The Feasibility of Exclusive Dealing and Partial Vertical Integration PDF Download
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Author: Myung-Joong Kwon
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Myung-Joong Kwon
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Volker Nocke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Oligopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Patrick Rey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 63
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Author: Yongmin Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Author: Lei Shao (Ph. D.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 398
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This dissertation explains new phenomena in platform industries such as wireless communication, video game, online video streaming, e-commerce, mobile app, and etc. It extends the frontier of economic studies in IT industry and gains new insights about classic industrial organization topics such as vertical integration, non-linear pricing, and product differentiation. The three chapters study platforms incentives to use exclusive contracts and the effects of exclusive dealings on consumer welfare in two-sided markets. Each focuses on a different aspect. The first chapter of my dissertation studies a different pro-competitive effect of exclusive contracts other than preventing free riding or inefficient contracting. In two-sided markets, when content providers have heterogeneous interaction benefits (i.e. some content providers benefits more from their interactions with consumers), platforms could use exclusive contracts in addition to non-exclusive contracts to "price discriminate" content providers. This could increase the number of participating content providers, which increases both consumer welfare and social welfare through the network effects. The second chapter of my dissertation investigates the effects of content heterogeneity on platforms' competition strategies and explains why many two-sided markets do not tip. Exclusive content appealing to the general public could enhance network effects. On the other hand, exclusive distinctive content could differentiate platforms. Thus, if there exists sufficiently contrasting content, both platforms would choose differentiation in equilibrium in order to soften competition and popular content would turn out to be non-exclusive so that the market does not tip. The third chapter of my dissertation explains why even though exclusive dealing has many benefits to firms, platforms in two-sided markets do not use "forced exclusivity" contracts. Instead, they negotiate both exclusive and non-exclusive contracts with content providers and let content providers decide which type of contract to sign. In addition, smaller bargaining power of platforms, difference in amounts of proprietary content, or consumer surplus per content makes content providers more willing to sign non-exclusive contracts.
Author: Simon Loertscher
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration when firms exert market power upstream and compete à la Cournot downstream. Contrasting with previous literature, a small degree of vertical integration is always procompetitive because efficiency gains dominate foreclosure effects, and vertical integration even to full foreclosure can be procompetitive. Surprisingly, vertical integration is more likely to be procompetitive if the industry is otherwise more concentrated. Extensions analyze incentives to integrate and differentiated Bertrand competition downstream. Our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should be wary of vertical integration when the integrating firm faces many competitors and should be permissive otherwise.
Author: Christoph Kleineberg
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9783030113575
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 62
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This book investigates under which circumstances vertical unbundling can lead to a more efficient market result. The assessment is based on an interdisciplinary approach combining law and economics. Drawing on the assessment, circumstances are subsequently presented under which unbundling might become necessary. Additionally, less severe means of regulatory intervention are suggested in order to protect competition. Given its scope, the book is chiefly intended for scholars and practitioners in the field of economic policy and regulation law; in addition, it will give interested members of the public a unique opportunity to learn about the underlying rationales of regulation law and regulation economics.
Author: Robert Bork
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781736089712
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 536
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The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
Author: International Economic Association
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262690935
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 588
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Book Description
These contributions discuss a number of important developments over the past decade in a newly established and important field of economics that have led to notable changes in views on governmental competition policies. They focus on the nature and role of competition and other determinants of market structures, such as numbers of firms and barriers to entry; other factors which determine the effective degree of competition in the market; the influence of major firms (especially when these pursue objectives other than profit maximization); and decentralization and coordination under control relationships other than markets and hierarchies.ContributorsJoseph E. Stiglitz, G. C. Archibald, B. C. Eaton, R. G. Lipsey, David Enaoua, Paul Geroski, Alexis Jacquemin, Richard J. Gilbert, Reinhard Selten, Oliver E. Williamson, Jerry R. Green, G. Frank Mathewson, R. A. Winter, C. d'Aspremont, J. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Steven Salop, Branko Horvat, Z. Roman, W. J. Baumol, J. C. Panzar, R. D. Willig, Richard Schmalensee, Richard Nelson, Michael Scence, and Partha Dasgupta
Author: H. E. Frech
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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