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Author: Jeffery Dorwart
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1591146194
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 539
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Book Description
This is the history of the founding in 1882 and operation through two world wars of America's first permanent intelligence agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence. In this study Dr. Jeffery M. Dorwart shows how and why a tiny late 19th century U.S. Navy bureau created to collect information about foreign warship design became during two world wars a complex and sometimes troubled domestic and worldwide intelligence agency. More significantly, this history of O.N.I. demonstrates how the founders and first generations of U.S. naval officers trained to man warships at sea confronted what seemed an inherent dilemma in new missions that interfered with providing technical and operational information to their navy. Dorwart explains the forces that created this dilemma and how ONI officers responded in different ways to their intelligence mission. This history recounts how from the very beginning ONI duty during the last decades of the 19th century seemed conflicting. Some found the new assignment very rewarding in collecting and collating data for the U.S. to build a "New Navy" of steel and steam-powered warships armed with the latest rifled ordnance. But other naval officers saw assignment to this tiny office as a monotonous dead-end assignment endangering their careers as shipboard operators. Dorwart shows how the first and second world wars and interwar period dramatically accelerated the naval intelligence office's dilemma. The threats in both oceans from powerful enemy navies equipped with the latest technology and weaponry gave an urgency to the collection of information on the strategies, warships, submarines, and aircraft development of potential and actual naval enemies. But at the same time ONI was asked to provide information of possible domestic threats from suspected enemy spies, terrorists, saboteurs or anti-war opponents. This led ONI officers to wiretap, break and enter, pursue surveillance of all types of people from foreign agents to Americans suspected of opposition to strengthening the U.S. Navy or becoming involved in world wars. This history explains that many ONI directors and officers were highly motivated to collect as much information as possible about the naval-military capabilities and strategies of Germany, Italy, Japan, and even allies. ONI officers understood that code-breaking was part of their job as well. But this all led some to become deeply involved in domestic spying, wiretapping, breaking and entering on private property. These extralegal and at times illegal operations, Dorwart argues, confused some ONI officers, leading to too much information that clouded vital intelligence such as Japanese plans to attack American naval bases. In the end, this study demonstrates the dilemma confronted between 1882 and 1945 by dedicated U.S. naval officers attached to or collecting information worldwide for the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Author: Jeffery Dorwart
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1591146194
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 539
Get Book Here
Book Description
This is the history of the founding in 1882 and operation through two world wars of America's first permanent intelligence agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence. In this study Dr. Jeffery M. Dorwart shows how and why a tiny late 19th century U.S. Navy bureau created to collect information about foreign warship design became during two world wars a complex and sometimes troubled domestic and worldwide intelligence agency. More significantly, this history of O.N.I. demonstrates how the founders and first generations of U.S. naval officers trained to man warships at sea confronted what seemed an inherent dilemma in new missions that interfered with providing technical and operational information to their navy. Dorwart explains the forces that created this dilemma and how ONI officers responded in different ways to their intelligence mission. This history recounts how from the very beginning ONI duty during the last decades of the 19th century seemed conflicting. Some found the new assignment very rewarding in collecting and collating data for the U.S. to build a "New Navy" of steel and steam-powered warships armed with the latest rifled ordnance. But other naval officers saw assignment to this tiny office as a monotonous dead-end assignment endangering their careers as shipboard operators. Dorwart shows how the first and second world wars and interwar period dramatically accelerated the naval intelligence office's dilemma. The threats in both oceans from powerful enemy navies equipped with the latest technology and weaponry gave an urgency to the collection of information on the strategies, warships, submarines, and aircraft development of potential and actual naval enemies. But at the same time ONI was asked to provide information of possible domestic threats from suspected enemy spies, terrorists, saboteurs or anti-war opponents. This led ONI officers to wiretap, break and enter, pursue surveillance of all types of people from foreign agents to Americans suspected of opposition to strengthening the U.S. Navy or becoming involved in world wars. This history explains that many ONI directors and officers were highly motivated to collect as much information as possible about the naval-military capabilities and strategies of Germany, Italy, Japan, and even allies. ONI officers understood that code-breaking was part of their job as well. But this all led some to become deeply involved in domestic spying, wiretapping, breaking and entering on private property. These extralegal and at times illegal operations, Dorwart argues, confused some ONI officers, leading to too much information that clouded vital intelligence such as Japanese plans to attack American naval bases. In the end, this study demonstrates the dilemma confronted between 1882 and 1945 by dedicated U.S. naval officers attached to or collecting information worldwide for the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Author: Jeffery M. Dorwart
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 200
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Book Description
