Why Did BERSATU Leave Pakatan Harapan?

Why Did BERSATU Leave Pakatan Harapan? PDF Author: Wan Saiful Wan Jan
Publisher: Iseas - Yusof Ishak Institute
ISBN: 9789814881890
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
The Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition won Malaysia's 14th general election on 9 May 2018, the first time a regime change took place in the country. However, it lost its majority in late February 2020, when Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (BERSATU) left the coalition. The four parties in PH had very different ideologies, especially when it comes to issues of race and religion. But despite taking various steps to create a coalition agreement, the more fundamental differences were never reconciled during the coalition's time in power. PH won GE-14 with a relatively low level of support from the ethnic Malays, who perceived it to be a coalition dominated by the mainly Chinese DAP. Fearmongering about how PH and the DAP were a threat to Malay privileges further weakened PH while in government. Furthermore, BERSATU disliked the possibility that Parti Keadilan Rakyat (KEADILAN) president Anwar Ibrahim might succeed Mahathir Mohamad as prime minister. They did not trust Anwar to champion the Malay agenda if he became prime minister. BERSATU decided as early as in 2019 to explore leaving PH to form a new Malay-led government, and saw the departure as a necessary step for a better chance at winning GE15. This was a controversial decision and it created a major rift within BERSATU itself, with party chairman and then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad refusing to accept the party's decision to leave PH.

Why Did BERSATU Leave Pakatan Harapan?

Why Did BERSATU Leave Pakatan Harapan? PDF Author: Wan Saiful Wan Jan
Publisher: Iseas - Yusof Ishak Institute
ISBN: 9789814881890
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
The Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition won Malaysia's 14th general election on 9 May 2018, the first time a regime change took place in the country. However, it lost its majority in late February 2020, when Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (BERSATU) left the coalition. The four parties in PH had very different ideologies, especially when it comes to issues of race and religion. But despite taking various steps to create a coalition agreement, the more fundamental differences were never reconciled during the coalition's time in power. PH won GE-14 with a relatively low level of support from the ethnic Malays, who perceived it to be a coalition dominated by the mainly Chinese DAP. Fearmongering about how PH and the DAP were a threat to Malay privileges further weakened PH while in government. Furthermore, BERSATU disliked the possibility that Parti Keadilan Rakyat (KEADILAN) president Anwar Ibrahim might succeed Mahathir Mohamad as prime minister. They did not trust Anwar to champion the Malay agenda if he became prime minister. BERSATU decided as early as in 2019 to explore leaving PH to form a new Malay-led government, and saw the departure as a necessary step for a better chance at winning GE15. This was a controversial decision and it created a major rift within BERSATU itself, with party chairman and then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad refusing to accept the party's decision to leave PH.

Why Did BERSATU Leave Pakatan Harapan?

Why Did BERSATU Leave Pakatan Harapan? PDF Author: Wan Saiful Wan Jan
Publisher: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
ISBN: 9814881902
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 44

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Book Description
he Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition won Malaysia’s 14th general election on 9 May 2018, the first time a regime change took place in the country. However, it lost its majority in late February 2020, when Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (BERSATU) left the coalition. The four parties in PH had very different ideologies, especially when it comes to issues of race and religion. But despite taking various steps to create a coalition agreement, the more fundamental differences were never reconciled during the coalition’s time in power. PH won GE-14 with a relatively low level of support from the ethnic Malays, who perceived it to be a coalition dominated by the mainly Chinese DAP. Fearmongering about how PH and the DAP were a threat to Malay privileges further weakened PH while in government. Furthermore, BERSATU disliked the possibility that Parti Keadilan Rakyat (KEADILAN) president Anwar Ibrahim might succeed Mahathir Mohamad as prime minister. They did not trust Anwar to champion the Malay agenda if he became prime minister. BERSATU decided as early as in 2019 to explore leaving PH to form a new Malay-led government, and saw the departure as a necessary step for a better chance at winning GE15. This was a controversial decision and it created a major rift within BERSATU itself, with party chairman and then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad refusing to accept the party’s decision to leave PH. Following Mahathir’s sudden resignation on 24 February 2020, BERSATU immediately announced their departure from PH. This led to a series of events that culminated in the collapse of PH and the formation a Perikatan Nasional government led by the three biggest Malay parties, UMNO, BERSATU and PAS. The whole episode shows that any coalition or political parties that wish to govern Malaysia must not ignore sentiments among the Malays, especially those in rural areas.

