Three Essays on Public Economics and Strategic Behavior PDF Download
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Author: António Freitas
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: António Freitas
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Bryan Douglas Caplan
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 306
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Author: Matthew Kim
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 138
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Author: Robert Laurent Scharff
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Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 258
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Author: Jeffrey Robert Traczynski
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 105
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Author: Jose Gabriel Castillo Garcia
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Languages : en
Pages :
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The three essays in this thesis foster the identification of unexpected influences of different institutional arrangements on economic outcomes. The first two essays, experimental in nature, analyze the impact of two different contexts within Public Goods Games (PGG) environments. The first essay documents exact replications of four classic experiments in PGG and cast unexpected results in contribution behavior. First, it shows how the attenuation effect in replication studies, well documented in other disciplines, is also pervasive in experimental economics. Not all previous findings replicate, and effects found in successful replications are much smaller. Second, it shows that experimental context matters; experimental subjects in Texas tend to contribute more and free ride less, across different experiments. The second essay analyzes whether democratic institutions have any impact on agency problems where group members face a centralized arrangement of sanctioning power. It offers novel evidence, although a weak effect, of the intrinsic incentives for pro-social behavior attached to legitimacy in democratic institutions to promote collective action and higher economic efficiency. Finally, the last essay offers an empirical alternative to unravel heterogeneous unobserved traits on credit market customers. Through the use of mixture density estimation methods and rich administrative data, it identifies different quality-types of clients for credit demand and default decisions. Credit customers differ in their individual preferences, as well as levels of foresight, strategic behavior; all unobserved by the principal (lender). Accounting for these unobserved traits improves the forecast of potential clients' behavior and offers alternatives for different contracts and risk-pricing strategies to reduce credit rationing. The electronic version of this dissertation is accessible from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/155533
Author: Anderson Luís Schneider
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 262
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Author: Ming-Sen Wang
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 134
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Author: Binzhen Wu
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 222
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Author: Martin Shubik
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262693110
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 472
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This first volume in a three-volume exposition of Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics" explores a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. This is the first volume in a three-volume exposition of Martin Shubik's vision of "mathematical institutional economics"--a term he coined in 1959 to describe the theoretical underpinnings needed for the construction of an economic dynamics. The goal is to develop a process-oriented theory of money and financial institutions that reconciles micro- and macroeconomics, using as a prime tool the theory of games in strategic and extensive form. The approach involves a search for minimal financial institutions that appear as a logical, technological, and institutional necessity, as part of the "rules of the game." Money and financial institutions are assumed to be the basic elements of the network that transmits the sociopolitical imperatives to the economy. Volume 1 deals with a one-period approach to economic exchange with money, debt, and bankruptcy. Volume 2 explores the new economic features that arise when we consider multi-period finite and infinite horizon economies. Volume 3 will consider the specific role of financial institutions and government, and formulate the economic financial control problem linking micro- and macroeconomics.