Author: Steven E. Maffeo
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1442255641
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 575
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Book Description
This unique reference presents 59 biographies of people who were key to the sea services being reasonably prepared to fight the Japanese Empire when the Second World War broke out, and whose advanced work proved crucial. These intelligence pioneers invented techniques, procedures, and equipment from scratch, not only allowing the United States to hold its own in the Pacific despite the loss of most of its Fleet at Pearl Harbor, but also laying the foundation of today’s intelligence methods and agencies. One-hundred years ago, in what was clearly an unsophisticated pre-information era, naval intelligence (and foreign intelligence in general) existed in rudimentary forms almost incomprehensible to us today. Founded in 1882, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)—the modern world’s “oldest continuously operating intelligence agency”—functioned for at least its first forty years with low manning, small budgets, low priority, and no prestige. The navy’s early steps into communications intelligence (COMINT), which included activities such as radio interception, radio traffic analysis, and cryptology, came with the 1916 establishment of the Code and Signals Section within the navy’s Division of Communications and with the 1924 creation of the “Research Desk” as part of the Section. Like ONI, this COMINT organization suffered from low budgets, manning, priority, and prestige. The dictionary focuses on these pioneers, many of whom went on, even after World War II, to important positions in the Navy, the State Department, the Armed Forces Security Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It reveals the work and innovations of well and lesser-known individuals who created the foundations of today’s intelligence apparatus and analysis.
Author: W.J. Holmes
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1612512550
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 256
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Book Description
In the foreword to this book, first published in 1978, Sen. Daniel Inouye describes the story as ""the raw material of adventure fiction--but this is all true and told in a manner that is at the same time fascinating and professional."" Despite the passage of twenty years and the appearance of several studies of code breaking, this inside look at naval intelligence in the Pacific is as powerful as ever. This book provides a compassionate and unique understanding of the war and the business of intelligence gathering. Assigned to the combat intelligence unit in Honolulu from June 1941 to the end of the war, W. J. Holmes shares his history-making experiences as part of an organization that collected, analyzed, and disseminated naval intelligence throughout World War II. His book not only captures the mood of the period but gives rare insight into the problems and personalities involved, allowing the reader to fully appreciate the painful moral dilemma faced daily by commanders in the Pacific once the Japanese naval codes were broken. Every time the Americans made use of the enemy messages they had decoded, they increased the probability of the Japanese realizing what had happened and changing their codes. And such a change would cause the U.S. Pacific Fleet to lose a vital edge. On the other hand, withholding the information could--and sometimes did--result in the loss of U.S. lives and ships. This revealing study illuminates the difficulties in both collecting intelligence and deciding when to use it.
Author: Richard A. Mobley
Publisher: U.S. Government Printing Office
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 108
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Book Description
U.S. Navy Intelligence Contribution Key to SE Asia War Effort from 1965-75 Knowing the Enemy, part of the commemorative series The U.S. Navy and the Vietnam War, covers the Navy intelligence establishment's support to the war effort in Southeast Asia from 1965 to 1975. It describes the contribution of naval intelligence to key strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of the war including the involvement of intelligence in the seminal Tonkin Gulf Crisis of 1964 and the Rolling Thunder and Linebacker bombing campaigns; the monitoring of Sino-Soviet bloc military assistance to Hanoi; the operation of the Seventh Fleet's reconnaissance aircraft; the enemy's use of the "neutral" Cambodian port of Sihanoukvil≤ and the support to U.S. Navy riverine operations during the Tet Offensive and the SEALORDS campaign in South Vietnam. Special features elaborate on the experiences of reconnaissance plane pilots navigating the dangerous skies of Indochina; intelligence professionals who braved enemy attacks at shore bases in South Vietnam; the perilous mission in Laos of Observation Squadron 67 (VO-67); the secret voyage of nuclear attack submarine Sculpin (SSN-590); and the leadership and heroism of Captain Earl F. Rectanus, Lieutenant Commander Jack Graf, and other naval intelligence professionals who risked, and sometimes lost, their lives in the service of their country during the war. The work is lavishly illustrated with more than 85 photographs and maps, and includes a select list of suggested readings. This publication will be of interest and value to scholars, veterans, and students of the Vietnam War and the Navy's role in that conflict. Related products: Vietnam War resources collection can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/vietnam-war Other products producted by the U.S. Navy, Naval History and Heritage Command can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/902
Author: Wyman H. Packard
Publisher: www.Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
ISBN: 9781907521782
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 522
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Book Description
Reprint of this scarce joint 1996 publication by the U.S. Naval Historical Center and the Office of Naval Intelligence. This comprehensive reference work is intended to provide intelligence professionals, scholars, and the general public with a detailed, topical accounting of the long and varied activities of U.S. Naval Intelligence. ill.
