Author: Colonel David M Glantz
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786250438
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 84
Book Description
In his classic work, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “As we shall show, defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack.” A generation of nineteenth century officers, nurtured on the study of the experiences of Napoleon and conditioned by the wars of German unification, had little reason to accept that view. The offensive spirit swept through European armies and manifested itself in the regulations, plans, and mentality of those armiehe events of 1939, 1940, and 1941 in Poland, France, and Russia respectively again challenged Clausewitz’ claim of the superiority of the defense and prompted armies worldwide to frantically field large armored forces and develop doctrines for their use. While blitzkrieg concepts ruled supreme, it fell to that nation victimized most by those concepts to develop techniques to counter the German juggernaut. The Soviets had to temper a generation of offensive tradition in order to marshal forces and develop techniques to counter blitzkrieg. In essence, the Soviet struggle for survival against blitzkrieg proved also to be a partial test of Clausewitz’ dictum. In July 1943, after arduous months of developing defensive techniques, often at a high cost in terms of men and material, the Soviets met blitzkrieg head-on and proved that defense against it was feasible. The titanic, grinding Kursk operation validated, in part, Clausewitz’ views. But it also demonstrated that careful study of force organization and employment and application of the fruits of that study can produce either offensive or defensive victory. While on the surface the events of Kursk seemed to validate Clausewitz’ view, it is often forgotten that, at Kursk, the Soviets integrated the concept of counteroffensive into their grand defensive designs. Thus the defense itself was meaningless unless viewed against the backdrop of the renewed offensive efforts and vice versa. What Kursk did prove was that strategic, operational, and tactical defenses could counter blitzkrieg.
Soviet Defensive Tactics At Kursk, July 1943
Author: Colonel David M Glantz
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786250438
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 84
Book Description
In his classic work, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “As we shall show, defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack.” A generation of nineteenth century officers, nurtured on the study of the experiences of Napoleon and conditioned by the wars of German unification, had little reason to accept that view. The offensive spirit swept through European armies and manifested itself in the regulations, plans, and mentality of those armiehe events of 1939, 1940, and 1941 in Poland, France, and Russia respectively again challenged Clausewitz’ claim of the superiority of the defense and prompted armies worldwide to frantically field large armored forces and develop doctrines for their use. While blitzkrieg concepts ruled supreme, it fell to that nation victimized most by those concepts to develop techniques to counter the German juggernaut. The Soviets had to temper a generation of offensive tradition in order to marshal forces and develop techniques to counter blitzkrieg. In essence, the Soviet struggle for survival against blitzkrieg proved also to be a partial test of Clausewitz’ dictum. In July 1943, after arduous months of developing defensive techniques, often at a high cost in terms of men and material, the Soviets met blitzkrieg head-on and proved that defense against it was feasible. The titanic, grinding Kursk operation validated, in part, Clausewitz’ views. But it also demonstrated that careful study of force organization and employment and application of the fruits of that study can produce either offensive or defensive victory. While on the surface the events of Kursk seemed to validate Clausewitz’ view, it is often forgotten that, at Kursk, the Soviets integrated the concept of counteroffensive into their grand defensive designs. Thus the defense itself was meaningless unless viewed against the backdrop of the renewed offensive efforts and vice versa. What Kursk did prove was that strategic, operational, and tactical defenses could counter blitzkrieg.
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786250438
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 84
Book Description
In his classic work, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “As we shall show, defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack.” A generation of nineteenth century officers, nurtured on the study of the experiences of Napoleon and conditioned by the wars of German unification, had little reason to accept that view. The offensive spirit swept through European armies and manifested itself in the regulations, plans, and mentality of those armiehe events of 1939, 1940, and 1941 in Poland, France, and Russia respectively again challenged Clausewitz’ claim of the superiority of the defense and prompted armies worldwide to frantically field large armored forces and develop doctrines for their use. While blitzkrieg concepts ruled supreme, it fell to that nation victimized most by those concepts to develop techniques to counter the German juggernaut. The Soviets had to temper a generation of offensive tradition in order to marshal forces and develop techniques to counter blitzkrieg. In essence, the Soviet struggle for survival against blitzkrieg proved also to be a partial test of Clausewitz’ dictum. In July 1943, after arduous months of developing defensive techniques, often at a high cost in terms of men and material, the Soviets met blitzkrieg head-on and proved that defense against it was feasible. The titanic, grinding Kursk operation validated, in part, Clausewitz’ views. But it also demonstrated that careful study of force organization and employment and application of the fruits of that study can produce either offensive or defensive victory. While on the surface the events of Kursk seemed to validate Clausewitz’ view, it is often forgotten that, at Kursk, the Soviets integrated the concept of counteroffensive into their grand defensive designs. Thus the defense itself was meaningless unless viewed against the backdrop of the renewed offensive efforts and vice versa. What Kursk did prove was that strategic, operational, and tactical defenses could counter blitzkrieg.
