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Author: Rohaida Basiruddin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auditing
Languages : en
Pages : 302
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Book Description
This thesis examines two empirical studies. Firstly, it examines the relationship between corporate governance characteristics (relating to the size, composition of independent members, financial expertise and meeting frequency of boards of directors and audit committee) and audit quality. Secondly, the study investigates the effectiveness of corporate governance characteristics and higher quality auditors in constraining earnings management. There are three proxies of audit quality employed: audit fees, non-audit fees and industry specialist auditors. Based on data obtained from the FTSE 350 between 2005 and 2008, the first empirical findings suggest that independent non-executive directors on board demand an additional and extensive audit effort from the auditor in order to certify their monitoring function, resulting in an increase in the audit fees and the perceived audit quality. The results also indicate a positive relationship between independent board and non-audit fees, suggesting that independent board support the view that the joint provision of audit and non-audit services does not necessarily compromise auditor independence, but rather that it broadens the auditors? knowledge and improves audit judgement. The findings from the second empirical study suggest that higher quality auditors (which either charge higher audit fees or are industry specialist auditors) are likely to reduce earnings manipulation. However, no evidence suggests that NAS fees affect earnings management. In addition, the current study finds inconsistent results linking the corporate governance characteristics and opportunistic earnings. Overall, both findings are consistent with agency theory, which states that independent board and higher quality auditors are associated with effective monitoring, which in turn helps to improve the quality of financial reporting. The findings are of potential interest to policy makers, professionals and boards of directors, especially on issues relating to audit quality and the mandating of corporate governance practices.
Author: Rohaida Basiruddin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auditing
Languages : en
Pages : 302
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Book Description
This thesis examines two empirical studies. Firstly, it examines the relationship between corporate governance characteristics (relating to the size, composition of independent members, financial expertise and meeting frequency of boards of directors and audit committee) and audit quality. Secondly, the study investigates the effectiveness of corporate governance characteristics and higher quality auditors in constraining earnings management. There are three proxies of audit quality employed: audit fees, non-audit fees and industry specialist auditors. Based on data obtained from the FTSE 350 between 2005 and 2008, the first empirical findings suggest that independent non-executive directors on board demand an additional and extensive audit effort from the auditor in order to certify their monitoring function, resulting in an increase in the audit fees and the perceived audit quality. The results also indicate a positive relationship between independent board and non-audit fees, suggesting that independent board support the view that the joint provision of audit and non-audit services does not necessarily compromise auditor independence, but rather that it broadens the auditors? knowledge and improves audit judgement. The findings from the second empirical study suggest that higher quality auditors (which either charge higher audit fees or are industry specialist auditors) are likely to reduce earnings manipulation. However, no evidence suggests that NAS fees affect earnings management. In addition, the current study finds inconsistent results linking the corporate governance characteristics and opportunistic earnings. Overall, both findings are consistent with agency theory, which states that independent board and higher quality auditors are associated with effective monitoring, which in turn helps to improve the quality of financial reporting. The findings are of potential interest to policy makers, professionals and boards of directors, especially on issues relating to audit quality and the mandating of corporate governance practices.
Author: Rohaida Basiruddin
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783846513262
Category :
Languages : de
Pages : 272
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Book Description
Author: Johanna Miettinen
Publisher: University of Vaasa
ISBN: 9524762447
Category : Audit committees
Languages : en
Pages : 169
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Book Description
Tiivistelmä: Tilintarkastuksen laadun vaikutus tarkastusvaliokunnan tehokkuuden ja taloudellisen tiedon laadun väliseen suhteeseen.
Author: Vieira, Elisabete S.
Publisher: IGI Global
ISBN: 1799875989
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 433
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Book Description
New trends are emerging regarding earnings management and corporate governance showing similarities and striking differences in the practices of different countries and economies. These new trends currently shape the field of modern corporate governance with crucial issues being looked at in governance law and practices, accounting systems, earnings quality and management, stakeholder involvement, and more. In order to advance these new avenues in corporate governance, research looks at accounting policies firms use in different opportunistic circumstances in order to manage earnings, the corporate governance practices in different countries, firm performance, and other dimensions of companies. The understanding of these topics is beneficial in understanding the current state of different types of firms and their practices in modern times. Comparative Research on Earnings Management, Corporate Governance, and Economic Value is focused on the investigation of key challenges and perspectives of corporate governance and earnings management and outlines possible scenarios of its development. The chapters explore this new avenue of research and cover theoretical, empirical, and experimental studies related to different themes in the global context of earnings management and corporate governance. This book is ideal for economists, businesses, managers, accountants, practitioners, stakeholders, researchers, academicians, and students who are interested in the current issues and advancements in corporate governance and earnings management.
