Author: Graham S. Pearson
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN: 9781349521494
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 338
Book Description
This authoritative account explores the facts that lie behind the Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes in Iraq. Graham Pearson shows how these programmes were gradually uncovered through the efforts of UN specialist exerts, then by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC and finally by the Iraq Survey Group. The book analyses why there was no stockpile of chemical or biological weapons to be found in Iraq. Finally, it examines the lessons for inspection, verification and non-proliferation in the chemical and biological weapons prohibition regimes.
The Search For Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Author: Graham S. Pearson
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN: 9781349521494
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 338
Book Description
This authoritative account explores the facts that lie behind the Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes in Iraq. Graham Pearson shows how these programmes were gradually uncovered through the efforts of UN specialist exerts, then by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC and finally by the Iraq Survey Group. The book analyses why there was no stockpile of chemical or biological weapons to be found in Iraq. Finally, it examines the lessons for inspection, verification and non-proliferation in the chemical and biological weapons prohibition regimes.
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN: 9781349521494
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 338
Book Description
This authoritative account explores the facts that lie behind the Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes in Iraq. Graham Pearson shows how these programmes were gradually uncovered through the efforts of UN specialist exerts, then by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC and finally by the Iraq Survey Group. The book analyses why there was no stockpile of chemical or biological weapons to be found in Iraq. Finally, it examines the lessons for inspection, verification and non-proliferation in the chemical and biological weapons prohibition regimes.
Meeting Saddam's Men
Author: Ashton Robinson
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780369348753
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This book is Ashton Robinsonâe(tm)s unique eye-witness account of the ISGâe(tm)s operations in Iraq, based at Camp Slayer, in one of Saddam Husseinâe(tm)s former palaces The groupâe(tm)s task was to search for weapons of mass destruction or to account for them if they did not exist. But the ISG discovered so much more.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780369348753
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This book is Ashton Robinsonâe(tm)s unique eye-witness account of the ISGâe(tm)s operations in Iraq, based at Camp Slayer, in one of Saddam Husseinâe(tm)s former palaces The groupâe(tm)s task was to search for weapons of mass destruction or to account for them if they did not exist. But the ISG discovered so much more.
Disarming Iraq
Author: Hans Blix
Publisher: Pantheon
ISBN: 0375423230
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 362
Book Description
The war against Iraq divided opinion throughout the world and generated a maelstrom of spin and counterspin. The man at the eye of the storm, and arguably the only key player to emerge from it with his integrity intact, was Hans Blix, head of the UN weapons inspection team. This is Dr. Blix’s account of what really happened during the months leading up to the declaration of war in March 2003. In riveting descriptions of his meetings with Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Kofi Annan, he conveys the frustrations, the tensions, the pressure and the drama as the clock ticked toward the fateful hour. In the process, he asks the vital questions about the war: Was it inevitable? Why couldn’t the U.S. and UK get the backing of the other member states of the UN Security Council? Did Iraq have weapons of mass destruction? What does the situation in Iraq teach us about the propriety and efficacy of policies of preemptive attack and unilateral action? Free of the agendas of politicians and ideologues, Blix is the plainspoken, measured voice of reason in the cacophony of debate about Iraq. His assessment of what happened is invaluable in trying to understand both what brought us to the present state of affairs and what we can learn as we try to move toward peace and security in the world after Iraq.
Publisher: Pantheon
ISBN: 0375423230
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 362
Book Description
The war against Iraq divided opinion throughout the world and generated a maelstrom of spin and counterspin. The man at the eye of the storm, and arguably the only key player to emerge from it with his integrity intact, was Hans Blix, head of the UN weapons inspection team. This is Dr. Blix’s account of what really happened during the months leading up to the declaration of war in March 2003. In riveting descriptions of his meetings with Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Kofi Annan, he conveys the frustrations, the tensions, the pressure and the drama as the clock ticked toward the fateful hour. In the process, he asks the vital questions about the war: Was it inevitable? Why couldn’t the U.S. and UK get the backing of the other member states of the UN Security Council? Did Iraq have weapons of mass destruction? What does the situation in Iraq teach us about the propriety and efficacy of policies of preemptive attack and unilateral action? Free of the agendas of politicians and ideologues, Blix is the plainspoken, measured voice of reason in the cacophony of debate about Iraq. His assessment of what happened is invaluable in trying to understand both what brought us to the present state of affairs and what we can learn as we try to move toward peace and security in the world after Iraq.
Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arms control
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arms control
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Book Description
The Iraqi Threat and Saddam Hussein's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Author: Stephen E. Hughes
Publisher: Trafford Publishing
ISBN: 1553691636
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 528
Book Description
The Iraqi Military and its Weapons of Mass Destruction, Saddam Hussein and Bid Laden alliance.
Publisher: Trafford Publishing
ISBN: 1553691636
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 528
Book Description
The Iraqi Military and its Weapons of Mass Destruction, Saddam Hussein and Bid Laden alliance.
Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction
Author: Great Britain. Intelligence and Security Committee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
The report examines whether the available intelligence that informed the decision to invade Iraq was adequate and properly assessed, and whether it was accurately reflected in Government publications. The report covers several topics. (1) Assessments between 1990 and September 2002. The Committee accepts that there was convincing evidence that Iraq had active chemical, biological and nuclear programmes after 1990, all prohibited by United Nations Security Council resolutions, but there was no firm intelligence about the exact nature and extent of any weapons. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessment of 9 September 2002 is viewed as a balanced assessment of scenarios, but it does not highlight in the key judgements the uncertainties and gaps in the UK's knowledge about the chemical and biological weapons (CBW). (2) The 24 September 2002 dossier. The Committee has examined the drafts of the dossier. It finds that the final draft was toned down from an earlier one, that the JIC had not been subjected to political pressures, and that the dossier was not "sexed-up" by Alastair Campbell or anyone else. Text highlighting that Saddam was not considered a current or imminent threat to the UK mainland was not, the Committee regrets, included in the published document, nor was there a sufficiently balanced view of Saddam's chemical and biological capacity. The claim that WMDs could be ready for use in 45 minutes was not placed in context, and it should have been explained that this referred to battlefield chemical and biological munitions and their movement on the battlefield. The concerns about the dossier raised by some members of the Defence Intelligence Service were not communicated to the chairman of the JIC or the Defence Secretary: the Committee recommends that this should happen in future. (3) Assessments October 2002 to March 2003. Assessments whilst the UN inspectors were in Iraq were that Saddam was continuing to retain and conceal Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes, and that he would use CBW if attacked. The presence of the inspectors would have inhibited the programmes to some extent, but this was not reflected in the assessments, nor in the February 2003 dossier. (4) The February 2003 dossier. This was designed to present further evidence of Iraqi concealment, but as it contained information that was not assessed by the intelligence agencies, including an unattrributed research article, it attracted publicity that detracted from the purpose of the dossier. (5) Annexes. The report also contains two annexes: a briefing note on the influence of the Iraqi intelligence and security services; and the Committee's comments on the Foreign Affairs Committee report (HCP 813-I, session 2002-02, ISBN 0215011627)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
The report examines whether the available intelligence that informed the decision to invade Iraq was adequate and properly assessed, and whether it was accurately reflected in Government publications. The report covers several topics. (1) Assessments between 1990 and September 2002. The Committee accepts that there was convincing evidence that Iraq had active chemical, biological and nuclear programmes after 1990, all prohibited by United Nations Security Council resolutions, but there was no firm intelligence about the exact nature and extent of any weapons. