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Author: Jungyoll T. Yun
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 92
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Author: Jungyoll T. Yun
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 92
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Author: Chaoli Guo
Publisher: Open Dissertation Press
ISBN: 9781361276532
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This dissertation, "Three Essays on Capital Market With Incomplete and Asymmetric Information" by Chaoli, Guo, 郭朝莉, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: This thesis includes one essay on incomplete information and two essays on the capital market implications of asymmetric information. The acquisition of information and its dissemination to all economic units are central activities in capital markets. Limits to information diffusion may exist when market participants have limited processing ability or when market structure causes information asymmetry to persist. Merton (1987) proposes a simple capital market equilibrium model with incomplete information, in which difference in a stock's investor recognition affects its cost of capital. Myers and Majluf (1984) lay out the theoretical foundation for the role of asymmetric information in corporate finance and its capital market implications. The first essay tests and offers support to Merton's (1987) theory. In the U.S. market, using the breadth of ownership among retail investors as a proxy for investor recognition, I show that a long-short portfolio based on the annual change of shareholder base earns a compounded annual abnormal return of 6.42% after controlling for the Fama-French three factors. These results are more pronounced among young, low visibility and high idiosyncratic volatility stocks. Moreover, I present evidence that the investor recognition effect can explain approximately 20% of the puzzling net equity issuance effect documented by Pontiff and Woodgate (2008). The second essay suggests a novel signaling mechanism in the framework of asymmetric information. When a firm's convertible debt is issued, it is not only determined by the fundamentals of the firm such as past stock performance, but also related to whether this performance is realized during the tenure of current CEO who decides the issues. I define the performance that the current CEO achieves in the firm ever since the CEO comes to the helm as CEO-specific performance. Higher CEOspecific performance leads to (1) a higher probability of convertible issues, and (2) a less negative abnormal stock return in response to the convertible issue announcement, controlling for other firm characteristics. These evidences indicate that CEO-specific performance serves as a credible information signal to influence the adverse selection costs between the firm and outside investors in convertible bond financing. The third essay explores the possibility of asymmetric information in explaining the pronounced share issue anomaly in the cross-sectional variations of stock returns, as documented by Pontiff and Woodgate (2008). A lot of equity share issue and repurchase actions are actively determined by the decision of corporate stakeholders, such as employees at the stock options exercises. As these stakeholders hold a large amount of private information about the firm, it is in their optimal decisions to try to time the exercise of their share purchase activity, but outside investors are likely to fail to interpret the information revealed from these actions. I present strong evidence that a negative relation between share issues and stock returns is affected to a greater extent when the information asymmetry problem is more severe. DOI: 10.5353/
Author: Günter Strobl
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 142
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Author: Tsvetanka Karagyozova
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 264
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Author: Tianxiang Ye
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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In the second essay, "Existence of Pure Strategy Bayesian Equilibrium in Uniform Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders", I prove that a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists and that equilibrium strategies are increasing.
Author: Uptal Bhattacharya
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 198
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Author: Basab Dasgupta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 282
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Author: György Venter
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This thesis contains three essays exploring the asset pricing implications of asymmetric information and trading constraints. Chapter 1 studies how short-sale constraints affect the informational efficiency of market prices and the link between prices and economic activity. I show that under short-sale constraints security prices contain less information. However, short-sale constraints increase the informativeness of prices to some agents who learn about the quality of an investment opportunity from market prices and have additional private information. This, in turn, can lead to higher allocative efficiency in the real economy. My result thus implies that the decrease in average informativeness due to short-sale constraints can be more than compensated by an increase in informativeness to some agents. In Chapter 2, I develop an equilibrium model of strategic arbitrage under wealth constraints. Arbitrageurs optimally invest into a fundamentally riskless arbitrage opportunity, but if their capital does not fully cover losses, they are forced to close their positions. Strategic arbitrageurs with price impact take this constraint into account and try to induce the fire sales of others by manipulating prices. I show that if traders have similar proportions of their capital invested in the arbitrage opportunity, they behave cooperatively. However, if the proportions are very different, the arbitrageur who is less invested predates on the other. The presence of other traders thus creates predatory risk, and arbitrageurs might be reluctant to take large positions in the arbitrage opportunity in the first place, leading to an initially slow convergence of prices. Chapter 3 (joint with Dömötör Pálvölgyi) studies the uniqueness of equilibrium in a textbook noisy rational expectations economy model a la Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). We provide a very simple proof to show that the unique linear equilibrium of their model is the unique equilibrium when allowing for any continuous price function, linear or not. We also provide an algorithm to create a (non-continuous) equilibrium price that is different from the Grossman-Stiglitz price.
Author: Nilson Teixeira
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 218
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Author: Kiyoung Lee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 374
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