Simple Contracts, Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-Up Problem PDF Download

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Simple Contracts, Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-Up Problem

Simple Contracts, Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-Up Problem PDF Author: Patrick W. Schmitz
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Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
In this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non-trivial. It is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a simple contract that the parties have written ex ante. This result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold-up problem to be solved, even if the parties' valuations are private information.