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Author: Yvan Lengwiler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
Author: Yvan Lengwiler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Yvan Lengwiler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The theory of multiple unit auctions traditionally assumes that the offered quantity is fixed. I argue that this assumption is not appropriate for many applications because the seller may be able and willing to adjust the supply to the bidding. In this paper I address this shortcoming by analyzing a multi-unit auction game between a monopolistic seller who can produce arbitrary quantities at constant unit cost, and oligopolistic bidders. I establish the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium for price discriminating and for uniform price auctions. I also show that bidders have an incentive to misreport their true demand in both auction formats, but they do that in different ways and for different reasons. Furthermore, both auction formats are inefficient, but there is no unambiguous ordering among them. Finally, the more competitive the bidders are, the more likely the seller is to prefer uniform pricing over price discrimination, yet increased competition among bidders may or may not enhance efficiency.
Author: Edward J. Anderson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue with the uniform-price auction is that seemingly collusive equilibria can exist. We show that such outcomes are less likely if the traded volume of the auctioneer is uncertain. But if bidders are asymmetric ex-ante, then both a price áoor and a price cap are normally needed to get a unique equilibrium, which is well behaved.
Author: Catherine D. Wolfram
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 72
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Book Description
This paper considers the bidding behavior of participants in the daily auction to supply electricity in England and Wales. Every day, owners of generating capacity submit bids reflecting a price for power from their plants. The price bid by the last plant used to meet electricity needs in a given time period is the price paid for capacity from all plants. Theoretical work on uniform-price multi-unit auctions suggests that bidders selling more than one unit of a good have an incentive to increase the prices they bid at high quantities. If a bid sets the equilibrium price, the bidder receives a higher price for that unit as well as for all inframarginal units. I find evidence of strategic bid increases. First, plants that are likely to be used after a number of other plants are already operating bid more. Second, the larger supplier submits higher bids, all else equal. Lastly, there is some evidence that bids for given plants are higher when the suppliers have more available capacity.
Author: Vijay Krishna
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 012426297X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 319
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Book Description
"Vijay Krishna's book provides a very thorough and patient presentation of auction theory, starting from the most basic analysis and graduating to sophisticated, state of the art theory, including multi-unit auctions. This book covers a very wide range of auction topics, providing a clear and accessible treatment. The theory is presented in a careful and easily understood style accessible to honors undergraduates as well as all economics graduate students. Krishna's book will certainly become the central book on auction theory." --R. Preston McAfee, Murray S. Johnson Chair in Economics, University of Texas "This book not only sets out much of the theoretical literature on auctions-including results that are very recent-but does so with a clarity, elegance, and rigor that is characteristic of Vijay Krishna's work." --Eric Maskin, A.O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey "The book gives a superb presentation of auction theory, with clear and concise proofs of all results. It is essential reading for any serious student of auctions." --Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland "This is the book we have been waiting for: a high level treatment of auction theory that carefully presents the technical details necessary for an in depth understanding of the main themes of auction theory, ideal as a basis for a graduate course, and by an author who has himself made important contributions to the subject." --Paul Klemperer, Edgeworth Professor of Economics, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization and his clear proofs for each proposition make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multiunit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.
Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Author: Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: John Charles Bernard
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 524
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Author: Daniel Friedman
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0429961081
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 456
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Book Description
This book focuses on markets organized as double auctions in which both buyers and sellers can submit bids and asks for standardized units of well-defined commodities and securities. It examines evidence from the laboratory and computer simulations.
Author: Wedad Jasmine Elmaghraby
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 232
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Book Description
