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Author: Haim Reisman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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The paper derives an optimal bidding strategy for a person that wishes to buy a product, e.g., a TV set, by bidding repeatedly in a sequence of second price auctions for such product until winning. This optimal bidding strategy depends on the distribution of the highest bid of the other bidders, and the cost to the bidder from not owning the product until winning. This is different from the standard results in which it is optimal to bid the highest price you are willing to pay.
Author: Haim Reisman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The paper derives an optimal bidding strategy for a person that wishes to buy a product, e.g., a TV set, by bidding repeatedly in a sequence of second price auctions for such product until winning. This optimal bidding strategy depends on the distribution of the highest bid of the other bidders, and the cost to the bidder from not owning the product until winning. This is different from the standard results in which it is optimal to bid the highest price you are willing to pay.
Author: Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Author: Flavio F. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Author: Paul Pezanis-Christou
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Author: Wei Ding
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of first-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.
Author: Audrey Hu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
A common assumption in the analysis of symmetric auctions is that the bidders' value estimates exhibit positive informational externalities (PIE). This assumption implies upward drifting price sequences at sequential auctions, which is challenged by an empirical regularity, known as the "declining price anomaly," that observed price sequences at real sequential auctions tend to be downward-drifting. This paper extends the existing analysis to a generalized interdependent values environment, in which the bidders' values can exhibit both PIE and NIE (negative informational externalities). The case of NIE can arise naturally when competing bidders are also competitors in the same product market. If a bidder's type is related to his or his firm's ensuing competitive advantage, then an increase of a bidder's type increases his own but may decrease other bidders' expected values.We consider a general sequential auction mechanism that sells m identical objects through K (≤m) consecutive rounds, each round involving possibly a different number of objects for sale and a different payment rule. For risk neutral bidders having unit demand and independent types, we obtain two major results. First, the direct sequentially incentive compatible auction mechanisms, which implement the performance of essentially all standard auctions, are feasible under both PIE and NIE. Second, while the total expected revenue is invariant to sequencing and payment rules, the expected selling prices from different rounds of the auction are not the same. In a PIE environment the expected price sequence tends to be upward drifting, whereas in an NIE environment the expected price sequence is strongly downward drifting: the expected lowest price in round k exceeds the expected highest price in round k 1. The declining price "anomaly" could, therefore, be evidence of bidders' values featuring NIE or post-auction competition.
Author: Janine Aron
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Comercio exterior - Africa (Sub-Saharan)
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Author: Robert Zeithammer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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When capacity-constrained bidders have information about a good sold in a future auction, they need to take the information into account in forming today's bids. The capacity constraint makes even otherwise unrelated objects substitutes and creates an equilibrium link between future competition and current bidding strategy. This paper proves the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium under mild conditions on the population distribution of valuations, characterizes general properties of the equilibrium bidding strategy, and provides a simple technique for numerically approximating the bidding strategy for arbitrary valuation distributions. The key property of the equilibrium is that almost all bidders submit positive bids in the first stage, thereby ensuring trade with probability one. Even bidders who strongly prefer the second object submit a positive bid in the first auction, because losing the first auction is informative about the remaining competitors who also lost, and losing with a low bid indicates that these competitors are quite strong. Because of the guaranteed trade, the sequential auction with information about future goods is a very efficient trading mechanism, achieving more than 98 percent of the potential gains from trade across a wide variety of settings.
Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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