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Author: Bart Streumer
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191088951
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 262
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Book Description
In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory says that these judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that these properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory, but he argues that it is not. Instead, he argues, our inability to believe this error theory makes the theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory, it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory, and it undermines revisionary alternatives to the theory. Streumer then sketches how certain other philosophical views can be defended in a similar way, and how philosophers should modify their method if there can be true theories that we cannot believe. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we should sharply distinguish the truth of a theory from our ability to believe it
Author: Bart Streumer
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191088951
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 262
Get Book Here
Book Description
In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory says that these judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that these properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory, but he argues that it is not. Instead, he argues, our inability to believe this error theory makes the theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory, it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory, and it undermines revisionary alternatives to the theory. Streumer then sketches how certain other philosophical views can be defended in a similar way, and how philosophers should modify their method if there can be true theories that we cannot believe. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we should sharply distinguish the truth of a theory from our ability to believe it
Author: Jonas Olson
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0198701934
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 226
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Book Description
Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
Author: Aleksandra Gruszka
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9781441912107
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 494
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Book Description
As cognitive models of behavior continue to evolve, the mechanics of cognitive exceptionality, with its range of individual variations in abilities and performance, remains a challenge to psychology. Reaching beyond the standard view of exceptional cognition equaling superior intelligence, the Handbook of Individual Differences in Cognition examines the latest findings from psychobiology, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience, for a comprehensive state-of-the-art volume. Breaking down cognition in terms of attentional mechanisms, working memory, and higher-order processing, contributors discuss general models of cognition and personality. Chapter authors build on this foundation as they revisit current theory in such areas as processing effort and general arousal and examine emerging methods in individual differences research, including new data on the role of brain plasticity in cognitive function. The possibility of a unified theory of individual differences in cognitive ability and the extent to which these variables may account for real-world competencies are emphasized, and commentary chapters offer suggestions for further research priorities. Coverage highlights include: The relationship between cognition and temperamental traits. The development of autobiographical memory. Anxiety and attentional control. The neurophysiology of gender differences in cognitive ability. Intelligence and cognitive control. Individual differences in dual task coordination. The effects of subclinical depression on attention, memory, and reasoning. Mood as a shaper of information. Researchers, clinicians, and graduate students in psychology and cognitive sciences, including clinical psychology and neuropsychology, personality and social psychology, neuroscience, and education, will find the Handbook of Individual Differences in Cognition an expert guide to the field as it currently stands and to its agenda for the future.
Author: James Lenman
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019888513X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 187
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Book Description
The Possibility of Moral Community defends the claim that there could be a moral community, a community of rational creatures somewhat like ourselves living together in ways informed and regulated by shared normative standards and understandings. These creatures aim to live together in this way and expect each other to conform to that shared aim. Those who fail to do so are deemed to have acted wrongly and held responsible for doing so. This possibility is not dependent on the truth of such large metaphysical claims as robust normative realism and libertarian free will. And even if these large metaphysical claims are false, moral community remains possible without those who compose it needing to commit any errors, believe any fictions, live any lies, or be subject to any illusions. There is nothing they need to make-believe or to pretend. This possibility is vindicated by developing and defending the view that our normative thought and talk expresses who we are. Or more exactly who we are when we are, by our own lights, at our best. This is something shaped by our history, our nature and the passions in our souls. It is something contingent, certainly, but it is idle to be troubled by that if it is also something we are able to take ownership of and agree to inhabit together as a space of mutual normative expectation and responsibility.
Author: Bart Streumer
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198785895
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 242
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Book Description
Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory. But he argues that it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory and it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory. He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it.
Author: Matthew Chrisman
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1000889475
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 212
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Book Description
What makes something morally right? Where do our ethical standards come from? Are they relative to cultures or timeless and universal? Are there any objective moral facts? What is goodness? If there are moral facts, how do we learn about them? What do we mean when we say someone ought to do something? These are all questions in metaethics, the branch of ethics that investigates the status of morality, the nature of ethical value, the possibility of ethical knowledge, and the meaning of ethical statements. To the uninitiated it can appear abstract and far removed from its two more concrete cousins, ethical theory and applied ethics, yet it is one of the fastest-growing and most exciting areas of ethics. What is this thing called Metaethics? demystifies this important subject and is ideal for students coming to it for the first time. Beginning with a brief overview of metaethics and the development of a "conceptual toolkit," Matthew Chrisman introduces and assesses the following key topics: ethical reality: including questions about naturalism and non-naturalism, moral facts, and the distinction between realism and antirealism ethical language: does language represent reality? What mental states are expressed by moral statements? moral psychology: the theory of motivation and the connection between moral judgement and motivation moral knowledge: intuitionist and coherentist moral epistemologies, and theories of objectivity and relativism in metaethics prominent metaethical theories: naturalism, nonnaturalism, error-theory, and expressivism new directions in metaethics, including non-traditional theories, thick ethical concepts, and extensions to metaepistemology and metanormative theory The Second Edition has been completely revised and updated throughout. This includes a new thematic organization of the core chapters, many new examples, a newly written final chapter including discussion of thick ethical concepts and all-things-considered normativity, updated references to recent scholarly literature, improved learning resources, an expanded glossary of terms, and much more. Additional features such as chapter summaries, questions of understanding, and suggestions for further reading make What is this thing called Metaethics? an ideal introduction to metaethics.
Author: Wouter Floris Kalf
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319772880
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 252
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Book Description
This book provides a novel formulation and defence of moral error theory. It also provides a novel solution to the so-called now what question; viz., the question what we should do with our moral thought and talk after moral error theory. The novel formulation of moral error theory uses pragmatic presupposition rather than conceptual entailment to argue that moral judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to categorical moral reasons. The new answer to the now what question is pragmatic presupposition substitutionism: we should substitute our current moral judgments, which pragmatically presuppose the existence of categorical moral reasons with ‘schmoral’ judgments that pragmatically presuppose the existence of a specific class of prudential reasons. These are prudential reasons that, when we act on them, contribute to the satisfaction of what the author calls ‘the fundamental desire’; namely, the desire to live in a world with mutually beneficial cooperation.
Author: Daniel Star
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199657882
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 1105
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Book Description
'The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity' contains 44 commissioned chapters on a wide range of topics, and will appeal to readers with an interest in ethics or epistemology. A diverse selection of substantive positions are defended by leading proponents of the views in question, and provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons as part of the study of ethics and as part of the study of epistemology (as well as focusing on reasons as part of the study of the philosophy of language and as part of the study of the philosophy of mind), the Handbook covers recent developments concerning the nature of normativity in general. A number of the contributions to the Handbook explicitly address such "metanormative" issues, bridging subfields as they do so. --
Author: Neil Sinclair
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107168791
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 297
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Book Description
Presents a definitive guide to the text, history and philosophy behind the most influential argument in the history of ethics.
Author: James M. Ambury
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1119746868
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 341
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Book Description
In the ancient world, philosophy was understood to be a practical guide for living, or even itself a way of life. This volume of essays brings historical views about philosophy as a way of life, coupled with their modern equivalents, more prevalently into the domain of the contemporary scholarly world. Illustrates how the articulation of philosophy as a way of life and its pedagogical implementation advances the love of wisdom Questions how we might convey the love of wisdom as not only a body of dogmatic principles and axiomatic truths but also a lived exercise that can be practiced Offers a collection of essays on an emerging field of philosophical research Essential reading for academics, researchers and scholars of philosophy, moral philosophy, and pedagogy; also business and professional people who have an interest in expanding their horizons
