Author: Martin Lipton
Publisher: Law Journal Press
ISBN: 9781588520050
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1168
Book Description
Takeovers & Freezeouts addresses important legal developments concerning topics such as: Sarbanes-Oxley, reducing vulnerability to hostile takeovers, specific responses to overtures and takeover bids.
Takeovers and Freezeouts
Author: Martin Lipton
Publisher: Law Journal Press
ISBN: 9781588520050
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1168
Book Description
Takeovers & Freezeouts addresses important legal developments concerning topics such as: Sarbanes-Oxley, reducing vulnerability to hostile takeovers, specific responses to overtures and takeover bids.
Publisher: Law Journal Press
ISBN: 9781588520050
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1168
Book Description
Takeovers & Freezeouts addresses important legal developments concerning topics such as: Sarbanes-Oxley, reducing vulnerability to hostile takeovers, specific responses to overtures and takeover bids.
Takeovers & Freezeouts
Author: Martin Lipton
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781588522016
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Takeovers & Freezeouts addresses important developments concerning such topics as: Sarbanes-Oxley; reducing vulnerability to hostile takeovers; specific responses to overtures and takeover bids; proxy fights and institutional activism; premerger notification under Hart-Scott-Rodino; state regulation of tender offers; tax, accounting and ERISA considerations; antitrust issues; and takeovers and mergers in the banking industry. You'll get expert strategic guidance on improving your negotiating leverage in converting hostile takeovers into friendly deals. The authors provide extensive documentation on acquisition and defensive techniques, including LBOs, tender offers, mergers, recapitalizations, restructurings, going private transactions, spin-offs and proxy contests.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781588522016
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Takeovers & Freezeouts addresses important developments concerning such topics as: Sarbanes-Oxley; reducing vulnerability to hostile takeovers; specific responses to overtures and takeover bids; proxy fights and institutional activism; premerger notification under Hart-Scott-Rodino; state regulation of tender offers; tax, accounting and ERISA considerations; antitrust issues; and takeovers and mergers in the banking industry. You'll get expert strategic guidance on improving your negotiating leverage in converting hostile takeovers into friendly deals. The authors provide extensive documentation on acquisition and defensive techniques, including LBOs, tender offers, mergers, recapitalizations, restructurings, going private transactions, spin-offs and proxy contests.
Takeovers & freezeouts
Author: Martin Lipton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
The Foundations of Freezeout Laws in Takeovers
Author: Yakov Amihud
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Book Description
We provide an economic basis for permitting freeze outs of non-tendering shareholdersfollowing successful takeovers. We describe a specific freeze out mechanism based on easily verifiable information that induces desirable efficiency and welfare properties in models of both corporations with widely dispersed shareholdings and corporations with large pivotal shareholders. The mechanism dominates previous proposals along some important dimensions. We also examine takeover premia that arise in the presence of competition among raiders. Our mechanism is closely related to the practice of takeover law in the U.S.; thus, our analysis may be thought of as analyzing the economic foundations of current regulations.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Book Description
We provide an economic basis for permitting freeze outs of non-tendering shareholdersfollowing successful takeovers. We describe a specific freeze out mechanism based on easily verifiable information that induces desirable efficiency and welfare properties in models of both corporations with widely dispersed shareholdings and corporations with large pivotal shareholders. The mechanism dominates previous proposals along some important dimensions. We also examine takeover premia that arise in the presence of competition among raiders. Our mechanism is closely related to the practice of takeover law in the U.S.; thus, our analysis may be thought of as analyzing the economic foundations of current regulations.
Efficiency and Fairness in Minority Freezeouts
Author: Ernst G. Maug
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
This paper argues that there is a trade-off between efficiency and fairness in minority freezeouts and that the focus on fairness (minority shareholder rights) may be misplaced. The model discusses alternative rules for valuing minority shares in freezeouts. Appraisals can be based on the stock price, publicly available information, or private information disclosed by the majority shareholder. Those valuation rules that enhance economic efficiency pay minority shareholders less than what their shares are intrinsically worth. Economic efficiency is worse if minority shareholders extract higher premia in freezeouts. Moreover, all freezeout rules induce inefficient takeovers caused by overbidding. Bidders overpay for some shares in order to obtain a valuable freezeout option, which sometimes remains unexercised. The real problem is the freeze-in problem, as minority shareholders are left with lower-valued shares. Efficiency can be restored through a mandatory bid rule.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Book Description
This paper argues that there is a trade-off between efficiency and fairness in minority freezeouts and that the focus on fairness (minority shareholder rights) may be misplaced. The model discusses alternative rules for valuing minority shares in freezeouts. Appraisals can be based on the stock price, publicly available information, or private information disclosed by the majority shareholder. Those valuation rules that enhance economic efficiency pay minority shareholders less than what their shares are intrinsically worth. Economic efficiency is worse if minority shareholders extract higher premia in freezeouts. Moreover, all freezeout rules induce inefficient takeovers caused by overbidding. Bidders overpay for some shares in order to obtain a valuable freezeout option, which sometimes remains unexercised. The real problem is the freeze-in problem, as minority shareholders are left with lower-valued shares. Efficiency can be restored through a mandatory bid rule.
The Efficiency and Welfare Foundations of Freezeout Laws in Takeovers
Author: Yakov Amihud
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
We provide an economic basis for permitting freezeouts of non-tendering shareholders following successful takeovers. We describe a specific freezeout mechanism that is based on easily verifiable information, making it simple to implement in practice. We show that this mechanism induces desirable efficiency and welfare properties in models of both corporations with widely-dispersed shareholdings (as in Grossman and Hart, 1980) and corporations with large pivotal shareholders (as in Bagnoli and Lipman, 1988), and that it strictly dominates previous proposals along some important dimensions. The mechanism we describe is very closely related to the practice of takeover law in the US.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
Book Description
We provide an economic basis for permitting freezeouts of non-tendering shareholders following successful takeovers. We describe a specific freezeout mechanism that is based on easily verifiable information, making it simple to implement in practice. We show that this mechanism induces desirable efficiency and welfare properties in models of both corporations with widely-dispersed shareholdings (as in Grossman and Hart, 1980) and corporations with large pivotal shareholders (as in Bagnoli and Lipman, 1988), and that it strictly dominates previous proposals along some important dimensions. The mechanism we describe is very closely related to the practice of takeover law in the US.
Corporate Takeovers
Author: Martin Lipton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Takeovers, Freezeouts, and Risk Arbitrage
Author: Armando Gomes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitrage
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitrage
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
Takeovers & Freezeouts, Appendix F
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Takeovers, Freezeouts, and Risk Arbitrage
Author: Armando Gomes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitrage
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Arbitrage
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description