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Author: Helmut Meister
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642502784
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 127
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Book Description
The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.
Author: Helmut Meister
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642502784
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 127
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Book Description
The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.
Author: Ulrich Schwalbe
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642584772
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 151
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Book Description
and should therefore constitute a part of every area of economic 3 theory. The spectrum covered by information economics today ranges from Stigler's search theory4 to industrial economics, including oligopoly theory, innovation, as well as research and develop 5 ment. However, the area information economics is most closely connected with is the theory of optimal contracts, mainly ana 6 lyzed in principal-agent models. Contract theory deals primar ily with the question of how optimal arrangements (contracts) for the purchase and sale of commodities and services between two or more agents should be structured. In these models, it is often assumed that the parties to the contract are informed differently or asymmetrically about relevant variables (e. g. the health of one party in the case of insurance contracts, or the effort in relation to employment contracts). As a result of this asymmetric in formation, phenomena such as moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and screening may arise. Frequently, results from con tract theory are referred to when making statements about the effects of asymmetric information on an economy. Models of this kind are often used to explain phenomena such as fixed wages or unemployment, among others. 7 However, such conclusions must be treated with caution for two reasons. In the first place, in these models, a contract (explicit or implicit) is determined by the solution of an optimization prob lem.
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011549
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 806
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Book Description
Robert Aumann's career in game theory has spanned over research - from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. When you look closely at one scientific idea, writes Aumann, you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I have tried to study.
Author: Michel Thera
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642457800
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 281
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Book Description
This book presents recent developments in the field of ill-posed variational problems and variational inequalities, covering a large range of theoretical, numerical and practical aspects. The main topics are: - Regularization techniques for equilibrium and fixed point problems, variational inequalities and complementary problems, - Links between approximation, penalization and regularization, - Bundle methods, nonsmooth optimization and regularization, - Error Bounds for regularized optimization problems.
Author: Leo Kaas
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9783540660293
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 182
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Book Description
This thesis was stimulated throughout the time of my participation in a research project on Dynamic Macroeconomics, supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The starting point was the central question of how to integrate price setting firms in a dynamic disequilibrium model. Almost all recent literature on imperfect competition in macroeconomics applies the objective demand approach by assuming that firms know the true demand curve they are faced with. While this approach can be ap plied in temporary monetary equilibrium models, it proves inadequate for formulating price adjustment in a dynamic disequilibrium model, where it has to be replaced by the concept of subjective demand. Based on this distinction, the thesis starts out with a comparison of the concepts of subjective and objective demand in an abstract framework and surveys the literature on general equilibrium theory with imperfect competition. The objective demand approach is criticized not only on the grounds of its strong rationality requirements and existence problems, but also by the observation that it cannot be applied successfully to characterize determinate rational expectations equilibria in intertemporal macroeco nomics. Finally, price setting firms using subjective demand functions are integrated in a dynamic disequilibrium model in order to study mo nopolistic and oligopolistic price adjustment.
Author: Pier C. Nicola
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642483992
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 176
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Book Description
Economic theory of the last fifty years has been dominated by the paradigm of General Equilibrium Theory, based on the scientific work of Walras-Pareto-Cassel-Wald-Hicks-Arrow-De breu-McKenzie. Some of its grounding assumptions are: all prices are fully flexible; an auctioneer appropriately manipulates all prices according to the law of supply and demand; every con sumer has only one budget constraint; all agents are perfectly informed; no actions are taken by agents before a vector of prices has been found such that all markets clear. Indeed, when all markets clear every agent can implement her/his chosen (opti mal) action and nobody is urged to change his/her decisions. Under these assumptions it is generally said that in a (one pe riod, competitive) general equilibrium model there is no place for money. The present monograph takes general equilibrium as the ba sis on which to build the model presented. But its first aim is to completely dispense with the Walrasian auctioneer by giving firms the task of choosing their output price~ period after period.