The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945
Author: David Glantz
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1135774994
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 515
Book Description
Volume I covers in detail the background, strategic regrouping, and strategic planning and conduct of the offensive.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1135774994
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 515
Book Description
Volume I covers in detail the background, strategic regrouping, and strategic planning and conduct of the offensive.
Inside the Soviet Army
Author: Viktor Suvorov
Publisher: Berkley
ISBN: 9780425071106
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 372
Book Description
Publisher: Berkley
ISBN: 9780425071106
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 372
Book Description
The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine
Author: Jonathan Samuel Lockwood
Publisher: Transaction Publishers
ISBN: 9781412834919
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 226
Book Description
Soviet perceptions of American strategic doctrine have influenced then-use of military power in foreign policy. An understanding of how those perceptions are being derived at and of their specific contents is therefore essential to any reflection on direction that American defense policy should take. Particularly in the field of arms control and disarmament, Soviet perceptions carry severe implications for U.S. proposals as well as general behavior. Lockwood bases his examination on Soviet sources such as newspapers, periodicals, radio broadcasts, and books. He establishes that Soviet analysts tend to project their own notions of clear strategy onto U.S. doctrine and intentions. Starting from the premise that the Soviets mean what they say Lockwood is able to give a historical account of Soviet perceptions starting from "massive retaliation" up to and including Presidential Directive 59. In his final chapter, the author gives possible policy strategies to successfully counteract the Soviet military policy.
Publisher: Transaction Publishers
ISBN: 9781412834919
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 226
Book Description
Soviet perceptions of American strategic doctrine have influenced then-use of military power in foreign policy. An understanding of how those perceptions are being derived at and of their specific contents is therefore essential to any reflection on direction that American defense policy should take. Particularly in the field of arms control and disarmament, Soviet perceptions carry severe implications for U.S. proposals as well as general behavior. Lockwood bases his examination on Soviet sources such as newspapers, periodicals, radio broadcasts, and books. He establishes that Soviet analysts tend to project their own notions of clear strategy onto U.S. doctrine and intentions. Starting from the premise that the Soviets mean what they say Lockwood is able to give a historical account of Soviet perceptions starting from "massive retaliation" up to and including Presidential Directive 59. In his final chapter, the author gives possible policy strategies to successfully counteract the Soviet military policy.
The Soviet Airborne Experience
Author: David M. Glantz
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428915826
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Contents: The Prewar Experience; Evolution of Airborne Forces During World War II; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, January-February 1942; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, February-June 1942; Operational Employment: On the Dnepr, September 1943; Tactical Employment; The Postwar Years.
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428915826
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Book Description
Contents: The Prewar Experience; Evolution of Airborne Forces During World War II; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, January-February 1942; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, February-June 1942; Operational Employment: On the Dnepr, September 1943; Tactical Employment; The Postwar Years.
The Russian Understanding of War
Author: Oscar Jonsson
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1626167346
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 200
Book Description
This book analyzes the evolution of Russian military thought and how Russia's current thinking about war is reflected in recent crises. While other books describe current Russian practice, Oscar Jonsson provides the long view to show how Russian military strategic thinking has developed from the Bolshevik Revolution to the present. He closely examines Russian primary sources including security doctrines and the writings and statements of Russian military theorists and political elites. What Jonsson reveals is that Russia's conception of the very nature of war is now changing, as Russian elites see information warfare and political subversion as the most important ways to conduct contemporary war. Since information warfare and political subversion are below the traditional threshold of armed violence, this has blurred the boundaries between war and peace. Jonsson also finds that Russian leaders have, particularly since 2011/12, considered themselves to be at war with the United States and its allies, albeit with non-violent means. This book provides much needed context and analysis to be able to understand recent Russian interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, how to deter Russia on the eastern borders of NATO, and how the West must also learn to avoid inadvertent escalation.
