Regulatory Competition in the Single Market PDF Download
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Author: Jeanne-Mey Sun
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789290791713
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
Author: Jeanne-Mey Sun
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789290791713
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
Author: Henri Tjiong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 128
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Book Description
Author: Stefano Lombardo
Publisher: Peter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der Wissenschaften
ISBN:
Category : Conflict of laws
Languages : en
Pages : 250
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Book Description
The work challenges the commonly accepted idea that the European single market needs a harmonized company law as a precondition for its correct functioning, on the basis of a law and economics comparison with the American situation. The study critically analyzes the two major reasons advanced to justify harmonization - the race to the bottom argument and the standardization argument - on the basis of the regulatory competition paradigm and concludes that they are basically wrong. Instead of pursuing harmonization of substantive company law, the proposal is to adjust conflict of law rules in favor of the incorporation theory as ruled by the European Court of Justice in its important Centros-decision of March 1999. Companies should be granted freedom of establishment and free movement among jurisdictions in the European Union.
Author: Giampaolo Galli
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781782541806
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 552
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Book Description
Throughout the book the authors aim to show how the market can function more efficiently and offer policy recommendations to show how regulatory reform can improve competitiveness at the firm level as well as performance at the industry, national and EU levels.
Author: Michelle Egan
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191529524
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 382
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Book Description
Efforts to tackle the trade impeding effects of divergent standards and regulations are at the core of European economic relations. This volume draws on literature from several disciplines to develop a comprehensive account of the regulatory strategies and institutional arrangements adopted by the EU in promoting the single market in goods. It provides a historical overview and detailed cases studies of the various policy initiatives that have altered the boundaries between the public and private sector in fostering market integration. Tackling interstate barriers to trade has relied heavily on European law to shape the framework of relations between states, and trade liberalization has been facilitated by legal rulings resolving territorial conflicts over regulatory jurisdiction and authority. The European Court of Justice has actively shaped markets, acting as a 'free trade umpire' in balancing the goals of market liberalization and market regulation while fostering market compliance. Although markets are absolutely dependent on public authority, the institutional innovation of the EU has been to use the private sector in an ancillary role to the state. By delegating responsibility to set standards for market access, the EU has chosen to draw on the resources of private actors, resulting in a system of governance that is a distinctive, hybrid model of regulation composed of state and non-state actors. Though the "outsourcing" of public sector regulatory activity was expected to be more effective than the process of regulatory harmonization, progress has been difficult. The current deficit in setting standards for European-wide market access raises concerns about the efficiency and effectiveness of such a regulatory regime. Egan provides a detailed evaluation of that process, highlighting regulatory gaps in the single market and the need to focus not only on the process of market integration, but also its outcome and impact on European business. Comparisons with American efforts to create a national market are made throughout to demonstrate the difficulties of constructing and maintaining a single market. American and European efforts to devise a uniform market for commerce and trade have involved both public and private authorities, though with different degrees of coordination and centralization, as many of the strategies undertaken by the EU echo earlier American market-building efforts.
Author: Catherine Barnard
Publisher: Hart Publishing
ISBN: 1841132713
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 455
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Book Description
This book explores the legal foundations of the single market project in Europe and examines the legal concepts underpinning its operation.
Author: David Bailey
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 9780198794752
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Competition Law and Policy in the EU --Article 101(1) --Article 101(3) --Market Definition --Cartels --Non-Covert Horizontal Cooperation --Vertical Agreements Affecting Distribution or Supply --Merger Control --Intellectual Property Rights --Article 102 --The Competition Rules and the Acts of Member States --Sectoral Regimes --Enforcement and Procedure --Fines for Substantive Infringements --The Enforcement of the Competition Rules by National Competition Authorities --Litigating Infringements in National Courts --State Aids.
Author: S.J. Berwin & Co
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 324
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Book Description
Examines the impact of EC competition rules and business regulation from the point of view of British businesses and explains how these rules create a new dynamic legal environment leading to both organic growth and growth in partnership with other EC companies and firms.