Will Pakatan Harapan’s Hold on Selangor Continue?

Will Pakatan Harapan’s Hold on Selangor Continue? PDF Author: Tricia Yeoh
Publisher: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
ISBN: 9814951447
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 55

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Book Description
When the Pakatan Harapan (PH) federal government fell in February 2020, PH also lost control over the states of Johor, Malacca, Perak and Kedah. In Sabah, PH-aligned Warisan was replaced by the PN-aligned United Alliance of Sabah. PH maintained its hold on three states—Selangor, Penang and Negeri Sembilan. Selangor’s position is of unique interest, given the largest share of PH assemblypersons comprising members from the People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, or PKR), the party which has faced significant elite splits in 2020. The present stability of PH’s survival in Selangor can be accounted for by the sheer majority it possesses within the legislative assembly, comprising forty-one out of fifty-six state seats. Unless a significant share of assemblypersons were to defect, the change in state government would be highly unlikely. PH built a strong base in Selangor during its time in power over more than a decade, securing performative legitimacy and rooting itself strongly within the community. PH has benefited from the highly urbanized and educated demographic profile of Selangor. However, the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic has likely changed the landscape, which may in turn affect how constituents will now respond to goodies offered by the federal government. Although PH in Selangor has survived the national storm, its future performance remains uncertain. This year’s political realignment, public opinion towards PN and the 2018 redelineation exercise where the number of Malay-majority seats has grown may hamper PH’s ability to maintain its strong margin. The political fragmentation that continues to unfold will see further party and coalitional realignment, which will invariably impact PH’s strength in Selangor.

Federal-State Relations under the Pakatan Harapan Government

Federal-State Relations under the Pakatan Harapan Government PDF Author: Tricia Yeoh
Publisher: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
ISBN: 9814951145
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 55

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Book Description
On 9 May 2018, Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional (BN) government lost the country’s 14th general election (GE14). Replacing it was the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition, made up of four parties, three of which had had experience cooperating with each other for a decade, namely Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah). The fourth was the new Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM) led by Dr Mahathir Mohamad. The election also saw equally significant changes at the state government level. PH now controlled seven states in total, up from two, while BN went from controlling ten states to retaining but two. PAS regained Terengganu and with its control over Kelantan now held the two East Coast states. The Sabah state government, held by Parti Warisan Sabah (Warisan) aligned itself with PH, while the Sarawak state government chose to stick with BN. As many as ten of the sixty promises listed in the PH 2018 election manifesto related to federalism and Sabah and Sarawak, an indication of the growing importance of these two states (and of state issues more generally). The PH administration’s two significant set-ups were the Special Select Committee on States and Federal Relations and the Special Cabinet Committee on the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63). Serious attempts were made to address concerns by both committees, with achievements being more visible in the Special Cabinet Committee on MA63, possibly due to the greater attention given on Sabah and Sarawak. Issues brought up within the Parliamentary Special Select Committee were not substantively addressed. PH’s time in power saw how states aligned to it maintained a smooth working relationship with the federal government. What was more interesting to note was that even non-PH aligned states such as Kelantan, Terengganu and Perlis also received favourable attention from the federal government. Federal-state relations were much more aggressively tackled under the PH government than under any other preceding administration.

Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia in Johor

Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia in Johor PDF Author: Wan Saiful Wan Jan
Publisher: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
ISBN: 9814818097
Category : Political Science
Languages : ms
Pages : 52

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Book Description
Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM) was officially launched on 14 January 2017, led by prominent personalities including former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, former Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, and former Kedah Chief Minister Mukhriz Mahathir. Upon establishment, the party immediately announced that they are aiming to win the southern state of Johor in the upcoming general election. Historically, UMNO splinter parties have never been able to threaten UMNO in this state. Since independence, Johor has always been seen as an UMNO bastion. PPBM has moved quickly to establish themselves in all parliamentary and state constituencies in Johor, however, and it has been rather successful in attracting support from those aged below 35. Their key challenge remains the rural and female voters. Identity politics is a major hurdle for PPBM. The presence of the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in the Pakatan Harapan coalition — of which PPBM is a member — is a hurdle in attracting Malay support. Among Malay voters, DAP is perceived as a threat to Malay privileges. At the same time, PPBM leaders in Johor believe that their contribution towards the coalition is not yet fully recognized by their coalition partners who insist that PPBM contests only in constituencies with a large Malay population. Areas with a high percentage of Malay voters are difficult for PPBM to win because UMNO tends to enjoy huge support in such constituencies, and PPBM leaders argue that they deserve more mixed seats to run in as well. Winning Johor, or some other state, is crucial for PPBM. Should the coalition fail to win at the federal level, PPBM will need a base to avoid disintegration

The Unrealized Mahathir-Anwar Transitions

The Unrealized Mahathir-Anwar Transitions PDF Author: Boo Teik Khoo
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789815011005
Category : Malaysia
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
The failure of two expected transitions of leadership from Dr Mahathir Mohamad to Anwar Ibrahim (in 1998 and 2020) are traceable beyond their personal entanglements to the social divides and political currents of their time. The unrealized transitions are symptomatic of UMNO's dynamic of 'dysfunctional succession'. Under Mahathir, the party split. Under Najib, it was defeated. The condition persists as the current prime minister, Muhyiddin Yassin, has not even appointed a deputy prime minister after being in power for fifteen months. The unrealized transitions were a setback for a 'reform agenda', which Anwar Ibrahim articulated, but which emerged from dissident movements for diverse reforms. These movements helped the multiethnic, socially inclusive, opposition to win the 14th General Election. They are only seemingly dormant because of the pandemic. The Pakatan Harapan regime had the best chance to supply a fresh vision, deeper social understanding, and commitment to reform. The present Perikatan Nasional regime's fixation on 'Malayness' overlooks twenty years of intense intra-Malay conflicts that began with the failure of the first transition. As the '7th Prime Minister', Mahathir had a rare chance to redeem himself from major errors of his first twenty-two-year tenure. He squandered his chance by not honouring the Pakatan Harapan transition plan. Anwar Ibrahim's opponents mock him for being obsessed with wanting to be prime minister. Yet they obsessively fear his becoming prime minister. Anwar may be twice loser in political succession but 'the spectre of Anwar' still haunts Malaysian political consciousness.

Catharsis

Catharsis PDF Author: Ooi Kee Beng
Publisher: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
ISBN: 9814818917
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 236

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Book Description
Malaysia pulled itself back from the brink on 9 May 2018. That day the majority of its voting population decided to topple the Barisan Nasional government that had been in power for over 60 years and that had come to be seen as corrupt beyond redemption, and incompetent to boot. Lined up against the unpopular administration of Najib Razak was a coalition led by former strongman Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, who at the age of 92 had decided to return to Malaysian politics to stop the rot which many believed had begun during his earlier period in power, in 1981-2003. As the oldest prime minister in world history, he is now setting about creating structure that he believes will lead to a Malaysia that will achieve the Vision 2020 that he first propounded in 1991. This vision dovetails with the ideals of the highly influential Reformasi Movement which was ignited by the sacking of his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, in 1998. This compilation of insightful analyses is Ooi Kee Beng’s seventh, and discusses key events from the last five years leading up to 9 May 2018 and beyond. These seven books together cover the strange period we may come to know as the Inter-Mahathir Era, and the present volume discusses some of the challenges facing the new government, and the Malaysian population in general, now that the Barisan Nasional has imploded.

Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS)

Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) PDF Author: Wan Saiful Wan Jan
Publisher: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
ISBN: 9814951269
Category : Political Science
Languages : ms
Pages : 31

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Book Description
The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) is no stranger to coalition politics. It has a long history of working with others, both in government and in opposition. Up until 2018, it used the framework of tahaluf siyasi as the guide to forming coalitions. Under the pretext of tahaluf siyasi or political coalition, PAS joined the Barisan Nasional (BN) government in 1974. It was also a key player in the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU), Barisan Alternatif (BA) and Pakatan Rakyat (PR) opposition coalitions. But in the lead up to GE14, PAS decided to form the Gagasan Sejahtera coalition with much smaller parties—Berjasa and Ikatan. It dominated this coalition and the two partners were largely insignificant. After GE14, PAS decided to partner with UMNO in Muafakat Nasional, under the pretext of a new strategy called ta’awun siyasi or political cooperation. This is a looser partnership arrangement, in which the partners are not strictly bound to each other. The formation of Muafakat Nasional is a historic development, as it brings together the two biggest and oldest Malay political parties for the time in an exclusive manner. Bersatu joined the pact in 2020, making Muafakat Nasional the biggest Malay political force in Malaysia today. PAS sees its role as a unifier of the Muslim ummah, holding and keeping the peace between UMNO and Bersatu. For PAS, creating Malay Muslim unity is not just an effective political strategy but also a religious obligation.

Non-State Chinese Actors and Their Impact on Relations between China and Mainland Southeast Asia

Non-State Chinese Actors and Their Impact on Relations between China and Mainland Southeast Asia PDF Author: Enze Han
Publisher: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
ISBN: 981495134X
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 27

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Book Description
International relations scholarship and the popular media tend to portray China as a great power with hegemonic designs for Southeast Asia. Moreover, studies on Chinese influence in Southeast Asia predominantly focus on the Chinese state. This paper argues that Chinese non-state actors and their daily encounters with local communities in Southeast Asia deserve equal attention as these interactions evidently produce friction at both the society-to-state and state-to-state levels. The influence of Chinese non-state actors in Southeast Asia can be illustrated with three examples, namely, Chinese tourism operations in Thailand, Chinese market demand and agricultural transformations in Myanmar, and Chinese gangs within the casino economy in Cambodia. Thailand has recently become a top tourist destination for Chinese nationals. This has cultural implications as those involved in the tourism industry need to have Chinese language skills. The economic implications include increased competition and decreased accountability as Chinese tour companies have set up in Thailand using Thai locals as nominees. Bilateral relations also soured after a boat carrying Chinese tourists capsized in Thailand. As global prices of corn rose in 2011 and 2012, areas in Myanmar close to the Chinese border have increased corn cultivation to meet Chinese demands for that crop. This has led to deforestation in these areas. Chinese gangsters fleeing their government’s crackdown in China have settled down to operate in the casino economy in Cambodia. Consequentially, there has been a rise in crime rate involving online scams and deteriorating public security. Despite the Chinese government encouraging the Cambodian government to enforce a ban on online gambling, the actions of non-state actors from China continue to be associated with the Chinese state as a whole and there is rising resentment towards the Chinese in Cambodia. The COVID-19 pandemic has temporarily halted cross-border trade between China and mainland Southeast Asia. This has negatively affected local farmers who are dependent on the Chinese market.

The Philippine Economy

The Philippine Economy PDF Author: Ramon L Clarete
Publisher: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
ISBN: 9814786500
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 476

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Book Description
In this volume, a leading group of scholars pose the question, has the Philippine economy rejoined the dynamic East Asian mainstream and, if so, what set of policies and priorities are required to maintain the strong economic momentum of recent years? Successive chapters address issues related to growth and poverty, infrastructure and urbanization, education, health, the environment, energy, development finance, and governance and institutions. The book has been written with a broad audience in mind. First and foremost it is for readers in, and interested in, this fascinating and important country with a population that now exceeds a hundred million. Second, it will appeal to those in the broader development community with an interest in the analytical and policy challenges that democratic, middle-income countries face as they struggle to lift their citizens out of poverty and to achieve broad-based and environmentally sustainable growth.