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessment of 9 September 2002 is viewed as a balanced assessment of scenarios, but it does not highlight in the key judgements the uncertainties and gaps in the UK's knowledge about the chemical and biological weapons (CBW). (2) The 24 September 2002 dossier. The Committee has examined the drafts of the dossier. It finds that the final draft was toned down from an earlier one, that the JIC had not been subjected to political pressures, and that the dossier was not "sexed-up" by Alastair Campbell or anyone else. Text highlighting that Saddam was not considered a current or imminent threat to the UK mainland was not, the Committee regrets, included in the published document, nor was there a sufficiently balanced view of Saddam's chemical and biological capacity. The claim that WMDs could be ready for use in 45 minutes was not placed in context, and it should have been explained that this referred to battlefield chemical and biological munitions and their movement on the battlefield. The concerns about the dossier raised by some members of the Defence Intelligence Service were not communicated to the chairman of the JIC or the Defence Secretary: the Committee recommends that this should happen in future. (3) Assessments October 2002 to March 2003. Assessments whilst the UN inspectors were in Iraq were that Saddam was continuing to retain and conceal Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes, and that he would use CBW if attacked. The presence of the inspectors would have inhibited the programmes to some extent, but this was not reflected in the assessments, nor in the February 2003 dossier. (4) The February 2003 dossier. This was designed to present further evidence of Iraqi concealment, but as it contained information that was not assessed by the intelligence agencies, including an unattrributed research article, it attracted publicity that detracted from the purpose of the dossier. (5) Annexes. The report also contains two annexes: a briefing note on the influence of the Iraqi intelligence and security services; and the Committee's comments on the Foreign Affairs Committee report (HCP 813-I, session 2002-02, ISBN 0215011627)
Frontier Justice
Author: Scott Ritter
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781893956476
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 228
Book Description
"Former U.N. weapons inspector Scott Ritter analyzes the overall strategy of the Bush presidency - national security through global domination - and the "Big Lie" he used to sell his brand of frontier justice to the world."--BOOK JACKET.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781893956476
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 228
Book Description
"Former U.N. weapons inspector Scott Ritter analyzes the overall strategy of the Bush presidency - national security through global domination - and the "Big Lie" he used to sell his brand of frontier justice to the world."--BOOK JACKET.
The WMD Mirage
Author: Craig Whitney
Publisher: PublicAffairs
ISBN: 9781586483616
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 704
Book Description
Features the official report from the bipartisan Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction--named by President Bush to try to prevent similar policy debacles in Iran and North Korea. It also includes the official speeches, United Nations reports, and declassified government investigation reports that show, step by step, how the United States got the crucial question of arms in Iraq so terribly wrong. The documents show that: The CIA concluded in 2002 that Iraq had reconstituted its WMD programs, but in fact Saddam had dismantled them; American policymakers consistently assumed the worst case: regardless of his denials, if there was intelligence that Saddam might be making weapons of mass destruction then he had them and was hiding them. UN inspectors, by contrast, assumed that thorough inspection and insistence on complete Iraqi documentation could determine what the truth was; UN inspectors were frustrated by Saddam's refusal to cooperate freely and thwarted by American military impatience just as they thought themselves on the verge of success; American inspectors sent in after the war in 2003 found no weapons of mass destruction and how they--and Washington insiders--began to question the basis of the prewar intelligence. The New York Times editor and contributor to The 9/11 Investigations (PublicAffairs, 2004) Craig R. Whitney has scoured the documents surrounding the search for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. In The WMD Mirage, he has assembled the most revelatory and pertinent of these. The result is a startling narrative trail that leads readers through the intelligence and misinformation leading into Iraq--and a telling portrait of how the Bush administration, whether deliberately or unintentionally, with scant evidence and largely against the will of the international community, convinced the American people and their few allies of the urgent need for war. A must-read for scholars, voters, and anyone interested in the goings-on in Iraq, the growing threats perceived elsewhere, and the truth behind our frayed international reputation, The WMD Mirage offers the real story of the missing weapons of mass destruction. In offering such a clear-eyed and documented picture of how we got it wrong in Iraq, The WMD Mirage is the first widely-available book that also includes the new conclusions of the Presidential Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.
