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Author: Joe B Stevens
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0429972482
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 522
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Book Description
The study of government policy and public decision-making has experienced a renaissance in recent years as economists and political scientists have come together to form the new field of collective, or public, choice. The Economics of Colletive Choice is a breakthrough text in this field. It is the first to approach the public policy process with a sophisticated understanding of both economics and government and to present these ideas with a grace and accessibility entirely appropriate to undergraduates. Collective choice economics as presented by Professor Stevens is a mix of applied welfare economics and public choice analysis and does not presuppose a knowledge of intermediate microeconomics. Professor Stevens credits both the conservative insight that government intervention is often worse than what it is intended to cure and the liberal view that efficiency and justice are sometimes best served by intervention. This approach allows students to find their own balance between these ideological views. This unique book is designed as a core text for courses on public choice and public policy analysis. It will also find wide use in courses on public administration or public affairs and as a supplementary text in courses on public sector economics and public finance.
Author: Joe B Stevens
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0429972482
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 522
Get Book Here
Book Description
The study of government policy and public decision-making has experienced a renaissance in recent years as economists and political scientists have come together to form the new field of collective, or public, choice. The Economics of Colletive Choice is a breakthrough text in this field. It is the first to approach the public policy process with a sophisticated understanding of both economics and government and to present these ideas with a grace and accessibility entirely appropriate to undergraduates. Collective choice economics as presented by Professor Stevens is a mix of applied welfare economics and public choice analysis and does not presuppose a knowledge of intermediate microeconomics. Professor Stevens credits both the conservative insight that government intervention is often worse than what it is intended to cure and the liberal view that efficiency and justice are sometimes best served by intervention. This approach allows students to find their own balance between these ideological views. This unique book is designed as a core text for courses on public choice and public policy analysis. It will also find wide use in courses on public administration or public affairs and as a supplementary text in courses on public sector economics and public finance.
Author: Amartya Sen
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674919211
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 641
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Book Description
Originally published in 1970, this classic study has been recognized for its groundbreaking role in integrating economics and ethics, and for its influence in opening up new areas of research in social choice, including aggregative assessment. It has also had a large influence on international organizations, including the United Nations, notably in its work on human development. The book showed that the “impossibility theorems” in social choice theory—led by the pioneering work of Kenneth Arrow—do not negate the possibility of reasoned and democratic social choice. Sen’s ideas about social choice, welfare economics, inequality, poverty, and human rights have continued to evolve since the book’s first appearance. This expanded edition preserves the text of the original while presenting eleven new chapters of fresh arguments and results. “Expanding on the early work of Condorcet, Pareto, Arrow, and others, Sen provides rigorous mathematical argumentation on the merits of voting mechanisms...For those with graduate training, it will serve as a frequently consulted reference and a necessity on one’s book shelf.” —J. F. O’Connell, Choice
Author: Shmuel Nitzan
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521897254
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 275
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Book Description
A study of the classical aggregation problems that arise in social choice theory, voting theory, and group decision-making under uncertainty.
Author: Thomas Schwartz
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780231937580
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 316
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Book Description
Author: David Austen-Smith
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 9780472087211
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 230
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Book Description
A definitive, comprehensive, and analytically sophisticated treatment of the theory of collective preference
Author: Norman Schofield
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401587671
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 430
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Book Description
In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an "economic" interpretation of democratic institutions. In the same period Anthony Downs (1957) sought to model representative democracy and elections while William Riker (1962) made use of work in cooperative game theory (by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944) to study coalition behavior. In my view, these "rational choice" analyses of collective decision-making have their antecedents in the arguments of Adam Smith (1759, 1776), James Madison (1787) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) about the "design" of political institutions. In the introductory chapter to this volume I briefly describe how some of the current normative and positive aspects of social choice date back to these earlier writers.
Author: Nicolaus Tideman
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351950622
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 343
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Book Description
When one thinks about how collective decisions are made, voting is the method that comes naturally to mind. But other methods such as random process and consensus are also used. This book explores just what a collective decision is, classifies the methods of making collective decisions, and identifies the advantages and disadvantages of each method. Classification is the prelude to evaluation. What are the characteristics of a method of making collective decisions, the book asks, that permit us to describe a collective decision as good? The second part of the book is detailed exploration of voting: the dimensions in which voting situations differ, the origins and logic of majority rule, the frequency of cycles in voting, the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems, criteria for ways of cutting through cycles and the application of these criteria to a variety of rules, voting over continuums, proportional representation, and voting rules that take account of intensities of preferences. Relatively unknown methods of voting give voting a much greater potential than is generally recognized. Collective Decisions and Voting is essential reading for everyone with an interest in voting theory and in how public choices might be made.
Author: Eric Maskin
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231153287
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 164
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Book Description
Kenneth Arrow's pathbreaking Òimpossibility theoremÓ was a watershed in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book, Amartya Sen and Eric Maskin explore the implications of ArrowÕs theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theoremÕs value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, while Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the idealÑgiven that achieving the ideal is impossible. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth Arrow himself, as well as essays by Sen and Maskin outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
Author: Kotaro Suzumura
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521122559
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 298
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Book Description
An examination of the phenomenon of social cooperation failure, even amongst a group of rational individuals.
Author: Herve Moulin
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262633116
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 302
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Book Description
The concept of fair division is as old as civil society itself. Aristotle's "equal treatment of equals" was the first step toward a formal definition of distributive fairness. The concept of collective welfare, more than two centuries old, is a pillar of modern economic analysis. Reflecting fifty years of research, this book examines the contribution of modern microeconomic thinking to distributive justice. Taking the modern axiomatic approach, it compares normative arguments of distributive justice and their relation to efficiency and collective welfare. The book begins with the epistemological status of the axiomatic approach and the four classic principles of distributive justice: compensation, reward, exogenous rights, and fitness. It then presents the simple ideas of equal gains, equal losses, and proportional gains and losses. The book discusses three cardinal interpretations of collective welfare: Bentham's "utilitarian" proposal to maximize the sum of individual utilities, the Nash product, and the egalitarian leximin ordering. It also discusses the two main ordinal definitions of collective welfare: the majority relation and the Borda scoring method. The Shapley value is the single most important contribution of game theory to distributive justice. A formula to divide jointly produced costs or benefits fairly, it is especially useful when the pattern of externalities renders useless the simple ideas of equality and proportionality. The book ends with two versatile methods for dividing commodities efficiently and fairly when only ordinal preferences matter: competitive equilibrium with equal incomes and egalitarian equivalence. The book contains a wealth of empirical examples and exercises.
