Author: Susan Athey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 51
Book Description
Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
Author: Susan Athey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 51
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 51
Book Description
Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
Author: Susan Athey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Games of Incomple Information
Author: Susan Athey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Book Description
The Existence of Pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium in Games with Payoffs that are Not Quasiconcave
Author: Michael R. Baye
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 62
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 62
Book Description
Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs
Author: Brian John Crone
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 212
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 212
Book Description
The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information
Author: Helmut Meister
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642502784
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 127
Book Description
The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642502784
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 127
Book Description
The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players
Author: Ali Khan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 33
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 33
Book Description
Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I
Author: Luis C. Corchón
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 178536328X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 567
Book Description
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 178536328X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 567
Book Description
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information
Author: David McAdams
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in which (1) each player i's action set is a finite sublattice of multi-dimensional Euclidean space, (2) types are multidimensional and atomless, and each player's interim expected payoff function satisfies two non-primitive conditions whenever others adopt isotone pure strategies: (3) single-crossing in own action and type and (4) quasisupermodularity in own action. Similarly, given that (134) and (2') types are multi-dimensional (with atoms) an isotone mixed strategy equilibrium exists. Conditions (34) are satisfied in supermodular and log-supermodular games given affiliated types, and in games with independent types in which each player's ex post payoff satisfies (a) supermodularity in own action and (b) non-decreasing differences in own action and type. These results also extend to games with a continuum action space when each player's ex post payoff is also continuous in his and others' actions.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in which (1) each player i's action set is a finite sublattice of multi-dimensional Euclidean space, (2) types are multidimensional and atomless, and each player's interim expected payoff function satisfies two non-primitive conditions whenever others adopt isotone pure strategies: (3) single-crossing in own action and type and (4) quasisupermodularity in own action. Similarly, given that (134) and (2') types are multi-dimensional (with atoms) an isotone mixed strategy equilibrium exists. Conditions (34) are satisfied in supermodular and log-supermodular games given affiliated types, and in games with independent types in which each player's ex post payoff satisfies (a) supermodularity in own action and (b) non-decreasing differences in own action and type. These results also extend to games with a continuum action space when each player's ex post payoff is also continuous in his and others' actions.
Handbook of Game Theory
Author: Petyon Young
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444537678
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 1025
Book Description
The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444537678
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 1025
Book Description
The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics