Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt

Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt PDF Author: Mr. Francisco Roch
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1513572636
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 38

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Book Description
We analyze how concerns for model misspecification on the part of international lenders affect the desirability of issuing state-contingent debt instruments in a standard sovereign default model à la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). We show that for the commonly used threshold state-contingent bond structure (e.g., the GDP-linked bond issued by Argentina in 2005), the model with robustness generates ambiguity premia in bond spreads that can explain most of what the literature has labeled as novelty premium. While the government would be better off with this bond when facing rational expectations lenders, this additional source of premia leads to welfare losses when facing robust lenders. Finally, we characterize the optimal design of the state-contingent bond and show how it varies with the level of robustness. Our findings rationalize the little use of these instruments in practice and shed light on their optimal design.

Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt

Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt PDF Author: Mr. Francisco Roch
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1513572636
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 38

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Book Description
We analyze how concerns for model misspecification on the part of international lenders affect the desirability of issuing state-contingent debt instruments in a standard sovereign default model à la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). We show that for the commonly used threshold state-contingent bond structure (e.g., the GDP-linked bond issued by Argentina in 2005), the model with robustness generates ambiguity premia in bond spreads that can explain most of what the literature has labeled as novelty premium. While the government would be better off with this bond when facing rational expectations lenders, this additional source of premia leads to welfare losses when facing robust lenders. Finally, we characterize the optimal design of the state-contingent bond and show how it varies with the level of robustness. Our findings rationalize the little use of these instruments in practice and shed light on their optimal design.

Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk

Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk PDF Author: Dr. Leonardo Martinez
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1455225045
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 29

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Book Description
We propose a modification to a baseline sovereign default framework that allows us to quantify the importance of debt dilution in accounting for the level and volatility of the interest rate spread paid by sovereigns. We measure the effects of debt dilution by comparing the simulations of the baseline model (with debt dilution) with the ones of the modified model without dilution. We calibrate the baseline model to mimic the mean and standard deviation of the spread, as well as the external debt level, the mean debt duration and a measure of default frequency in the data. We find that, even without commitment to future repayment policies and withoutcontingency of sovereign debt, if the sovereign could eliminate debt dilution, the number of default per 100 years decreases from 3.10 to 0.42. The mean spread decreases from 7.38% to 0.57%. The standard deviation of the spread decreases from 2.45 to 0.72. Default risk falls in part because of a reduction of the level of sovereign debt (36% of the face value and of 11% of the market value). But we show that the most important effect of dilution on default risk results from a shift in the set of government''s borrowing opportunities. Our analysis is also relevant for the study of other credit markets where the debt dilution problem could be present.

The Premia on State-Contingent Sovereign Debt Instruments

The Premia on State-Contingent Sovereign Debt Instruments PDF Author: Deniz Igan
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1616357002
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 48

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Book Description
State-contingent debt instruments such as GDP-linked warrants have garnered attention as a potential tool to help debt-stressed economies smooth repayments over business cycles, yet very few studies of the empirical properties of these instruments exist. This paper develops a general f ramework to estimate the time-varying risk premium of a state-contingent sovereign debt instrument. Our estimation framework applied to GDP-linked warrants issued by Argentina, Greece, and Ukraine reveals three stylized facts: (i) the risk premium in state-contingent instruments is high and persistent; (ii) the risk premium exhibits a pro-cyclical pattern; and (iii) the liquidity premium is higher and more volatile than that for plain-vanilla government bonds issued by the same sovereign. We then present a model in which investors fear ambiguity and that can account for the cyclical properties of the risk premium.

Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010

Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010 PDF Author: Mr.Udaibir S. Das
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475505531
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 128

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Book Description
This paper provides a comprehensive survey of pertinent issues on sovereign debt restructurings, based on a newly constructed database. This is the first complete dataset of sovereign restructuring cases, covering the six decades from 1950–2010; it includes 186 debt exchanges with foreign banks and bondholders, and 447 bilateral debt agreements with the Paris Club. We present new stylized facts on the outcome and process of debt restructurings, including on the size of haircuts, creditor participation, and legal aspects. In addition, the paper summarizes the relevant empirical literature, analyzes recent restructuring episodes, and discusses ongoing debates on crisis resolution mechanisms, credit default swaps, and the role of collective action clauses.

