The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955

The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 PDF Author: Ian Clark
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 280

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Book Description
Why did Britain decide in 1947 to build an atomic bomb? What plans were there for using it? Employing the previously inaccessible confidential records of the British government in the decade after World War II, including those of the Chiefs of Staff, this book provides the first detailed assessment of the technical, political, and economic factors behind British nuclear policy. The authors argue that British thinking on nuclear deterrence was distinctive and made a unique contribution to early theorizing on nuclear weapons, and compare the strategic thought of Britain and the United States.

The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955

The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 PDF Author: Ian Clark
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 280

Get Book

Book Description
Why did Britain decide in 1947 to build an atomic bomb? What plans were there for using it? Employing the previously inaccessible confidential records of the British government in the decade after World War II, including those of the Chiefs of Staff, this book provides the first detailed assessment of the technical, political, and economic factors behind British nuclear policy. The authors argue that British thinking on nuclear deterrence was distinctive and made a unique contribution to early theorizing on nuclear weapons, and compare the strategic thought of Britain and the United States.

The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953

The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953 PDF Author: Samuel R. Williamson Jr
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 113705882X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 231

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Book Description
The United States took almost a decade after Hiroshima and Nagasaki to develop a coherent strategy of nuclear deterrence. This comprehensive study by two careful and well-informed historians provides the best explanation we have of why this process took so long; it also suggests the inherent difficulties of relying on nuclear weapons to provide security in the first place. Required reading for anyone interested in the early history of the nuclear era.

Ambiguity and Deterrence

Ambiguity and Deterrence PDF Author: John Baylis
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 9780198280125
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 522

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Book Description
This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous than is commonly supposed.

The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953

The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953 PDF Author: Samuel R. Williamson Jr
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN: 9780312089641
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 224

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Book Description
The United States took almost a decade after Hiroshima and Nagasaki to develop a coherent strategy of nuclear deterrence. This comprehensive study by two careful and well-informed historians provides the best explanation we have of why this process took so long; it also suggests the inherent difficulties of relying on nuclear weapons to provide security in the first place. Required reading for anyone interested in the early history of the nuclear era.

Hegemony and Culture in the Origins of NATO Nuclear First-Use, 1945–1955

Hegemony and Culture in the Origins of NATO Nuclear First-Use, 1945–1955 PDF Author: A. Johnston
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1403976937
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 329

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Book Description
Johnston argues that the preemptive first-use of nuclear weapons, long the foundation of American nuclear strategy, was not the carefully reasoned response to a growing Soviet conventional threat. Instead, it was part of a process of cultural 'socialization', by which the United States reconstituted the previously nationalist strategic cultures of the European allies into a seamless western community directed by Washington. Building a bridge between theory and practice, this book examines the usefulness of cultural theory in international history.

Ambiguity and Deterrence

Ambiguity and Deterrence PDF Author: John Baylis
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780191684357
Category : Deterrence (Strategy)
Languages : en
Pages : 495

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Book Description
This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous than is commonly supposed.

The Cambridge History of the Cold War

The Cambridge History of the Cold War PDF Author: Melvyn P. Leffler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521837197
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 663

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Book Description
This volume examines the origins and early years of the Cold War in the first comprehensive historical reexamination of the period. A team of leading scholars shows how the conflict evolved from the geopolitical, ideological, economic and sociopolitical environments of the two world wars and interwar period.

Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice

Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice PDF Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428910336
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 369

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Book Description
Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."

The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent

The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent PDF Author: Matthew Jones
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1351755404
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 569

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Book Description
"Volume II of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British government's strategic nuclear policy from 1964 to 1970. Written with full access to the UK documentary record, Volume II examines the controversies that developed over nuclear policy following the arrival in office of a Labour government led by Harold Wilson in October 1964 that openly questioned the independence of the deterrent. Having decided to preserve the Polaris programme, Labour ministers were nevertheless committed not to develop another generation of nuclear weapons beyond those in the pipeline, placing major doubts over the long-term future of the nuclear programme and collaboration with the United States. Defence planners also became increasingly concerned that the deployment of Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defences around Moscow threatened to undermine the ability of Polaris to fulfil its role as a national strategic nuclear deterrent. During 1967, under heavy pressures to control defence spending, a protracted debate was conducted within Whitehall over the future of Polaris and how to respond to the evolving ABM challenge. The volume concludes with Labour's defeat at the general election of June 1970, by which time the Royal Navy had assumed the nuclear deterrent role from the RAF, and plans had already been formulated for a UK project to improve Polaris which could both ensure its continuing credibility and rejuvenate the Anglo-American nuclear relationship."--Back cover.

Imagining Nuclear War in the British Army, 1945-1989

Imagining Nuclear War in the British Army, 1945-1989 PDF Author: Simon J. Moody
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192586351
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 250

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Book Description
The primary mission assigned to the British Army from the 1950s until the end of the Cold War was deterring Soviet aggression in Europe by demonstrating the will and capability to fight with nuclear weapons in defence of NATO territory. This 'surreal' mission was unlike any other in history, and raised a number of conceptual and practical difficulties. This comprehensive study observes how the British Army imagined nuclear war, and how it planned to fight it. Using new archival sources, Simon J. Moody analyses British thinking about tactical nuclear weapons, the role of the Army within NATO strategy, the development of theories of tactical nuclear warfare, how nuclear war was taught at the Staff College, the role of operational research, and the evolution of the Army's nuclear war-fighting doctrine. He argues that the British Army possessed the intellectual capacity for organisational adaptation, but that it displayed a cognitive dissonance about some of the more uncomfortable realities of nuclear war.