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Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011471
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372
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Book Description
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011471
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372
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Book Description
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Author: George R. Feiwel
Publisher: SUNY Press
ISBN: 9780873959421
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 512
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Book Description
This important book and its companion volume, Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, capture and convey the spirit, fundamental issues, underlying tensions, rich variety, accomplishments, and failures in contemporary economics. It presents economics as a dynamic subject, showing its strengths and limitations, exploring alternative approaches, and tracing the sources of differences. The essays include original contributions by the theorists themselves; major interpretations, reflections, and assessments by leading economists, and evaluations of particular areas by rising young scholars.
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
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Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: Sylvain Sorin
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9783540430285
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 228
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Book Description
This volume aims to present the basic results in the theory of two-person zero-sum repeated games including stochastic games and repeated games with incomplete information. It is intended for graduate students with no previous knowledge of the field.
Author: Jean-François Mertens
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110703020X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 597
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Book Description
This landmark work significantly advances the literature on game theory with a masterful conceptual presentation of the CORE working papers published in 1994.
Author: William Spaniel
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781492728153
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 273
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Book Description
Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook is a no-nonsense, games-centered introduction to strategic form (matrix) and extensive form (game tree) games. From the first lesson to the last, this textbook introduces games of increasing complexity and then teaches the game theoretical tools necessary to solve them. Quick, efficient, and to the point, Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook is perfect for introductory game theory, intermediate microeconomics, and political science.
Author: Melvin Dresher
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 140088201X
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 693
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Book Description
A classic treatment of game theory from the acclaimed Annals of Mathematics Studies series Princeton University Press is proud to have published the Annals of Mathematics Studies since 1940. One of the oldest and most respected series in science publishing, it has included many of the most important and influential mathematical works of the twentieth century. The series continues this tradition as Princeton University Press publishes the major works of the twenty-first century. To mark the continued success of the series, all books are available in paperback and as ebooks.
Author: Maurice Sion
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Concave functions
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Book Description
Author: Steve Tadelis
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691129088
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 416
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Book Description
The definitive introduction to game theory This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives. Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them. Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262303760
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 605
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Book Description
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.
