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Author: Ning Gao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Ning Gao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Ning Gao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 252
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Author: Bin Wang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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In the first essay titled "Shareholder Coordination, Information Diffusion and Stock Returns", we show that the quality of information sharing networks linking firms' institutional investors has stock return predictability implications. First, we demonstrate that firms with high shareholder coordination experience less local comovement and less post earnings announcement drift, consistent with the notion that coordination improves firms' information environment. We then document that the stock return performance of firms with high shareholder coordination leads that of firms with low shareholder coordination, supporting the view that coordination acts as an information diffusion channel. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with the notion that the market does not readily recognize the superior quality of high shareholder coordination firms and prices it gradually through the trading of sophisticated institutional investors, thereby causing future returns to be positively associated with shareholder coordination. In the second essay titled "Shareholder Coordination and Stock Price Informativeness", we find that stock prices of firms with better information sharing networks linking institutional shareholders exhibit higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility. This positive relation between shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness is mainly driven by coordination among dedicated and independent institutions and exists even after accounting for endogeneity. We further show that institutional trading serves as an information diffusion channel that strengthens the relationship of shareholder coordination with price informativeness. Overall, our results indicate that a higher degree of shareholder coordination leads to more informative stock prices by encouraging the collection of and trading on private information.
Author: Yu-Hsin Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 120
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Author: Xiaorong Ma
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781360996561
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This dissertation, "Three Essays on Information Production and Monitoring Role of Institutional Investors" by Xiaorong, Ma, 马笑蓉, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: This thesis includes one essay about the information production of institutional investors and two essays about the monitoring role of institutional investors. The first essay empirically examines the association between investor base and information production in the context of stock splits. Using the proportion of 13F filers as the proxy for the size of investor base, we show that three proxies for stock price informativeness, adjusted probability of information-based trading (AdjPIN), price non-synchronicity and probability of information-based trading (PIN), decrease significantly due to enlarged investor base after stock splits. It suggests that institutional investors are less incentivized to gather firm specific information when firm''s investor base expands, which is consistent with the "risk sharing hypothesis," proposed by Peress (2010). Furthermore, we find that the change of the price informativeness around splits is negatively related to the magnitude of positive return drifts following splits. This result is consistent with the notion that less information incorporated in stock prices results in a sluggish response by the market to corporate event. The second essay empirically identifies an external corporate governance mechanism through which the institutional trading improves firm value and disciplines managers from conducting value-destroying behaviors. We propose a reward-punishment intensity (RPI) measure based on institutional investors'' absolute position changes, and find it is positively associated with firm''s subsequent Tobin''s Q. Importantly, we find that firms with higher RPI exhibit less subsequent empire building and earnings management. It suggests that the improved firm values can be attributed to the discipline effect of institutional trading on managers, which is in line with the argument of "Governance Through Trading." Furthermore, we find that the exogenous liquidity shock of decimalization augments the governance effect of institutional trading. We also find that the discipline effect is more pronounced for firms with lower institutional ownership concentration, higher stock liquidity, and higher managers'' wealth-performance sensitivity, which further supports the notion that institutional trading could exert discipline on a manager. The third essay focuses on a particular type of institutional investor, short sellers, and explores the discipline effect of short selling on managerial empire building. Employing short-selling data from 2002-2012, we find a significantly negative association between the lending supply in the short-selling market and the subsequent abnormal capital investment. Besides, we find a positively significant association between the lending supply and the mergers and acquisitions announcement returns of acquiring firms. These results suggest that the short-selling potential could deter managers from conducting over-investment and value-destroying acquisitions. In addition, the discipline effect is stronger for firms with higher managers'' wealth-performance-sensitivity, for firms with lower financial constraints, and for stock-financed acquisition deals. Finally, firms with higher lending supply also have higher Tobin''s Q in the subsequent year. These results indicate that short-selling is another important external governance force. DOI: 10.5353/th_b5066226 Subjects: Institutional i
Author: Haina Ding
