The Influence of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on Earnings Quality

The Influence of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on Earnings Quality PDF Author: Bo Qin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
An audit committee with financial expertise is expected to strengthen the firms' internal control system, and consequently, contribute to reliable and relevant financial reporting. The controversial definition of financial expert was intensively commented on before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stipulated the final rules. In this study, the author examines whether the impact of audit committee's financial expertise on earnings quality as measured by returns-earnings relation varies with the way the financial expert is defined. The results indicate that the firms with an accounting-literate professional serving on the audit committee are more likely to have high quality of reported earnings than others without such an expert. In addition, the size of the audit committee with accounting-related expertise has a positive impact on earnings quality. In contrast, the presence of a financial expert under SEC final definition is not significantly related to earnings quality. The results are robust with other influential factors, such as earnings growth, persistence, firm size, and industry specificity, taken into account.

The Influence of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on Earnings Quality

The Influence of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on Earnings Quality PDF Author: Bo Qin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
An audit committee with financial expertise is expected to strengthen the firms' internal control system, and consequently, contribute to reliable and relevant financial reporting. The controversial definition of financial expert was intensively commented on before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stipulated the final rules. In this study, the author examines whether the impact of audit committee's financial expertise on earnings quality as measured by returns-earnings relation varies with the way the financial expert is defined. The results indicate that the firms with an accounting-literate professional serving on the audit committee are more likely to have high quality of reported earnings than others without such an expert. In addition, the size of the audit committee with accounting-related expertise has a positive impact on earnings quality. In contrast, the presence of a financial expert under SEC final definition is not significantly related to earnings quality. The results are robust with other influential factors, such as earnings growth, persistence, firm size, and industry specificity, taken into account.

Audit Committees and Financial Reporting Quality

Audit Committees and Financial Reporting Quality PDF Author: Chaudhry Ghafran
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
This thesis examines the impact of audit committee characteristics on financial reporting quality in the context of a large sample of UK companies over the period 2007-2010. The notion of financial reporting quality is assessed by looking at the audit quality and earnings quality of the firms. This study utilises the audit fee and non-audit fee ratio as its proxies for audit quality and accruals based earnings management models as its proxies for earnings quality. The findings from the multivariate analysis show that audit committee meetings and financial expertise exert a significant positive impact on audit fees. Investigating expertise further, this study finds no support for the notion that accounting expertise influences audit fees, however a significant positive influence on audit fees is recorded for the non-accounting financial expertise. However, the holding of additional directorships has a significant negative impact on audit fees. This study also finds that audit committee members' financial expertise has a negative and significant impact on non-audit fee ratio suggesting a strong support of members with financial expertise on issues relating to auditor independence. The study also documents that audit committee members serving longer on the boards do not prefer to purchase high amount of non-audit services from the incumbent auditor. This study also records a significant positive impact of the holding of additional directorships on the provision of non-audit fee ratio, thus signifying a profound support for the busyness hypothesis which argues that overstretched directors are not very good monitors of financial reporting quality. Furthermore, this study finds broadly consistent evidence that audit committees meeting three or more times per year and fully independent audit committees exert a significant positive impact on the quality of reported earnings. This study also finds some evidence (depending on the earnings model used) that the level of ownership of audit committee members also exerts a positive impact on the quality of reported earnings, highlighting the fact that audit committee members with an equity stake in their companies are considered more effective in their oversight of the financial reporting process. On the other hand, this study finds evidence that the busyness of audit committee members (busyness defined in terms of the holding of board seats in other companies) has a significant negative impact on the quality of reported earnings. The composite variables (i.e. ACE1, ACE2, ACE3 and ACE4) representing those companies that satisfy all aspects of current best practice in terms of audit committee composition and operation, has a positive impact on the quality of reported earnings. This study covers the period 2007 to 2010 and therefore offers a contemporary analysis of the influence of audit committee characteristics on financial reporting quality. The study is very comprehensive in its scope not only in the selection of audit committee characteristics and methods employed to quantify these characteristics, but also in the use of various proxies developed to capture the true essence of financial reporting quality. The choice of multiple measurement methods both for the dependent and independent variables facilitates a much richer investigation into the relationship between governance and financial reporting quality variables. Therefore this study makes a major contribution to our understanding of the association between the various audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality in the wake of recently introduced regulatory recommendations. These findings will also have policy implications as regulators around the world continue to define and refine the desired characteristics and behaviour of audit committees. Therefore, the findings of this study will ensure future policy changes regarding audit committees are adequately informed.