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1626167346
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 200
Book Description
This book analyzes the evolution of Russian military thought and how Russia's current thinking about war is reflected in recent crises. While other books describe current Russian practice, Oscar Jonsson provides the long view to show how Russian military strategic thinking has developed from the Bolshevik Revolution to the present. He closely examines Russian primary sources including security doctrines and the writings and statements of Russian military theorists and political elites. What Jonsson reveals is that Russia's conception of the very nature of war is now changing, as Russian elites see information warfare and political subversion as the most important ways to conduct contemporary war. Since information warfare and political subversion are below the traditional threshold of armed violence, this has blurred the boundaries between war and peace. Jonsson also finds that Russian leaders have, particularly since 2011/12, considered themselves to be at war with the United States and its allies, albeit with non-violent means. This book provides much needed context and analysis to be able to understand recent Russian interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, how to deter Russia on the eastern borders of NATO, and how the West must also learn to avoid inadvertent escalation.
The Battle for Kursk, 1943
Author: David M. Glantz
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1135233179
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 372
Book Description
This volume offers detailed information about the Red Army's preparation for and conduct of the Battle of Kursk, the nature of the war on the German Eastern Front, and on the range of horrors that have characterized warfare in the 20th century.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1135233179
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 372
Book Description
This volume offers detailed information about the Red Army's preparation for and conduct of the Battle of Kursk, the nature of the war on the German Eastern Front, and on the range of horrors that have characterized warfare in the 20th century.
Soviet Night Operations in World War II
Author: Claude R. Sasso
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428915966
Category : Night fighting (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 66
Book Description
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428915966
Category : Night fighting (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages : 66
Book Description
The Offensive
Author: A. A. Sidorenko
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780898756104
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Book Description
The Offensive is significant and representative Soviet military writing, translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force in 1970. Soviet Party-military spokesmen stipulate that introduction of nuclear weapons into their armed forces brought about "a revolution in military affairs." They further state this "revolution" has caused complete revisions in Soviet military doctrine, strategy and tactics. The study of history shows that in armed conflict victory over the enemy can best be achieved through offensive actions. It is the offensive that assures complete defeat of the enemy and seizure of important objectives and regions. This is the view expressed by Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, Doctor of Military Science and faculty member of the Frunze Military Academy, in The Offensive. His work was listed as recommended reading in "The Soldier?s Bookshelf" section of the annual Calendar of a Soldier. Colonel Sidorenko is a well-known Soviet military spokesman with many credits to his name. Colonel Sidorenko provides the student of military affairs with an enhanced understanding of Soviet military thought.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780898756104
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Book Description
The Offensive is significant and representative Soviet military writing, translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force in 1970. Soviet Party-military spokesmen stipulate that introduction of nuclear weapons into their armed forces brought about "a revolution in military affairs." They further state this "revolution" has caused complete revisions in Soviet military doctrine, strategy and tactics. The study of history shows that in armed conflict victory over the enemy can best be achieved through offensive actions. It is the offensive that assures complete defeat of the enemy and seizure of important objectives and regions. This is the view expressed by Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, Doctor of Military Science and faculty member of the Frunze Military Academy, in The Offensive. His work was listed as recommended reading in "The Soldier?s Bookshelf" section of the annual Calendar of a Soldier. Colonel Sidorenko is a well-known Soviet military spokesman with many credits to his name. Colonel Sidorenko provides the student of military affairs with an enhanced understanding of Soviet military thought.
The Soviet Union and the Gutting of the UN Genocide Convention
Author: Anton Weiss-Wendt
Publisher: University of Wisconsin Pres
ISBN: 0299312909
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 401
Book Description
How both the Soviet Union and the United States manipulated and weakened the drafting of the United Nations Genocide Convention treaty in the midst of the Cold War.
Publisher: University of Wisconsin Pres
ISBN: 0299312909
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 401
Book Description
How both the Soviet Union and the United States manipulated and weakened the drafting of the United Nations Genocide Convention treaty in the midst of the Cold War.