Author: Sonda Marrakchi Chtourou
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35
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Book Description
This study investigates whether a firm's corporate governance practices have an effect on the quality of its publicly released financial information. In particular, we examine the relationship between audit committee and board of directors characteristics and the extent of corporate earnings management as measured by the level of positive and negative discretionary accruals. Using two groups of US firms, one with relatively high and one with relatively low levels of discretionary accruals in the year 1996, we find that earnings management is significantly associated with some of the governance practices by audit committees and boards of directors. For audit committees, income increasing earnings management is negatively associated with a larger proportion of outside members who are not managers in other firms, a clear mandate for overseeing both the financial statements and the external audit, and a committee composed only of independent directors that meets more than twice a year. We also find that short-term stocks options held by non-executive committee members are associated with income increasing earnings management. Income decreasing earnings management is negatively associated with the presence of at least a member with financial expertise and a clear mandate for overseeing both the financial statements and the external audit.For the board of directors, we find less income increasing earnings management in firms whose outside board members have experience as board members with the firm and with other firms. We also find that larger board, the importance of the ownership stakes in the firm held by non-executive directors, and experience as board members seems to reduce income decreasing earnings management.Our results provide evidence that effective boards and audit committees constrain earnings management activities. These findings have implications for regulators, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as they attempt to supervise firms whose financial reporting is in the gray area between legitimacy and outright fraud and where earnings statements reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying financial performance of the company, as pointed out by the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999).
Author: Harry DeAngelo
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601982046
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 215
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Book Description
Corporate Payout Policy synthesizes the academic research on payout policy and explains "how much, when, and how". That is (i) the overall value of payouts over the life of the enterprise, (ii) the time profile of a firm's payouts across periods, and (iii) the form of those payouts. The authors conclude that today's theory does a good job of explaining the general features of corporate payout policies, but some important gaps remain. So while our emphasis is to clarify "what we know" about payout policy, the authors also identify a number of interesting unresolved questions for future research. Corporate Payout Policy discusses potential influences on corporate payout policy including managerial use of payouts to signal future earnings to outside investors, individuals' behavioral biases that lead to sentiment-based demands for distributions, the desire of large block stockholders to maintain corporate control, and personal tax incentives to defer payouts. The authors highlight four important "carry-away" points: the literature's focus on whether repurchases will (or should) drive out dividends is misplaced because it implicitly assumes that a single payout vehicle is optimal; extant empirical evidence is strongly incompatible with the notion that the primary purpose of dividends is to signal managers' views of future earnings to outside investors; over-confidence on the part of managers is potentially a first-order determinant of payout policy because it induces them to over-retain resources to invest in dubious projects and so behavioral biases may, in fact, turn out to be more important than agency costs in explaining why investors pressure firms to accelerate payouts; the influence of controlling stockholders on payout policy --- particularly in non-U.S. firms, where controlling stockholders are common --- is a promising area for future research. Corporate Payout Policy is required reading for both researchers and practitioners interested in understanding this central topic in corporate finance and governance.
Author: Ademola Akinteye
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 334607871X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 862
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Book Description
Doctoral Thesis / Dissertation from the year 2015 in the subject Business economics - Investment and Finance, grade: Great Distinction, UGSM-Monarch Business School Switzerland (Accounting and Finance), course: Doctor of Philosophy in Finance, language: English, abstract: The dissertation examined Earnings Management and Corporate Governance Governance Practices of the firms that are listed on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The researcher investigated the published financial statements of all the listed companies across all the sectors of the exchange using empirical quantitative research methods. Al the variables of earnings management were extracted from the published annual financial statements and Directors Annual Reports through Content Analysis. The paper further explored all the variables of corporate governance as published by the Directors in the Annual Reports in the Financial Statements and through a face to face recorded interviews of the members of the Board of Directors, the members of the Audit Committees and the Heads of Internal Audit Functions in the Listed Public Companies. The study documented that companies that are listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange are involved in both the upward and downward earnings management practices. This findings cut across all the Sectors and categorization of the companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The research thus recommended the need for better oversight by the Board of Directors, the Audit Committee and the Market Regulators mainly the Security and Exchange Commission and the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The findings of the Research on Corporate Governance is mixed. In certain sectors, evidence of strong corporate governance are documented as reflected in the quality of Board Members, the Quality of the deliberations at the Board meetings, the independence of the Board, the independence of the Audit Committee and the independence and effectiveness of the Head of the Internal Audit function measured by the reporting line of the holder of this role. In some sectors, the ingredients of strong corporate governance were missing thus suggesting a need for a more stricter regime of corporate governance to be implemented in these corporations.