Author: Henri I.T Tjiong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Regulatory competition is increasingly becoming the dominant argument on regulatory structure in both the debate on federalism in the United States and that on subsidiarity in the European Union. The argument, briefly put, is that regulatory competition might produce efficiency benefits that justify yielding federal or harmonized regulation in favor of decentralizing governance. The present direction in this debate is to identify in which contexts and under what circumstances these efficiency benefits are likely. This paper intends to contribute to this debate by analyzing the proposition that regulatory competition can be understood as an argument of regulatory structure modeled on the principles of market order. The purpose of this paper is to clarify but ultimately to challenge the wisdom of this intriguing argument. Regulatory competition is an intriguing and sophisticated argument which, as it deals with interpreting the complex dynamic between political and economic integration, deserves to be spelled out in full and with considerable care. The persuasive force of regulatory competition as an academic proposition however lies in the double efficiency argument hidden in it. Regulatory competition can be and is most often understood as a macro-argument for federal governance structures in that these allow for extrinsic efficiency benefits in the form of experimentation and innovation at a broad scale (economies of scope). But regulatory competition can also be framed as a force for improving the intrinsic efficiency of regulations by allowing actors to structure their need for economic coordination to their own liking, thus incorporating the preferences of consumers into the structure of regulation (a micro argument). The debate in the US after several critiques which expressed frustration at the broadness and inexactness of the initial macro arguments has steadily moved on to focus on the micro argument which attempts to detail the instances and conditions under which regulatory competition might indeed work to improve the intrinsic efficiency of regulation. Regulatory competition, to the extent that actors internalize the costs of their decision, has come to be viewed as a largely untapped mechanism for improving the efficiency of rules in a potentially wide range of legal domains. The European debate appreciates regulatory competition in light of the common market and the effort to reduce regulatory trade barriers. Regulatory competition is treated here under the nomers of standortwettbewerb, competition among rules, institutional competition or competition over organizational arrangements. Regulatory competition is argued essentially in its macro form: Negative integration leads to economic flows of mobility unleashing arbitrage over regulatory policies. The room left for this type of arbitrage by existing harmonization measures is the topic of continuing discussion among commission officials, political scientists and economists. Generally, the European Commission perceives regulatory differences to be undesirable as it will interfere with the common market or result in-what is seen as-unfair competition. Hence, the Commission has embarked upon harmonization commonly without reference to the scale of economic arbitrage to be expected. We may observe this from Commission efforts in fields as disparate as taxation (where economic arbitrage is very much prevalent) and social or environmental regulation (where economic arbitrage is much less strong). It seems that regulatory competition plays a role only in so far as it allows the Commission to construct it as a credible threat to the ability of individual member state governments to pursue national policies unilaterally. The political use of the regulatory competition argument in this way seems to favor cooperation rather than competition. Political scientists explain regulatory competition as a game in which national regulators are interested in bringing forward national policy approaches at the EU level which minimize the degree of institutional adaptation to European legislation and possibly confers a competitive advantage to domestic producers. Economists construct regulatory competition as an allocative efficiency argument made possible by the existence of different centers of rule-production in Europe. To the extent that rules or regulations have economic implications inducing arbitrage or the threat of arbitrage, competition among rules is seen to correlate with the-perceived-number of exit options offered by the internal market. Normative welfare economics and the Tiebout model suggests that legal heterogeneity may create regulatory arbitrage as a result of the normal arbitrage occurring in the markets, thus hitching regulatory competition on the process of market competition and producing additional avenues for improving regulatory efficiency. To be sure, regulatory arbitrage is limited by progressively increasing opportunity costs that would limit the scope of such arbitrage (consumers would move until the erosion of the tax base would threaten the possibility of providing the desired public goods). In addition, externalities limit the case for allocative efficiency of regulatory heterogeneity further and justify efforts for positive integration at a higher political level that can internalize the costs of negative externalities. This essay aims to analyze the positive and normative claims put forward by regulatory competition theorists on both sides of the Atlantic. It is structured as follows. Part II starts with an account of the Tiebout model-generally considered to be the analytical backbone of regulatory competition arguments. It preludes the discussion on regulatory competition by developing a caveat on the Tiebout hypothesis of voting with feet focusing on the inadequate conception of politics within the model. Part III discusses regulatory competition in its macro form and uses the European debate on regulatory competition to elucidate factual mechanisms of arbitrage which are supposed to underpin the competitive process. Regulatory competition in this context is seen as embedded within institutional efforts toward economic integration and mutual recognition. This portion of the essay examines the internal logic of the argument and argues that even if regulatory competition were to operate as conceived, the factual mechanisms of economic arbitrage in a regulatory market do not justify the application of normative welfare economics to demonstrate an invisible hand in the market for regulations. Part IV develops an external critique focussing on the behavorial assumptions (derived from economic theory) that structure regulatory competition theory. It argues for relaxing these assumptions and working toward a more credible and richer set of hypotheses about regulatory behavior. It discusses regulatory competition in its micro form and examines the conditions structuring the problematic proposition that regulatory competition ipso facto is a force that can attribute to intrinsic regulatory efficiency. Part V attempts to formulate the case of regulatory competition from the perspective of post-international politics. Part VI finally recapitulates the theoretical argument made so far and develops some of its positive and normative implications. The article concludes by outlining a new investigative orientation to the problem of regulatory exit and by demonstrating some ramifications of the argument for policy purposes.
Author: Tinne Heremans
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1847318797
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 388
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Book Description
Professional services are a key component of the EU internal market economy yet also significantly challenge the legal framework governing this internal market. Indeed, specific professional regulatory structures, which are often the result of a blend of government and self-regulation, hold clear potential for conflict with EU free movement and competition law rules. Hence this book looks at the manner in which both free movement and competition laws might apply to such self- and co-regulatory set-ups, and at the leeway given to quality considerations (apparently) conflicting with free movement or competition objectives. In addition, since court action will seldom suffice to genuinely integrate a market, the book also explores those instruments of EU secondary legislation that are likely to impact the most on the provision of professional services. However, the book goes beyond a mere inventory to ask how EU Internal Market policy could contribute to the optimal legal environment for professional services. A law and economics analysis is employed to investigate the need for specific professional rules, the preferred type of regulator (self-, co- or government regulation), and the level - national and/or European - at which regulation should be adopted. As becomes clear, the story of the market for professional services is one of market and government failure; the author is thus left to compare imperfect situations where market failures compete with rent-seeking efforts, the tendency towards over-centralisation and national protectionism. This book offers both an in-depth legal analysis of the EU framework as it applies to professional services as well as a more normative evaluation of this framework based on insights from law and economics scholarship. It will therefore be a valuable resource for all practitioners, policy-makers and academics dealing with professional services, as well as, more generally, with questions of quality and self-regulation.
