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Author: Anish Agarwal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The design of data markets has gained importance as firms increasingly use machine learning models fueled by externally acquired training data. A key consideration is the externalities firms face when data, though inherently freely replicable, is allocated to competing firms. In this setting, we demonstrate that a data seller's optimal revenue increases as firms can pay to prevent allocations to others. To do so, we first reduce the combinatorial problem of allocating and pricing multiple datasets to the auction of a single digital good by modeling utility for data through the increase in prediction accuracy it provides. We then derive welfare and revenue maximizing mechanisms, highlighting how the form of firms' private information- whether the externalities one exerts on others is known, or vice-versa- affects the resulting structures. In all cases, the optimal allocation rule is a single threshold per firm, where either all data is allocated or none is.
Author: Anish Agarwal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The design of data markets has gained importance as firms increasingly use machine learning models fueled by externally acquired training data. A key consideration is the externalities firms face when data, though inherently freely replicable, is allocated to competing firms. In this setting, we demonstrate that a data seller's optimal revenue increases as firms can pay to prevent allocations to others. To do so, we first reduce the combinatorial problem of allocating and pricing multiple datasets to the auction of a single digital good by modeling utility for data through the increase in prediction accuracy it provides. We then derive welfare and revenue maximizing mechanisms, highlighting how the form of firms' private information- whether the externalities one exerts on others is known, or vice-versa- affects the resulting structures. In all cases, the optimal allocation rule is a single threshold per firm, where either all data is allocated or none is.
Author: Maryann Z. Rui
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 86
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Book Description
Data is increasingly important for firms, regulators, and researchers to develop accurate models for decision-making. Since data sets often need to be externally acquired, a systematic way to value and trade data is necessary. Moreover, buyers of data often interact with each other downstream, such as firms competing in a market. In this setting, an allocation of data may not only benefit the buying firm, but also impose negative externalities on the firm’s competitors. The way data is allocated and sold should thus depend on the particulars of its downstream usage and the interaction between data buyers. We capture the problem of valuing and selling data sets to buyers who interact downstream within the general framework of auctions of digital, or freely replicable, goods. We study the resulting single-item and multi-item mechanism design problems in the presence of additively separable, negative allocative externalities among bidders. Two settings of bidders’ private types are considered, in which bidders either know the externalities that others exert on them or know the externalities that they exert on others. We obtain forms of the welfare-maximizing (efficient) and revenue-maximizing (optimal) auctions of single digital goods in both settings and highlight how the information structure affects the resulting mechanisms. We find that in all cases, the resulting allocation rules are deterministic single thresholding functions for each bidder. For auctions of multiple digital goods, we assume that bidders have independent, additive valuations over items and study the first setting of privately known incoming externalities. We show that the welfare-maximizing mechanism decomposes into multiple efficient single-item auctions using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Under revenue-maximization, we show that selling items separately via optimal single-item auctions yields a guaranteed fraction of the optimal multi-item auction revenue. This allows us to construct approximately revenue-maximizing multi-item mechanisms using the aforementioned optimal single-item mechanisms.
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Ki-eun Rhee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Book Description
Author: Björn Bartling
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
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Book Description
Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality-robustness, which addresses players' motives to affect other players' monetary payoffs. One example is externalities due to spite, which has been used to explain overbidding in second-price auctions. We show theoretically and experimentally that a trade-off exists between dominant-strategy implementation and externality-robust implementation. In particular, we derive the externality-robust counterpart of the second-price auction. Our experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average bids equal value in the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting that both dimensions of robustness are equally important. Our results are relevant for mechanism design in general, because the concept of externality-robustness is applicable to arbitrary mechanism design problems.
Author: Ioannis Giotis
Publisher: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing
ISBN: 9783838375847
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 96
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Book Description
Sponsored search has grown to be an important share of the advertisement market and a major income source for large Internet companies. Its success relies not only on the explosive Internet use but also on successful implementation that made it a highly efficient and profitable concept for advertisers and search engines, in particular, through the use of keyword auctions. Up until now, most of the research relies on the simplest game-theoretic models to extract useful results. We extend the most common models to encapsulate an aspect of the system that only recently has begun to draw attention; the effect of competing advertisements on the user's actions and subsequently on the advertisers' campaign efficiency. We present models that take these effects into account while remaining simple enough for us to answer the most basic game-theoretic questions about them such as the presence of equilibria and their efficiency. We also compare our models to the most common model and show their significant advantages. Finally, we discuss a proposed new mechanism that incorporates externalities and evaluate its performance.
Author: Peter C. Cramton
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 678
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Book Description
A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Artificial intelligence
Languages : en
Pages : 1620
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Book Description
Author: Wim Heijman
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540354840
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 343
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Book Description
This book offers practical and theoretical insights in regional externalities. Regional externalities are a specific subset of externalities that can be defined as externalities where space plays a dominant role. The book offers examples of this class of externalities that can be divided into three categories: (1) externalities related to mobility and transport; (2) external economies of scale and cluster effects, and (3) spatial environmental externalities.
Author: Jonathan Michie
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1135932263
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 2166
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Book Description
This 2-volume work includes approximately 1,200 entries in A-Z order, critically reviewing the literature on specific topics from abortion to world systems theory. In addition, nine major entries cover each of the major disciplines (political economy; management and business; human geography; politics; sociology; law; psychology; organizational behavior) and the history and development of the social sciences in a broader sense.