Audit Committee Financial Expertise and Earnings Management

Audit Committee Financial Expertise and Earnings Management PDF Author: Patrick Badolato
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
Regulatory pressure to increase both audit committee financial expertise and board independence has resulted in lower status for audit committees relative to management. This status differential is relevant because expertise and relative status are important determinants of each party's ability to influence outcomes, particularly when parties face conflicting goals. We find that audit committees with both financial expertise and high relative status are associated with lower levels of earnings management, as measured by accounting irregularities and abnormal accruals. These results speak to benefits and limitations of financial expertise, which have been the focus of considerable debate.

The Effect of Audit Quality on the Relationship Between Audit Committee Effectiveness and Financial Reporting Quality

The Effect of Audit Quality on the Relationship Between Audit Committee Effectiveness and Financial Reporting Quality PDF Author: Johanna Miettinen
Publisher: University of Vaasa
ISBN: 9524762447
Category : Audit committees
Languages : en
Pages : 169

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Book Description
Tiivistelmä: Tilintarkastuksen laadun vaikutus tarkastusvaliokunnan tehokkuuden ja taloudellisen tiedon laadun väliseen suhteeseen.

Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings Management

Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings Management PDF Author: Joseph V. Carcello
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55

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Book Description
A prime objective of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and recent changes to stock exchange listing standards is to improve the quality of financial reporting. We examine the associations between audit committee financial expertise and alternate corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management. We find that both accounting and certain types of non-accounting financial expertise reduce earnings management for firms with weak alternate corporate governance mechanisms, but that independent audit committee members with financial expertise are most effective in mitigating earnings management. Importantly we find that alternate corporate governance mechanisms are an effective substitute for audit committee financial expertise in constraining earnings management. Finally, we find either no association or a positive association between financial expertise and real earnings management. Our results suggest that alternate governance approaches are equally effective in improving the quality of financial reporting, and that firms should have the flexibility to design the particular set of governance mechanisms that best fit their unique situations.

The Effects of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on Auditor Changes and Subsequent Audit Quality

The Effects of Audit Committee Financial Expertise on Auditor Changes and Subsequent Audit Quality PDF Author: James D. Whitworth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Accounting
Languages : en
Pages : 73

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Book Description
My dissertation examines the impact of audit committee financial expertise on the circumstances and likelihood of an auditor change. Auditor changes are costly events associated with decreased financial reporting quality. The audit committee is in position to influence the timing and circumstances surrounding these changes through their role overseeing the external financial reporting process. I find that audit committees with greater accounting expertise are associated with fewer auditor changes overall, more auditor dismissals when there is an auditor change, greater industry expertise by the successor auditor, and an increase in financial reporting quality following the auditor change. I find no consistent evidence supporting the impact of supervisory expertise influencing any of the above outcomes.

Audit Committee's Effectiveness and Financial Reporting Quality

Audit Committee's Effectiveness and Financial Reporting Quality PDF Author: Nurul Nazlia Jamil
Publisher: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing
ISBN: 9783847336785
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 92

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Book Description
Financial reporting quality has been under scrutiny especially after the collapse of major companies. The main objective of this study is to investigate the audit committee's effectiveness on the financial reporting quality among the Malaysian GLCs. In particular, the study examined the impact of audit committee characteristics (independence, size, frequency meeting and financial expertise) on earnings management in periods prior to and following the transformation program (2003-2009). The study is important as it provides additional knowledge about the impact of audit committee's effectiveness on reducing the earnings management, and assist practitioners, policymakers and regulators such as Malaysian Institute of Accountants, Securities Commission and government to determine ways to enhance audit committee's effectiveness and improve the financial reporting of GLCs, as well as improving the quality of the accounting profession.

