, 1965
Languages : en
Pages : 454
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Book Description
Author: Brij Mohan Kaul
Publisher: Delhi : Vikas Publications
ISBN:
Category : India
Languages : en
Pages : 390
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Book Description
General Kaul, The Author Examines The Period 1945-1965, Criticises The Confusion And Realities In The Military High Command In Delhi - Surveys The Political Scene - The Political Leadership Comes In For Criticism For Its Apathy And Realities Of Indian Political Scene - 2 Parts - The India-Pak Conflict - National Affairs - Remedies - 26 Chapters - Index - 4 Sketch Maps. Copy Signed By The Author. Without Dustjacket.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Middle East
Languages : en
Pages : 7
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Book Description
Author: Bhupinder Singh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : India
Languages : en
Pages : 332
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Book Description
Author: Farooq Bajwa
Publisher: Hurst Publishers
ISBN: 1849042306
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 421
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Book Description
Decades of Pakistani resentment over India’s stance on Kashmir, and its subsequent attempt to force a military solution on the issue, led to the 1965 war between the two neighbours. It ended in a stalemate on the battlefield, and after a mere twenty-one days, the war was brought to a dramatic end with the signing of a peace treaty at Tashkent. The opposing sides both claimed victory, however, and also catalogues of heroic deeds that have since taken on the character of mythology. Although neither prevailed outright, the one undoubted loser in the conflict was the incumbent President of Pakistan, General Ayub Khan, who staked his political and military reputation on Pakistan emerging victorious. With the superpowers unwilling assist in negotiations, and Pakistan reluctant to damage its alliance with America, the agreement that followed only reinforced India’s position not to surrender anything during diplomacy that Pakistan had failed to gain militarily. This book examines in detail the politics, diplomacy and military manoeuvres of the war, using British and American declassified documents and memoirs, as well as some unpublished interviews. It provides a comprehensive overview of the conflict and makes sense of the morass of diplomacy and the confusion of war.
Author: Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh
Publisher: Lancer Publishers LLC
ISBN: 1935501593
Category : India-Pakistan Conflict, 1965
Languages : en
Pages : 261
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Book Description
The conflict was short and limited, packed with intense activity, major movement, heavy fighting and crucial decisions. The initiative rested with Pakistan to commence hostilities, which they did with a mix of irregular and regular troops and tactics. This is a story of anticipation, of impending actions, of virtual equality of forces engaged in a savage battle of attrition in which no quarters were given or asked. The author, GOC-in-C Western Command during those fateful days provided an unflappable presence under whose command the Army imposed unacceptable levels of losses on the enemy, first toning down their rhetoric, then their confidence, and lastly their ability to sustain very high levels of material losses. There is very little material or records to draw upon for our military studies of warfare in and around the Indian subcontinent. War Despatches narrates for the first time the inside story through original despatches field by the Army Commander from the war zone. To maintain the authenticity of the Despatches, the military style of writing has been followed in the text as far as possible.