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Author: Saul Brenner
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139475681
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 197
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Book Description
To what extent do the justices on the Supreme Court behave strategically? In Strategy on the United States Supreme Court, Saul Brenner and Joseph M. Whitmeyer investigate the answers to this question and reveal that justices are substantially less strategic than many Supreme Court scholars believe. By examining the research to date on each of the justice's important activities, Brenner and Whitmeyer's work shows that the justices often do not cast their certiorari votes in accord with the outcome-prediction strategy, that the other members of the conference coalition bargain successfully with the majority opinion writer in less than 6 percent of the situations, and that most of the fluidity in voting on the Court is nonstrategic. This work is essential to understanding how strategic behavior - or its absence - influences the decisions of the Supreme Court and, as a result, American politics and society.
Author: Saul Brenner
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139475681
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 197
Get Book Here
Book Description
To what extent do the justices on the Supreme Court behave strategically? In Strategy on the United States Supreme Court, Saul Brenner and Joseph M. Whitmeyer investigate the answers to this question and reveal that justices are substantially less strategic than many Supreme Court scholars believe. By examining the research to date on each of the justice's important activities, Brenner and Whitmeyer's work shows that the justices often do not cast their certiorari votes in accord with the outcome-prediction strategy, that the other members of the conference coalition bargain successfully with the majority opinion writer in less than 6 percent of the situations, and that most of the fluidity in voting on the Court is nonstrategic. This work is essential to understanding how strategic behavior - or its absence - influences the decisions of the Supreme Court and, as a result, American politics and society.
Author: Scott A. Comparato
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313059586
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 191
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Book Description
Applying strategic approaches to both interest groups as amici curiae and state supreme court justices, Comparato investigates the influence of judicial retention methods and the ballot initiative on their behaivor. The results demonstrate that they behave strategically, attempting to achieve their goals within the confines of the institutional setting. What impact do state-level institutions have on the behavior of state supreme court justices and interest groups participating as amici curiae in those courts? Specifically, is the information provided by interest groups conditioned on the judicial retention system, or whether the state uses the ballot initiative, and does that information impact the decision-making process of the justices? Comparato answers these questions by employing strategic theories of judicial and group behavior, with groups motivated by the attainment of policy and group maintenance, and state supreme court justices motivated by policy and the continued maintenance of their position on the court. He argues that the information provided in amicus curiae briefs allows both groups and state supreme court justices to achieve their respective goals. In order to answer these questions, Comparto analyzes litigant and amicus curiae briefs as well as judicial decisions from seven state supreme courts to evaluate the effects of state-level institutions on the types of information provided to state supreme court justices, and how those justices respond to that information. The results suggest that interest groups do behave strategically, providing information to justices that they believe will be useful in helping the justices retain their seats on the court and achieve their desired policy outcomes. There is also support for the expectation that the information provided by litigants and amici, as well as the retention method, have a direct impact on the decision-making of justices.
Author: Ryan James Owens
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 232
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Book Description
Author: Aaron Walker
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Certiorari
Languages : en
Pages : 74
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Book Description
Author: Timothy R. Johnson
Publisher: SUNY Press
ISBN: 9780791461037
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 200
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Book Description
How oral arguments influence the decisions of Supreme Court justices.
Author: Joseph Daniel Ura
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We develop and test a theoretical account of the effect of management tenure on the strategic behavior of the Chief Justice of the United States. Substantial evidence from a variety of learning models and the public management literature indicates that tenure (length of service) is positively related to management performance in public organizations. This suggests that the chief justice's tenure in office should be positively related to efficiency in the use of the chief justice's formal powers. We assess this hypothesis by replicating and extending Johnson, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck's (2005) study of Chief Justice Burger's conference voting behavior. The data support our management tenure hypothesis, showing that Burger used greater discretion in reserving his conference vote over time as he became more adept at discriminating between circumstances when the tactic was strategically valuable and when it was not.
