The Center of Gravity (COG) Systemically Understood - Clausewitz and Systems Thinking, Napoleon, Battles of Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela, Jena-Auerstadt 1806, Vietnam War (Cambodia), Desert Storm PDF Download
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Author: U. S. Military
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781521293911
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 94
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Book Description
How does the U.S. military understand and apply the center of gravity concept in the contexts of theory, doctrine, and planning for the conduct of operations? In particular, does the center of gravity serve as an effective tool when applied in accordance with current military doctrine and other non-doctrinal methodologies, and how does its use help reveal causal relationships and account for the emergent properties of complex systems? Academics and military practitioners have debated the meaning and usefulness of the concept of centers of gravity since Clausewitz introduced it in the early nineteenth century. In order to understand and apply the joint doctrine for operational design as described in Joint Publication 50, Joint Operations Planning, the military must come to a consensus on the meaning, uses, and applicability of centers of gravity. So far this consensus has not formed, and as time passes it appears even more elusive. With the U.S. Army currently undertaking a major reworking of its operational doctrine, an opportunity exists to clarify the concept and its practical application; otherwise the term could end up trapped in the same conceptual quagmire that led to the death of "Effects Based Operations" (EBO) as a joint doctrinal concept. INTRODUCTION * Hypothesis * METHODOLOGY * Systems Thinking Understood * Mechanisms of Collective Behavior (Patterns) * Multi-scale Perspective * The Evolutionary Process that Creates Complex Systems * Nature of Purposive or Goal-Directed Behavior * ANALYSIS * Battles of Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela * Jena-Auerstadt 1806 * Vietnam War (The 1970 Cambodian Campaign) * Operation Desert Storm * CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS * Conclusions * Implications and Recommendations * BIBLIOGRAPHY
Author: U. S. Military
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781521293911
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 94
Get Book Here
Book Description
How does the U.S. military understand and apply the center of gravity concept in the contexts of theory, doctrine, and planning for the conduct of operations? In particular, does the center of gravity serve as an effective tool when applied in accordance with current military doctrine and other non-doctrinal methodologies, and how does its use help reveal causal relationships and account for the emergent properties of complex systems? Academics and military practitioners have debated the meaning and usefulness of the concept of centers of gravity since Clausewitz introduced it in the early nineteenth century. In order to understand and apply the joint doctrine for operational design as described in Joint Publication 50, Joint Operations Planning, the military must come to a consensus on the meaning, uses, and applicability of centers of gravity. So far this consensus has not formed, and as time passes it appears even more elusive. With the U.S. Army currently undertaking a major reworking of its operational doctrine, an opportunity exists to clarify the concept and its practical application; otherwise the term could end up trapped in the same conceptual quagmire that led to the death of "Effects Based Operations" (EBO) as a joint doctrinal concept. INTRODUCTION * Hypothesis * METHODOLOGY * Systems Thinking Understood * Mechanisms of Collective Behavior (Patterns) * Multi-scale Perspective * The Evolutionary Process that Creates Complex Systems * Nature of Purposive or Goal-Directed Behavior * ANALYSIS * Battles of Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela * Jena-Auerstadt 1806 * Vietnam War (The 1970 Cambodian Campaign) * Operation Desert Storm * CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS * Conclusions * Implications and Recommendations * BIBLIOGRAPHY
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428910883
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35
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Book Description
Author: Maj Seow Hiang Lee
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781479202553
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
Despite its crucial role in campaign planning, the center of gravity (COG) concept remains poorly understood and inconsistently applied. This research paper seeks to understand the common sources of confusion that can occur when the COG concept is employed. It investigates the extent to which these inconsistencies can be resolved and the implications for the employment of the concept when these inconsistencies persist. To address these core questions, the paper first highlights the confusions that are caused by an incomplete reading of Clausewitz's theoretical framework that underpins his magnum opus On War. The analysis then proceeds to distill the additional sources of confusion that can lead to disagreements during the employment of the concept. This paper discusses the contentious issues of inconsistency in definitions, misunderstandings regarding the nature of the COG concept, divergent services' perceptions, and finally, inconsistencies that are caused by the inherent unpredictability of war. The ideas are then applied historically to help understand the anomalies that arose during the Persian Gulf War. Unlike previous studies which purport that much of the confusion can be easily removed by having clearer and more unambiguous definitions, the findings suggest otherwise; the sources of confusion are multifarious, and some may not even be amenable to complete resolution. The implication of having these enduring inconsistencies is neither to jettison the concept nor to return to a reductionist concept of the COG but to confront nonlinearities by applying the principles of systems thinking, superior leadership, and decisive action that is supported by a flexible feedback system.