A Primer on Managing Sovereign Debt-Portfolio Risks

A Primer on Managing Sovereign Debt-Portfolio Risks PDF Author: Thordur Jonasson
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484350545
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 133

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Book Description
This paper provides an overview of sovereign debt portfolio risks and discusses various liability management operations (LMOs) and instruments used by public debt managers to mitigate these risks. Debt management strategies analyzed in the context of helping reach debt portfolio targets and attain desired portfolio structures. Also, the paper outlines how LMOs could be integrated into a debt management strategy and serve as policy tools to reduce potential debt portfolio vulnerabilities. Further, the paper presents operational issues faced by debt managers, including the need to develop a risk management framework, interactions of debt management with fiscal policy, monetary policy, and financial stability, as well as efficient government bond markets.

The Role of State-Contingent Debt Instruments in Sovereign Debt Restructurings

The Role of State-Contingent Debt Instruments in Sovereign Debt Restructurings PDF Author: Charles Cohen
Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
ISBN: 9781513556482
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
The COVID-19 crisis may lead to a series of costly and inefficient sovereign debt restructurings. Any such restructurings will likely take place during a period of great economic uncertainty, which may lead to protracted negotiations between creditors and debtors over recovery values, and potentially even relapses into default post-restructuring. State-contingent debt instruments (SCDIs) could play an important role in improving the outcomes of these restructurings.

Global Waves of Debt

Global Waves of Debt PDF Author: M. Ayhan Kose
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 1464815453
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 403

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Book Description
The global economy has experienced four waves of rapid debt accumulation over the past 50 years. The first three debt waves ended with financial crises in many emerging market and developing economies. During the current wave, which started in 2010, the increase in debt in these economies has already been larger, faster, and broader-based than in the previous three waves. Current low interest rates mitigate some of the risks associated with high debt. However, emerging market and developing economies are also confronted by weak growth prospects, mounting vulnerabilities, and elevated global risks. A menu of policy options is available to reduce the likelihood that the current debt wave will end in crisis and, if crises do take place, will alleviate their impact.

Optimal State Contingent Sovereign Debt Instruments

Optimal State Contingent Sovereign Debt Instruments PDF Author: Mr. Alejandro D Guerson
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1513595911
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 31

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Book Description
This paper shows that the optimal sovereign lending contract is state-contingent when a government can default. It provides a theoretical basis for the specification of optimal state-contingent debt instruments (SCDIs) in countries subject to large shocks that can be observed and verified by all parties involved, such as natural disasters or global pandemics. The result is obtained as the endogenous solution to a contracting problem under time-inconsistency when a government cannot credibly commit to honor debt service obligations in all possible states of nature. It is shown that rational investors optimally offer SCDIs that include additional financing when the default constraint is binding, keeping the debtor engaged in the contractual relationship and avoiding asset loss. The debtor benefits because the contract implies net-positive financing when facing a large shock, increasing concurrent welfare, while maintaining access to financing in the future for consumption smoothing at the same terms as with precommitment. SCDIs require maintaining debt at a low level compared to the precommitment case, and also a fiscal consolidation when triggered to contain the increase in debt. Extension of the time inconsistency problem to add the taxation of capital returns shows that the optimal physical capital investment is also state-contingent.

State-Contingent Debt Instruments for Sovereigns - Annexes

State-Contingent Debt Instruments for Sovereigns - Annexes PDF Author: International Monetary Fund. Asia and Pacific Dept
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1498346804
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 56

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Book Description
These annexes accompany the IMF Policy Paper State Contingent Debt Instruments for Sovereigns

The Dynamics of Sovereign Debt Crises and Bailouts

The Dynamics of Sovereign Debt Crises and Bailouts PDF Author: Mr.Francisco Roch
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475533241
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 46

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Book Description
Motivated by the recent European debt crisis, this paper investigates the scope for a bailout guarantee in a sovereign debt crisis. Defaults may arise from negative income shocks, government impatience or a "sunspot"-coordinated buyers strike. We introduce a bailout agency, and characterize the minimal actuarially fair intervention that guarantees the no-buyers-strike fundamental equilibrium, relying on the market for residual financing. The intervention makes it cheaper for governments to borrow, inducing them borrow more, leaving default probabilities possibly rather unchanged. The maximal backstop will be pulled precisely when fundamentals worsen.