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This dissertation contains three independent essays. The first two essays look at the informational role of stock prices and its impact on the real economy. The last one explores the relationship between managerial incentive and product market competition. In the first essay, two firms compete in a product market and have an opportunity to invest in a risky technology either early on as a leader or later once stock prices reveal the value of the technology. Information leakage thus introduces an option of waiting, which enhances production efficiency. A potential leader may nevertheless be discouraged from investing upfront, when anticipating its competitor to invest later in response to good news. I show that an increase in product market competition increases the option value of waiting but has an ambiguous effect on information production. It may thus be the case that intense competition leads to more leakage such that no firm would invest, especially so in a smaller market. Given a moderate level of competition, price informativeness may improve investment outcome when investment profitability and the market size are relatively large. The second essay examines the feedback effects of certifications in financial markets. A firm has to decide whether to monitor (or to ascertain) internally the prospect of a potential investment or to delegate this task to a certifier who reveals his evaluations to the outsiders. The investment decision is then taken based on all of the information available in the market. The information asymmetry between the firm and lenders is alleviated under delegation, and hence the firm enjoys a lower cost of capital at the financing stage. Delegation however reduces the information advantage of speculators who then make less effort to acquire information. This results in a potential information crowding-out effect. We show that the firm may prefer to delegate when the prior belief about the investment prospect is relatively high, and to choose in-house information production when its own signal is more precise and when its current assets in place generate a higher expected payoff. The third essay considers a spatial competition model with horizontal and vertical differentiation. Two firms are assigned to exogenous locations on a circular city. Consumers, distributed on the circle, need to pay a transportation cost for purchasing. Anticipating a future uncertainty in product quality, firms simultaneously offer incentive contracts to managers to induce an optimal effort level. I show that competition may adversely affects incentives, as a lower transportation cost impairs a firm's local market power and consequently reduces a firm's marginal benefit from producing a high quality product, particularly when its competitor also produces a high quality product. On the other hand, greater competition reduces a firm's profit if it fails to improve product quality. This effect increases the optimal effort level and becomes dominant if the quality improvement is relatively large compared to the effort cost. Moreover, a large decrease in the transportation cost may change the market structure, such that the firm with better quality goods attracts all the demand, and thus the positive effect of competition on managerial effort becomes more significant.
Author: Ke-Hsin Chou
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 146
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In the change rapidly trading market, informativeness has always been attention by investors and academics. As more and more investors engage the market and form more regularly highlight corporate governance, it takes the stock information, and investor sentiment invoked by news becomes more valuable to research. The first part, This research follows Roll (1988) to investigate whether existing stock price informativeness affects the debt rate and forms a supervision effect in the Taiwan stock market. According to Morck et al. (2000) study, Taiwan market rank prior three number in price synchronize; hence we use the sample of Taiwan market as context to test price information with debt rate for checking transparent price change and market efficiency. As a result, the result shows that more transparency and openness have positive significance in the market. In the second part, we directly use artificial intelligence to capture news from public internet websites for natural language processing and use Bitcoin as an underlying to prove the iii hypothesis of sequential information arrival and the hypothesis of mixed distribution. In short, the innovative contribution of this research is to use Text mining and Big data methods to obtain news article data, introduce Artificial intelligence model calculations and quantify news sentiment data to replace transaction volume. Therefore, this research can use actual news indicator data to discuss the relationship between it and the volatility of returns to compare the estimated feasibility of the two financial hypotheses (SIAH and MDH) in Bitcoin. This approach can make up for the lack of indicator data of the information field in the past research literature and provide investors, policymakers, and academia with greater enlightenment and the role of future research.
Author: Thomas Gehrig
Publisher:
ISBN: 9782854188400
Category : Investments
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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We show that a cross-listing allows a firm to make better investment decisions because it enhances stock price informativeness. This theory of cross-listings yields a rich set of new predictions. In particular, it implies that the sensitivity of investment to stock prices should be larger for cross-listed firms. Moreover, the increase in value generated by a cross-listing (the 'cross-listing premium') should be positively related to the size of growth opportunities and negatively related to the quality of managerial information. The sensitivity of the cross-listing premium to the size of growth opportunities increases when holdings and trading become more evenly distributed between foreign and domestic markets. Last, we show that concentration of trading in the home market ('flow-back') can indeed increase the cross-listing premium for some firms.
Author: Sung Hoon Cho
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 258
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 572
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