Author: Antulio Joseph Echevarria
Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute
ISBN:
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
The author cuts through the myriad interpretations surrounding the concept and gets back to the original idea as conceived by its author, the Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz. In going back to the original concept, Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria reveals that Clausewitz intended the center of gravity to function much as its counterpart in the mechanical sciences does, that is, as a focal point. He thus argues, quite persuasively, that the Clausewitzian center of gravity is not a strength, nor a weakness, nor even a source of strength. A center of gravity is the one element within a combatant's entire structure or system that has the necessary centripetal force to hold that structure together. This is why Clausewitz wrote that a blow directed against a center of gravity will have the greatest effect. The author concludes with recommendations for revising Joint and Service doctrine so that they will reflect a more accurate and coherent definition of a center of gravity. He also offers some considerations for the war planner when applying the concept.
Author: Antulio Joseph Echevarria
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military doctrine
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
Author: Rudolph M. Janiczek
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military doctrine
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Book Description
Author: Stuart Kinross
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134180292
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 312
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Book Description
This book demonstrates how Clausewitzian thought influenced American strategic thinking between the Vietnam War and the current conflict in Iraq. Carl von Clausewitz's thought played a part in the process of military reform and the transition in US policy that took place after the Vietnam War. By the time of the 1991 Gulf War, American policy makers demonstrated that they understood the Clausewitzian notion of utilizing military force to fulfil a clear political objective. The US armed forces bridged the operational and strategic levels during that conflict in accordance with Clausewitz’s conviction that war plans should be tailored to fulfil a political objective. With the end of the Cold War, and an increasing predilection for technological solutions, American policy makers and the military moved away from Clausewitz. It was only the events of 11 September 2001 that reminded Americans of his intrinsic value. However, while many aspects of the ‘War on Terror’ and the conflict in Iraq can be accommodated within the Clausewitzian paradigm, the lack of a clear policy for countering insurgency in Iraq suggests that the US may have returned full circle to the flawed strategic approach evident in Vietnam. Clausewitz and America will be of great interest to students of strategy, military history, international security and US politics.
Author: Carl Clausewitz
Publisher: Penguin UK
ISBN: 0141920289
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 464
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Book Description
Writing at the time of Napoleon's greatest campaigns, Prussian soldier and writer Carl von Clausewitz created this landmark treatise on the art of warfare, which presented war as part of a coherent system of political thought. In line with Napoleon's own military actions, he illustrated the need to annihilate the enemy and make a strong display of one's power in an 'absolute war' without compromise. But he was also careful to distinguish between war and politics, arguing that war could only be justified when debate was no longer adequate, and that if undertaken, its aim should ultimately be to improve the wellbeing of the nation.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Center of gravity (Military science)
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Tiha von Ghyczy
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 0471415138
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 209
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Book Description
Think about strategy and sharpen judgment in an unpredictable environment Carl von Clausewitz is widely acknowledged as one of the most important of the major strategic theorists; he's been read by Eisenhower, Kissinger, Patton, Chairman Mao, and numerous other leaders. In Clausewitz on Strategy, the Boston Consulting Group's Strategy Institute has excerpted those passages most relevant to business strategy from Clausewitz's classic text On War, the most general, applicable, and enduring work of strategy in the modern West and a source of insight into the nature of conflict, whether on the battlefield or in the boardroom. This book offers Clausewitz's framework for self-education--a way to train the reader's thinking. Clausewitz speaks the mind of the executive, revealing logic that those interested in strategic thinking and practice will find invaluable. He presents unique ideas, such as the idea that friction--unexpected interference--is an intrinsic part of strategy. The Boston Consulting Group is one of the world's leading management consulting firms whose clients include many of the world's industry leaders. Tiha von Ghyczy (Charlottesville, VA) has been a faculty member and Director of Business Projects at the Darden School of Business since 1996. While with The Boston Consulting Group, he assumed responsibility for the practice groups in manufacturing/time-based competition and high technology. He has published numerous articles and books on vision and strategy. Bolko von Oetinger (Munich, Germany) is a Senior Vice President of BCG. Christopher Bassford (Washington, DC) is presently a Professor of Strategy at the National War College in Washington, DC, and the author of several books, including Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945.