Author: Alexandre Ziegler
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3662215896
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 154
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Book Description
Modem option pricing theory was developed in the late sixties and early seventies by F. Black, R. C. Merton and M. Scholes as an analytical tool for pricing and hedging option contracts and over-the-counter warrants. However, already in the seminal paper by Black and Scholes, the applicability of the model was regarded as much broader. In the second part of their paper, the authors demonstrated that a levered firm's equity can be regarded as an option on the value of the firm, and thus can be priced by option valuation techniques. A year later, Merton showed how the default risk structure of corporate bonds can be determined by option pricing techniques. Option pricing models are now used to price virtually the full range of financial instruments and financial guarantees such as deposit insurance and collateral, and to quantify the associated risks. Over the years, option pricing has evolved from a set of specific models to a general analytical framework for analyzing the production process of financial contracts and their function in the financial intermediation process in a continuous time framework. However, virtually no attempt has been made in the literature to integrate game theory aspects, i. e. strategic financial decisions of the agents, into the continuous time framework. This is the unique contribution of the thesis of Dr. Alexandre Ziegler. Benefiting from the analytical tractability of continuous time models and the closed form valuation models for derivatives, Dr.
Author: Werner Güth
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642483674
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 211
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Book Description
This book develops a general solution concept for strategic games which resolves strategic uncertainty completely. The concept is described by a mathematically formulated solution procedure and illustrated by applying it to many interesting examples. A long nontechnical introduction tries to survey and to discuss the more technical parts of the book. The book and especially the introduction provide firm and consistent guidance for scholars of game theory. There are many open problems which could inspire further research efforts.
Author: Immanuel M. Bomze
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 364245660X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 152
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Book Description
These Lecture Notes arose from discussions we had over a working paper written by the first author in fall 1987. We decided then to write a short paper about the basic structure of evolutionary stability and found ourselves ending up with a book manuscript. Parts of the material contained herein were presented in a seminar at the Department of Mathematics at the University of Vienna, as well as at a workshop on evolutionary game theory in Bielefeld. The final version of the manuscript has certainly benefitted from critical comments and suggestions by the participants of both the seminar and the workshop. Thanks are also due to S. Bomze-de Barba, R. Burger, G. Danninger, J. Hofbauer, R. Selten, K. Sigmund, G. Stiastny and F. Weising. The co-operation of W. Muller from Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, is gratefully acknowledged. Vienna, November 1988 Immanuel M. Bomze Benedikt M. Potscher III Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Strategies and payoffs 5 2. 1. A general setting for evolutionary game theory 6 2. 2. Mixed strategies and population games 8 2. 3. Finite number of strategies . . . . . 13 2. 4. Infinitely many (pure) strategies 15 2. 5. Structured populations: asymmetric contests and multitype games 17 2. 6. Additional remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. Evolutionary stability 25 3. 1. Definition of evolutionary stability 25 3. 2. Evolutionary stability and solution concepts in classical game theory 30 3. 3. Conditions for evolutionary stability based on the normal cone 31 3. 4.
Author: Leopold von Thadden
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642585566
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 203
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Book Description
This book is a slightly revised version of my doctoral thesis which I wrote during my time as an assistant at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Magdeburg. I am grateful that I had the opportunity to write my the sis in the stimulating atmosphere of this young and lively faculty. lowe a great amount of gratitude to my supervisor Prof. G. Schwodiauer who con stantly encouraged my work and helped to improve it in many discussions. I also would like to thank Prof. K-H. Paque and Prof. P. Flaschel who, as members of my doctoral committee, commented on various details of this study in a very constructive manner. At various stages of my work I received helpful comments from many colleagues of mine, in particular T. Konig and A. Wohrmann. However, it goes without saying that I retain full responsi bility for all remaining errors. Contents Introduction 1 I Money, inflation, and capital formation in the long run: general remarks 5 1 Summary of the literature: theoretical aspects 7 2 Summary of the literature: empirical aspects 19 3 Further reflections on money 29 II Money, inflation, and capital formation: the perspective of overlapping generations models 43 4 The Diamond model with money as single outside asset 45 4. 1 The model. . . . . . . . 46 4. 2 Equilibrium conditions. 51 4. 3 Policy effects 58 4. 4 Discussion. 61 4. 5 Appendix . 63 5 Variation 1: Imperfect credit markets and asymmetric information 65 5. 1 The model. . . . . . . .