Author:
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 366846748X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2017 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, grade: 1,3, , language: English, abstract: This paper studies the relation between audit and earnings quality. It examines whether firms audited by a Big 4 member engage in higher earnings management activities as proxied by the magnitude of discretionary and absolute accruals, as well as an income smoothing measure. The author predicts that large auditors have higher competencies and incentives to deliver a higher quality audit. Therefore, their clients are expected to reveal less sophisticated earnings management and thus higher earnings quality. The results do not support this relation. Since standardsetters have been concerned about managers’ use of discretion to manage earnings in their financial reports, an increasing amount of empirical research was conducted to address this issue, additionally to regulation. While independent auditors (aim to) assure that these statements are in accordance with legal compliance, the actual audit quality can be grasped as the contingency that the auditor exposes and discloses an anomaly in their clients’ financial reports. Whereas numerous audit scandals threaten the trustworthiness of well-known large auditors, there is various research revealing that Big N audited firms are supposed to disclose financial reports of higher quality. Supplementing misguiding accrual accounting practices in this regard, this study also addresses another proxy for earnings management: income smoothing. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) explain corporate income smoothing with the fact that managers avoid revealing earning decreases and losses to diminish costs arising from transactions with stakeholders. Similarly, Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) show that managers smooth earnings to meet analysts’ forecasts. On the other hand there are various contrary studies. DeFond and Jimbalvo (1993) found that auditor-client disagreements resulting from earnings management, are more present in Big 4 audited firms. They explain this with the properties of the “common” Big 4 clients. For the reason of the ambiguous results, it is interesting to study the effects and compare them with prior evidence to answer the question whether Big 4 auditors deliver “higher” quality in terms of a “better” financial reporting. The terms are operationalized using a dis-cretionary accruals and income smoothing measure and analyzed for (non-)Big 4 audited UK-firms in the period 2005-2011.
Author: Murya Habbash
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Earnings management
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Agency theory predicts that corporate governance and external audit enhance the convergence of interests between shareholders and managers. The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate the effect of corporate governance and external audit on constraining earnings management practice in the UK. In this thesis, earnings management is measured using the magnitude of discretionary accruals as estimated by the performance matched discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 2005) model. A review of the corporate governance literature reveals sixteen attributes that can impact on shareholders? perception of earnings quality due to their role in enhancing financial reporting integrity. The corporate governance attributes are organized in four categories: 1) Board Composition; 2) Audit Committee Effectiveness; 3) Non-Executive Directors? (NEDs) Commitment; and 4) Ownership Structures. The external audit factors include auditor independence and audit quality. Two models are constructed and a set of hypotheses are stated. These models are tested using a sample consisting of the top 350 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. Firms in the financial, mining and regulated industries are excluded due to different accrual choices and valuation processes. The study covers the period of four financial years (2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006). Nineteen hypotheses are derived from both models. These hypotheses are tested using univariate and multivariate techniques to determine if corporate governance attributes and external auditor factors significantly constrain discretionary accruals. The results reveal that board size and independence, audit committee independence and expertise, nomination committee independence, chairman independence, the level of NED fees and an independent and specialised external auditor are negatively associated with earnings management at significant levels. The primary contribution to knowledge of this research is its extension of the literature on the role of corporate governance and the external auditor in constraining earnings management practice in the UK. This study?s results are useable by stock market participants in their evaluation of corporate governance and the role of the external auditor in enhancing earnings quality. The findings will also assist regulators in defining effective corporate governance attributes and assessing the disclosure of corporate governance practices.
Author: Brenda Porter
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 0470974451
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 905
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Book Description
Principles of External Auditing has become established as one of the leading textbooks for students studying auditing. Striking a careful balance between theory and practice, the book describes and explains, in non-technical language, the nature of the audit function and the principles of the audit process. The book covers international auditing and accounting standards and relevant statute and case law. It explains the fundamental concepts of auditing and takes the reader through the various stages of the audit process. It also discusses topical aspects of auditing such as legal liability, audit risk, quality control, and the impact of information technology. Brenda Porter is currently visiting Professor at Exeter University and Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.
