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Author: Santiago J. Rubio
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. For this second stage we have studied both the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the feedback Nash equilibrium. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-loop or feedback strategies). We have also studied the effects of a minimum participation clause finding that for this case a self-enforcing IEA just consists of the number of countries established in the clause. The rationale for the low level of international cooperation that can be expected for controlling pollution is given by the fact that nonsignatories benefit from the emissions control supported by signatories because of the public bad nature of the pollution stock. The result is that signatories always do better by withdrawing from the agreement whenever the number of signatories is higher than two.
Author: Santiago J. Rubio
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. For this second stage we have studied both the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the feedback Nash equilibrium. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-loop or feedback strategies). We have also studied the effects of a minimum participation clause finding that for this case a self-enforcing IEA just consists of the number of countries established in the clause. The rationale for the low level of international cooperation that can be expected for controlling pollution is given by the fact that nonsignatories benefit from the emissions control supported by signatories because of the public bad nature of the pollution stock. The result is that signatories always do better by withdrawing from the agreement whenever the number of signatories is higher than two.
Author: Santiago J. Rubio
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement shows that if the signatories of an international environmental agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand coalition. Barrett obtains this result using numerical simulations in a pollution abatement model where he is not constraining emissions to be non-negative. Recent attempts to use analytical approaches and to explicitly recognize the non-negativity constraints have suggested that the number of signatories of a stable IEA may be very small. The way such papers have dealt with non-negativity constraints is to restrict parameter values to ensure interior solutions for emissions. We argue that a more appropriate approach is to use Kuhn-Tucker conditions to derive the equilibrium of the emissions game. When this is done we show, analytically, that the key results from Barrett's paper are maintained. Finally, we explain why his main conclusion is correct although his analysis can implicitly imply negative emissions.
Author: David M. McEvoy
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have typically employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing these agreements once they are in place. Most analyses of IEAs simply ignore the issue of enforcing compliance by parties to the terms of an agreement. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent enforcement body with the power to monitor the parties' compliance to the terms of the IEA and impose penalties in cases of noncompliance. This approach is broadly consistent with the enforcement mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol under the Marrakesh Accords. We find that costly enforcement limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to protect the environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs do form they will involve greater participation than IEAs that do not require costly enforcement. Consequently, costly enforcement of IEAs is associated with higher international environmental quality. Moreover, under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly enforcement. These conclusions are accentuated when monitoring for compliance to IEAs is inaccurate.
Author: Santiago J. Rubio
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Environmental law, International
Languages : en
Pages : 49
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Author: Scott Barrett
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ISBN:
Category : Environmental policy
Languages : en
Pages : 21
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Author: Effrosyni Diamantoudi
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Scott Barrett
Publisher:
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Category : Environmental policy
Languages : en
Pages : 21
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Author: Effrosyni Diamantoudi
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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The present paper examines the stability of self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) among heterogeneous countries in a two-stage emission game. In the first stage, each country decides whether or not to join the agreement, while in the second stage the quantity of emissions is chosen simultaneously by all countries. We use quadratic benefit and environmental damage functions and assume k types of countries that differ in their sensitivity to the global pollutant. We find that the introduction of heterogeneity does not yield larger stable coalitions. In particular, we show that, in the case of two types, when stable coalitions exist their size is very small, and, if the asymmetry is strong enough, they include only one type of countries. Moreover, heterogeneity can reduce the scope of cooperation relative to the homogeneous case. We demonstrated that introducing asymmetry into a stable, under symmetry, agreement can disturb stability.
Author: Bruno Nkuiya
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamic international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution, and the emission rate as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. We show numerically that at the initial date, as the length of commitment is increased, the potential gain from cooperation tends to diminish, increasing the disincentive to ratify the agreements. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements.
Author: Carsten Schmidt
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783906502519
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35
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