Final Accounting

Final Accounting PDF Author: Barbara Ley Toffler
Publisher: Currency
ISBN: 0767913833
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 290

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Book Description
A withering exposé of the unethical practices that triggered the indictment and collapse of the legendary accounting firm. Arthur Andersen's conviction on obstruction of justice charges related to the Enron debacle spelled the abrupt end of the 88-year-old accounting firm. Until recently, the venerable firm had been regarded as the accounting profession's conscience. In Final Accounting, Barbara Ley Toffler, former Andersen partner-in-charge of Andersen's Ethics & Responsible Business Practices consulting services, reveals that the symptoms of Andersen's fatal disease were evident long before Enron. Drawing on her expertise as a social scientist and her experience as an Andersen insider, Toffler chronicles how a culture of arrogance and greed infected her company and led to enormous lapses in judgment among her peers. Final Accounting exposes the slow deterioration of values that led not only to Enron but also to the earlier financial scandals of other Andersen clients, including Sunbeam and Waste Management, and illustrates the practices that paved the way for the accounting fiascos at WorldCom and other major companies. Chronicling the inner workings of Andersen at the height of its success, Toffler reveals "the making of an Android," the peculiar process of employee indoctrination into the Andersen culture; how Androids—both accountants and consultants--lived the mantra "keep the client happy"; and how internal infighting and "billing your brains out" rather than quality work became the all-important goals. Toffler was in a position to know when something was wrong. In her earlier role as ethics consultant, she worked with over 60 major companies and was an internationally renowned expert at spotting and correcting ethical lapses. Toffler traces the roots of Andersen's ethical missteps, and shows the gradual decay of a once-proud culture. Uniquely qualified to discuss the personalities and principles behind one of the greatest shake-ups in United States history, Toffler delivers a chilling report with important ramifications for CEOs and individual investors alike.

Audit Committees and Quarterly Earnings Management

Audit Committees and Quarterly Earnings Management PDF Author: Joon S. Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32

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Book Description
Regulators have frequently expressed concerns about corporate earnings management. Audit committees are expected to monitor managers' tendencies to manipulate their earnings numbers. The extant literature until now has focused on managers' incentives to manipulate annual earnings numbers. However, managers also have incentives to manage quarterly earnings, due for example, to pressures to meet quarterly analyst forecasts. We test whether audit committees with certain characteristics curb managers' ability to engage in quarterly earnings management. We examine the following characteristics of audit committees: their independence, number of meetings, financial expertise, stock ownership, outside directorships, tenure, and number of directors.Using a sample of 896 firm-year observations for the years 1996-2000, we report three findings. First, the number of outside directorships held by audit committee directors is negatively associated with earnings management behavior. This could reflect possible independence of these directors because of their desire to maintain their reputations or their expertise in dealing with financial reporting issues. Second, we find that stock ownership by independent audit committee directors is positively associated with earnings management. The monitoring benefits of independent directors seem to be eroded in situations where they are given stock ownership. Moreover, in our sample, it is mainly the independent directors that own stock. Although we do not know how generalizable this finding is, it suggests that stock ownership by audit committee directors is undesirable. Third, the average tenure of audit committee directors is negatively associated with quarterly earnings management suggesting a possible positive effect of experience with the firm and its accounting. Our results are robust to two different measures of quarterly earnings management.

Audit Committee Tenure, Earnings Quality, Firm Performance and Cost of Capital

Audit Committee Tenure, Earnings Quality, Firm Performance and Cost of Capital PDF Author: James M. Braswell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Audit committees
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
Regulators and financial reporting institutions have recently increased their focus on audit committee composition, indicating an acknowledgement of the potential importance of audit committee monitoring efforts on financial reporting quality. I extend prior corporate governance research by exploring whether the duration of service on a specific audit committee (i.e., audit committee tenure) affects earnings quality, future financial performance and cost of capital. Using a sample of 2,355 firm years for fiscal years 1998-2003, I test the potential association between audit committee tenure and GAAP-based earnings quality proxies and find some evidence that audit committee tenure improves earnings quality by limiting the degree to which management relies on accruals to determine income. I also test whether audit committee tenure effectively reduces real earnings management proxies since such techniques reflect routine business decisions that often fall outside of GAAP's jurisdiction. I find that audit committee tenure is associated with the use of abnormally low discretionary expenses, suggesting that current-period earnings are artificially inflated when audit committee tenure is relatively longer. The next stage of my study examines the effect of audit committee tenure on firm performance. Audit committees can influence firm performance by two avenues. First, committee effectiveness can influence the quality of reported earnings, which could reduce the cost of capital and improve firm performance by making positive NPV projects more feasible. The audit committee also oversees risk management activities and internal reporting efforts that are ultimately used by the board of directors to monitor and ratify management's strategic decisions. The results of this analysis provide evidence consistent with the entrenchment hypotheses since audit committee tenure appears to have a negative effect on future firm performance. I conclude the study by analyzing the potential association between audit committee tenure and cost of capital. After employing both cost of equity and cost of debt proxies as dependent variables, I find no significant associations with audit committee tenure.