Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Seapower
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
The Force Structure Impacts on Fleet and Strategic Lift Operations
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Seapower
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
The Force Structure Impacts on Fleet and Strategic Lift Operations
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Seapower
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 92
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 92
Book Description
Force structure impacts on fleet and strategic lift operations
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
106-1&2 Legislative Calendar: Committee on Armed Services, S. Prt. 106-88, 1999-2000, December 31, 2000, *
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 84
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 84
Book Description
Legislative Calendar
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 84
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 84
Book Description
Bedding Down with C-O-T-S
Author: Christopher J. Bence
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Airlift, Military
Languages : en
Pages : 84
Book Description
The United States has emerged as the sole superpower. Recognizing the dramatic change in the international environment, the U.S. has adopted a national security strategy of engagement. As such, the U.S. relies on the civilian and military strategic airlift assets of the National Airlift Fleet to influence world events. However, due to changed force structures, cut-backs, and dwindling resources, the U.S. does not possess enough airlift assets to accomplish national goals and objectives. Hence, this paper asks, "In order to meet current and future airlift requirements of the United States, does the Air Force need to procure and field a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) cargo aircraft?" The post Cold War strategic environment and the National Security Strategy of engagement dramatically increased the nation's commitments around the world, thus requiring reevaluation of the National Airlift Policy. The United States military currently does not posses the strategic airlift capability required by the Unified Command Plans. The procurement of 120 C-l7s to replace 266 rapidly aging C-l41s adds increased capability, due to the C-17's ability to carry outsized cargo and operate in and out of small austere locations, but at reduced flexibility due to the reduced number of airframes available to the National Command Authority. Furthermore, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction dramatically increases the likelihood operating in.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Airlift, Military
Languages : en
Pages : 84
Book Description
The United States has emerged as the sole superpower. Recognizing the dramatic change in the international environment, the U.S. has adopted a national security strategy of engagement. As such, the U.S. relies on the civilian and military strategic airlift assets of the National Airlift Fleet to influence world events. However, due to changed force structures, cut-backs, and dwindling resources, the U.S. does not possess enough airlift assets to accomplish national goals and objectives. Hence, this paper asks, "In order to meet current and future airlift requirements of the United States, does the Air Force need to procure and field a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) cargo aircraft?" The post Cold War strategic environment and the National Security Strategy of engagement dramatically increased the nation's commitments around the world, thus requiring reevaluation of the National Airlift Policy. The United States military currently does not posses the strategic airlift capability required by the Unified Command Plans. The procurement of 120 C-l7s to replace 266 rapidly aging C-l41s adds increased capability, due to the C-17's ability to carry outsized cargo and operate in and out of small austere locations, but at reduced flexibility due to the reduced number of airframes available to the National Command Authority. Furthermore, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction dramatically increases the likelihood operating in.
Monthly Catalog of United States Government Publications
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 648
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 648
Book Description
Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations
Author: Robert C. Owen
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833040383
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 103
Book Description
Current and probable future United States involvement in counterinsurgencies revives a long-standing debate about whether these missions call for adding specialized aircraft, training, or other resources to the general military airlift fleet. The authors examine the use of airlift in past and present counterinsurgency operations, including the Foreign Internal Defense program. They conclude that general U.S. airlift forces can accomplish most counterinsurgency missions effectively, with adjustments in employment doctrines and training. However, they also note that continued operations likely will require reinforcement of the general airlift fleet and, perhaps, acquisition of a small fleet element optimized for certain counterinsurgency missions.
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833040383
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 103
Book Description
Current and probable future United States involvement in counterinsurgencies revives a long-standing debate about whether these missions call for adding specialized aircraft, training, or other resources to the general military airlift fleet. The authors examine the use of airlift in past and present counterinsurgency operations, including the Foreign Internal Defense program. They conclude that general U.S. airlift forces can accomplish most counterinsurgency missions effectively, with adjustments in employment doctrines and training. However, they also note that continued operations likely will require reinforcement of the general airlift fleet and, perhaps, acquisition of a small fleet element optimized for certain counterinsurgency missions.
National Defense
Author: U S Government Accountability Office (G
Publisher: BiblioGov
ISBN: 9781289013134
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
Maintaining more crews than necessary to fly the C-5 and C-141 strategic airlift planes is costly and unjustified. The Air Force has determined that it needs four crews for each of these aircraft, but due to efforts to preserve the service life of the C-5 by limiting the flying hours of the fleet, only 3.25 aircrews are presently authorized for each C-5. The Air Force has developed and uses a computer model simulating the operations of the strategic airlift system under wartime conditions to determine crew needs. However, a number of factors the Air Force uses are unrealistic and tend to overstate crew needs. GAO analyzed model simulations made by the Air Force and noted that during the first 45 days of an emergency, the period of highest demand, the utilization rate attained with a crew ratio of 3 to 1, with no flying hour limits imposed, was comparable to the rate attained with a 4 to 1 crew ratio with flying hour limits imposed. Where no flying hour limits were imposed, certain aircrews exceeded the 125 hours within 30 days limit. This indicated that a reduced crew ratio warrants serious consideration. A reduction of the aircrew ratio on from the currently authorized 3.25:1 to 3:1 for the C-5, and from 4:1 to 3:1 for the C-141, would lower the Air Force's annual funding requirement by as much as $105 million for the strategic airlift operational fleet if only active duty personnel were reduced. The Air Force omitted the effects of aircraft attrition in estimating required crews. At least three extra crews become available when each plane is lost. The Air Force indicates the extent of fatigue varies among aircrew positions; does not consider ground times at home stations to perform aircraft maintenance in its latest model simulations; assumes that all required crewmembers are fully qualified, onboard, and available for flying duties; and assumes, in its computer model, that crews must perform staff duties as well as flying airlift missions.
Publisher: BiblioGov
ISBN: 9781289013134
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
Maintaining more crews than necessary to fly the C-5 and C-141 strategic airlift planes is costly and unjustified. The Air Force has determined that it needs four crews for each of these aircraft, but due to efforts to preserve the service life of the C-5 by limiting the flying hours of the fleet, only 3.25 aircrews are presently authorized for each C-5. The Air Force has developed and uses a computer model simulating the operations of the strategic airlift system under wartime conditions to determine crew needs. However, a number of factors the Air Force uses are unrealistic and tend to overstate crew needs. GAO analyzed model simulations made by the Air Force and noted that during the first 45 days of an emergency, the period of highest demand, the utilization rate attained with a crew ratio of 3 to 1, with no flying hour limits imposed, was comparable to the rate attained with a 4 to 1 crew ratio with flying hour limits imposed. Where no flying hour limits were imposed, certain aircrews exceeded the 125 hours within 30 days limit. This indicated that a reduced crew ratio warrants serious consideration. A reduction of the aircrew ratio on from the currently authorized 3.25:1 to 3:1 for the C-5, and from 4:1 to 3:1 for the C-141, would lower the Air Force's annual funding requirement by as much as $105 million for the strategic airlift operational fleet if only active duty personnel were reduced. The Air Force omitted the effects of aircraft attrition in estimating required crews. At least three extra crews become available when each plane is lost. The Air Force indicates the extent of fatigue varies among aircrew positions; does not consider ground times at home stations to perform aircraft maintenance in its latest model simulations; assumes that all required crewmembers are fully qualified, onboard, and available for flying duties; and assumes, in its computer model, that crews must perform staff duties as well as flying airlift missions.
Threat Assessment, Military Strategy, and Operational Requirements
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Europe
Languages : en
Pages : 954
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Europe
Languages : en
Pages : 954
Book Description