Relative Influence of the Managerial Power Dimension of Corporate Governance on Analysts' Earnings Forecast Accuracy in Large and Small Firms PDF Download
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Author: Kwadwo N. Asare
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
This study examines the influence of managerial power on analysts' earnings forecast accuracy. CEO/Chairperson duality and voting power of management on the board are used as proxies for managerial power. After controlling for key variables that have been shown to affect analysts' forecast accuracy in prior literature, this study indicates that managerial power is positively associated with analysts' earnings forecast errors for large firms, but not for small firms. The non-significant association between managerial power and forecast accuracy for small firms suggests that managerial power presents relatively less agency problems for small firms, while the inverse relationship between managerial power and forecast accuracy for large firms indicates that the managerial power dimension of corporate governance is a potential source of significant agency problems for large firms.
Author: Kwadwo N. Asare
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
This study examines the influence of managerial power on analysts' earnings forecast accuracy. CEO/Chairperson duality and voting power of management on the board are used as proxies for managerial power. After controlling for key variables that have been shown to affect analysts' forecast accuracy in prior literature, this study indicates that managerial power is positively associated with analysts' earnings forecast errors for large firms, but not for small firms. The non-significant association between managerial power and forecast accuracy for small firms suggests that managerial power presents relatively less agency problems for small firms, while the inverse relationship between managerial power and forecast accuracy for large firms indicates that the managerial power dimension of corporate governance is a potential source of significant agency problems for large firms.
Author: Carol Liu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
This study investigates whether effective audit committees influence the association between management earnings forecasts and the properties of analysts" forecasts. We posit that this influence on the part of an audit committee would likely result from increased responsibility for monitoring voluntary disclosure. Using the four attributes that the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and prior research suggest as being indicative of audit committee effectiveness, we find that analysts" forecasts exhibit higher accuracy and lower dispersion with the issuance of management forecasts for those firms employing audit committees that are composed exclusively of independent directors, include an accounting expert, and act with due diligence. We also find that effective audit committees strengthen the association between management and analyst forecast accuracy. Our evidence, therefore, supports the notion that effective corporate governance influences the reliability of voluntary disclosure, and thereby benefits the users of financial information.
Author: Lawrence D. Brown
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Managerial behavior differs considerably when managers report quarterly profits versus losses. When they report profits, managers seek to just meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. When they report losses, managers do not attempt to meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. Instead, managers often do not forewarn analysts of impending losses, and the analyst's signed error is likely to be negative and extreme (i.e., a measured optimistic bias). Brown (1997 Financial Analysts Journal) shows that the optimistic bias in analyst earnings forecasts has been mitigated over time, and that it is less pronounced for larger firms and firms followed by many analysts. In the present study, I offer three explanations for these temporal and cross-sectional phenomena. First, the frequency of profits versus losses may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. Since an optimistic bias in analyst forecasts is less likely to occur when firms report profits, an optimistic bias is less likely to be observed in samples possessing a relatively greater frequency of profits. Second, the tendency to report profits that just meet or slightly beat analyst estimates may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. A greater tendency to 'manage profits' (and analyst estimates) in this manner reduces the measured optimistic bias in analyst forecasts. Third, the tendency to forewarn analysts of impending losses may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. A greater tendency to 'manage losses' in this manner also reduces the measured optimistic bias in analyst forecasts. I provide the following temporal evidence. The optimistic bias in analyst forecasts pertains to both the entire sample and the losses sub-sample. In contrast, a pessimistic bias exists for the 85.3% of the sample that consists of reported profits. The temporal decrease in the optimistic bias documented by Brown (1997) pertains to both losses and profits. Analysts have gotten better at predicting the sign of a loss (i.e., they are much more likely to predict that a loss will occur than they used to), and they have reduced the number of extreme negative errors they make by two-thirds. Managers are much more likely to report profits that exactly meet or slightly beat analyst estimates than they used to. In contrast, they are less likely to report profits that fall a little short of analyst estimates than they used to. I conclude that the temporal reduction in optimistic bias is attributable to an increased tendency to manage both profits and losses. I find no evidence that there exists a temporal change in the profits-losses mix (using the I/B/E/S definition of reported quarterly profits and losses). I document the following cross-sectional evidence. The principle reason that larger firms have relatively less optimistic bias is that they are far less likely to report losses. A secondary reason that larger firms have relatively less optimistic bias is that their managers are relatively more likely to report profits that slightly beat analyst estimates. The principle reason that firms followed by more analysts have relatively less optimistic bias is that they are far less likely to report losses. A secondary reason that firms followed by more analysts have relatively less optimistic bias is that their managers are relatively more likely to report profits that exactly meet analyst estimates or beat them by one penny. I find no evidence that managers of larger firms or firms followed by more analysts are relatively more likely to forewarn analysts of impending losses. I conclude that cross-sectional differences in bias arise primarily from differential 'loss frequencies,' and secondarily from differential 'profits management.' The paper discusses implications of the results for studies of analysts forecast bias, earnings management, and capital markets. It concludes with caveats and directions for future research.