Publisher: PublicAffairs
ISBN: 9781586483616
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 704
Book Description
Features the official report from the bipartisan Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction--named by President Bush to try to prevent similar policy debacles in Iran and North Korea. It also includes the official speeches, United Nations reports, and declassified government investigation reports that show, step by step, how the United States got the crucial question of arms in Iraq so terribly wrong. The documents show that: The CIA concluded in 2002 that Iraq had reconstituted its WMD programs, but in fact Saddam had dismantled them; American policymakers consistently assumed the worst case: regardless of his denials, if there was intelligence that Saddam might be making weapons of mass destruction then he had them and was hiding them. UN inspectors, by contrast, assumed that thorough inspection and insistence on complete Iraqi documentation could determine what the truth was; UN inspectors were frustrated by Saddam's refusal to cooperate freely and thwarted by American military impatience just as they thought themselves on the verge of success; American inspectors sent in after the war in 2003 found no weapons of mass destruction and how they--and Washington insiders--began to question the basis of the prewar intelligence. The New York Times editor and contributor to The 9/11 Investigations (PublicAffairs, 2004) Craig R. Whitney has scoured the documents surrounding the search for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. In The WMD Mirage, he has assembled the most revelatory and pertinent of these. The result is a startling narrative trail that leads readers through the intelligence and misinformation leading into Iraq--and a telling portrait of how the Bush administration, whether deliberately or unintentionally, with scant evidence and largely against the will of the international community, convinced the American people and their few allies of the urgent need for war. A must-read for scholars, voters, and anyone interested in the goings-on in Iraq, the growing threats perceived elsewhere, and the truth behind our frayed international reputation, The WMD Mirage offers the real story of the missing weapons of mass destruction. In offering such a clear-eyed and documented picture of how we got it wrong in Iraq, The WMD Mirage is the first widely-available book that also includes the new conclusions of the Presidential Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Author: Joseph M. Siracusa
Publisher: Weapons of Mass Destruction and Emerging Technologies
ISBN: 9781442242371
Category : Nuclear arms control
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This foundational primer offers a comprehensive analysis of the evolution and current status of weapons of mass destruction and seeks to inform and advance policy debate in ways that support international security, while also adding important connective tissue between analytical areas in the IR and historical domains that often remain separate.
Publisher: Weapons of Mass Destruction and Emerging Technologies
ISBN: 9781442242371
Category : Nuclear arms control
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This foundational primer offers a comprehensive analysis of the evolution and current status of weapons of mass destruction and seeks to inform and advance policy debate in ways that support international security, while also adding important connective tissue between analytical areas in the IR and historical domains that often remain separate.
Chilcot Report
Author: Sir John Chilcot (chairman)
Publisher: Canbury Press
ISBN: 099549780X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 220
Book Description
All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled: Saddam Hussein's threat to Britainthe legal advice for the invasionintelligence about weapons of mass destruction andplanning for a post-conflict Iraq. This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016. Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books: 'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.' Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million. The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document. Contents Introduction Pre-conflict strategy and planning The UK decision to support US military action Why Iraq? Why now? The UK's relationship with the US Decision-making Advice on the legal basis for military action Weapons of mass destruction Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq The post-conflict period Occupation Transition Planning for withdrawal Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? Key findings Lessons Timeline of events REVIEWS The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons. It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate. — Philippe Sands, London Review of Books A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft. Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times. — Derek B. Miller, The Guardian Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort... — Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or conflict.
Publisher: Canbury Press
ISBN: 099549780X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 220
Book Description
All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled: Saddam Hussein's threat to Britainthe legal advice for the invasionintelligence about weapons of mass destruction andplanning for a post-conflict Iraq. This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016. Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books: 'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.' Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million. The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document. Contents Introduction Pre-conflict strategy and planning The UK decision to support US military action Why Iraq? Why now? The UK's relationship with the US Decision-making Advice on the legal basis for military action Weapons of mass destruction Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq The post-conflict period Occupation Transition Planning for withdrawal Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? Key findings Lessons Timeline of events REVIEWS The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons. It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate. — Philippe Sands, London Review of Books A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft. Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times. — Derek B. Miller, The Guardian Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort... — Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or conflict.