Author: Lawrence Baum
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 0472022636
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 230
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Book Description
From local trial courts to the United States Supreme Court, judges' decisions affect the fates of individual litigants and the fate of the nation as a whole. Scholars have long discussed and debated explanations of judicial behavior. This book examines the major issues in the debates over how best to understand judicial behavior and assesses what we actually know about how judges decide cases. It concludes that we are far from understanding why judges choose the positions they take in court. Lawrence Baum considers three issues in examining judicial behavior. First, the author considers the balance between the judges' interest in the outcome of particular cases and their interest in other goals such as personal popularity and lighter workloads. Second, Baum considers the relative importance of good law and good policy as bases for judges' choices. Finally Baum looks at the extent to which judges act strategically, choosing their own positions after taking into account the positions that their fellow judges and other policy makers might adopt. Baum argues that the evidence on each of these issues is inconclusive and that there remains considerable room for debate about the sources of judges' decisions. Baum concludes that this lack of resolution is not the result of weaknesses in the scholarship but from the difficulty in explaining human behavior. He makes a plea for diversity in research. This book will be of interest to political scientists and scholars in law and courts as well as attorneys who are interested in understanding judges as decision makers and who want to understand what we can learn from scholarly research about judicial behavior. Lawrence Baum is Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University.
Author: James R. Rogers
Publisher: University of Virginia Press
ISBN: 0813934192
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 606
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Book Description
Over the course of the past decade, the behavioral analysis of decisions by the Supreme Court has turned to game theory to gain new insights into this important institution in American politics. Game theory highlights the role of strategic interactions between the Court and other institutions in the decisions the Court makes as well as in the relations among the justices as they make their decisions. Rather than assume that the justices’ votes reveal their sincere preferences, students of law and politics have come to examine how the strategic concerns of the justices lead to "sophisticated" behavior as they seek to maximize achievement of their goals when faced with constraints on their ability to do so. In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court, James Rogers, Roy Flemming, and Jon Bond gather various essays that use game theory to explain the Supreme Court's interactions with Congress, the states, and the lower courts. Offering new ways of understanding the complexity and consequences of these interactions, the volume joins a growing body of work that considers these influential interactions among various branches of the U.S. government. Contributors: Kenneth A. Shepsle, Andrew De Martin, James R. Rogers, Christopher Zorn, Georg Vanberg, Cliff Carrubba, Thomas Hammond, Christopher Bonneau, Reginald Sheehan, Charles Cameron, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Matthew Stephenson, Stefanie A. Lindquist, Susan D. Haire, Lawrence Baum
Author: Ryan C. Black
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316733769
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 371
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Book Description
United States Supreme Court justices make decisions that have a profound impact on American society. Empirical legal scholars have portrayed justices as either single-minded or strategic seekers of policy, and there is little room in these theories for things like law, reputation, or personality. This book offers a fresh perspective that will jar Supreme Court scholarship out of complacency. It argues that justices' personalities influence their behavior, which in turn influences legal development and the United States Constitution. This impressive group of authors exhaustively examine every part of the Court's decision-making process, and focus on the trait of conscientiousness and how it influences justices over nine different empirical contexts, from agenda setting to writing the Court's opinions. The Conscientious Justice is an important and comprehensive account of judging that restructures existing approaches to analyzing the High Court.
Author: Lee Epstein
Publisher: SAGE
ISBN: 148330485X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 369
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Book Description
The Choices Justices Make is a groundbreaking work that offers a strategic account of Supreme Court decision making. Justices realize that their ability to achieve their policy and other goals depends on the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they act. All these factors hold sway over justices as they make their decisions, from which cases to accept, to how to interact with their colleagues, and what policies to adopt in their opinions. Choices is a thought-provoking, yet nontechnical work that is an ideal supplement for judicial process and public law courses. In addition to offering a unique and sustained theoretical account, the authors tell a fascinating story of how the Court works. Data culled from the Court′s public records and from the private papers of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Powell provide empirical evidence to support the central argument, while numerous examples from the justices′ papers animate the work.