Author: Minna Yu
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780549075219
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 132
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Book Description
Abstract not available.
Author: Jennifer Francis
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601981147
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 97
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Book Description
This review lays out a research perspective on earnings quality. We provide an overview of alternative definitions and measures of earnings quality and a discussion of research design choices encountered in earnings quality research. Throughout, we focus on a capital markets setting, as opposed, for example, to a contracting or stewardship setting. Our reason for this choice stems from the view that the capital market uses of accounting information are fundamental, in the sense of providing a basis for other uses, such as stewardship. Because resource allocations are ex ante decisions while contracting/stewardship assessments are ex post evaluations of outcomes, evidence on whether, how and to what degree earnings quality influences capital market resource allocation decisions is fundamental to understanding why and how accounting matters to investors and others, including those charged with stewardship responsibilities. Demonstrating a link between earnings quality and, for example, the costs of equity and debt capital implies a basic economic role in capital allocation decisions for accounting information; this role has only recently been documented in the accounting literature. We focus on how the precision of financial information in capturing one or more underlying valuation-relevant constructs affects the assessment and use of that information by capital market participants. We emphasize that the choice of constructs to be measured is typically contextual. Our main focus is on the precision of earnings, which we view as a summary indicator of the overall quality of financial reporting. Our intent in discussing research that evaluates the capital market effects of earnings quality is both to stimulate further research in this area and to encourage research on related topics, including, for example, the role of earnings quality in contracting and stewardship.
Author: Stephen P. Baginski
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
The 1990s were characterized by substantial increases in the performance of and investor reliance on financial analysts. Because managers possess superior private information and issue forecasts to align investors' expectations with their own, we predict that managers increased the quality of their earnings forecasts during the 1990s in order to keep pace with the improved forward-looking information provided by financial analysts, upon which investors increasingly relied.Using a sample of 2,437 management earnings forecasts, we document an increase in management earnings forecast precision, management earnings forecast accuracy, and managers' tendency to explain earnings forecasts in 1993-1996 relative to 1983-1986. Given that these forecast characteristics are linked to greater informativeness and credibility, we also document that the information content of management earnings forecasts, as measured by the strength of share price responses to forecast news, increased in 1993-1996 relative to 1983-1986. As expected, the increased information content of management forecasts primarily occurred for firms covered by financial analysts.
Author: Joshua Ronen
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 0387257713
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 587
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Book Description
This book is a study of earnings management, aimed at scholars and professionals in accounting, finance, economics, and law. The authors address research questions including: Why are earnings so important that firms feel compelled to manipulate them? What set of circumstances will induce earnings management? How will the interaction among management, boards of directors, investors, employees, suppliers, customers and regulators affect earnings management? How to design empirical research addressing earnings management? What are the limitations and strengths of current empirical models?
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 562
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Book Description
Author: Thu Phuong Truong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporate governance
Languages : en
Pages : 438
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Book Description
Author: Alexander Gabriel Kerl
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Book Description
This paper examines whether star-analysts have better forecasting abilities than non-star-analysts. Our results reveal that star-analysts' earnings forecasts outperform their peers' forecasts. Because the level of corporate governance plays an important role for the general level of forecast accuracy, we furthermore investigate whether star-analysts benefit from higher levels of governance. Our findings suggest that forecast accuracy of star-analysts increases with the level of both country- and company-specific corporate governance. Investors in capital markets do not seem to be aware of this fact because they do not react differently to forecasts issued by star-analysts compared to those of non-star-analysts.