Author: Andrew Boyd
Publisher: Seaforth Publishing
ISBN: 1526736608
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 757
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Book Description
An acclaimed military historian examines the vital role of British naval intelligence from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of the Cold War. In this comprehensive account, Andrew Boyd brings a critical new dimension to our understanding of British naval intelligence. From the capture of Napoleons signal codes to the satellite-based systems of the Cold War era, he provides a coherent and reliable overview while setting his subject in the larger context of the British state. It is a fascinating study of how naval needs and personalities shaped the British intelligence community that exists today. Boyd explains why and how intelligence was collected and assesses its real impact on policy and operations. Though he confirms that naval intelligence was critical to Britains victory in both World Wars, he significantly reappraises its role in each. He reveals that coverage of Germany before 1914 and of the three Axis powers in the interwar period was more comprehensive and effective than previously suggested; and while British power declined rapidly after 1945, the book shows how intelligence helped the Royal Navy to remain a significant global force for the rest of the twentieth century.
Author: Ellis M. Zacharias
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1612517692
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 450
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Book Description
An instant bestseller when it was first published in 1946, this memoir recounts the author's nearly forty years of service in naval intelligence, beginning in 1908. One of the first to venture into the realm of psychological warfare, Ellis Zacharias was awarded the Legion of Merit with two gold stars for his contributions. Among the highlights of his impressive career was the role he played in convincing the Japanese to accept surrender in 1945, a subject he deals with in fascinating detail in this book. Zacharias gives readers access to rare psychological profiles that he prepared for the Office of Naval Intelligence on leading political and military figures in Japan. His book also recounts his exploits as a young naval attaché with the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo in the early 1920s. In the early months of the war readers join him in the thick of combat in the Pacific, first aboard a cruiser under his command and later in a battleship. Of particular interest are descriptions of his one-man radio broadcasts beamed at Japan between V-E and V-J days that received kudos from Adm. Ernest J. King for helping bring about the surrender.
Author: Office of Naval Intelligence (U S )
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 9780160939686
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
This updated resource provides a more comprehensive history, including: Iran's Persian imperial past, the spread of Islam, and the Iran-Iraq War The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) emphasizes an asymetric doctrine to ensure national security in the Persian Gulf against regional neighbors and foreign presence. The Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) employs a more conventional doctrine and focuses on forward presence and naval diplomacy. Both navies have considerable equities and are well positioned to influence and leverage the Strait of Hormuz; a vital chokepoint for the flow of resources and international commerce. Illustrated with organizational charts, and photos of key Iranian leaders, including commanders within the Navy Command and Control Leadership, as well as rank insignia graphics, maps, ships, aircrafts, missile images, and more. Check out ourMiddle East resources collection for more resources on this topic. You may also be interested in ourForeign Military History collection Other products produced by theUnited States Navy
Author: Frederick D. Parker
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781478344292
Category : Pearl Harbor (Hawaii), Attack on, 1941
Languages : en
Pages : 104
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Book Description
This is the story of the U.S. Navy's communications intelligence (COMINT) effort between 1924 and 1941. It races the building of a program, under the Director of Naval Communications (OP-20), which extracted both radio and traffic intelligence from foreign military, commercial, and diplomatic communications. It shows the development of a small but remarkable organization (OP-20-G) which, by 1937, could clearly see the military, political, and even the international implications of effective cryptography and successful cryptanalysis at a time when radio communications were passing from infancy to childhood and Navy war planning was restricted to tactical situations. It also illustrates an organization plagues from its inception by shortages in money, manpower, and equipment, total absence of a secure, dedicated communications system, little real support or tasking from higher command authorities, and major imbalances between collection and processing capabilities. It explains how, in 1941, as a result of these problems, compounded by the stresses and exigencies of the time, the effort misplaced its focus from Japanese Navy traffic to Japanese diplomatic messages. Had Navy cryptanalysts been ordered to concentrate on the Japanese naval messages rather than Japanese diplomatic traffic, the United States would have had a much clearer picture of the Japanese military buildup and, with the warning provided by these messages, might have avoided the disaster of Pearl Harbor.
