Real Earnings Management by Benchmark-Beating Firms PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Real Earnings Management by Benchmark-Beating Firms PDF full book. Access full book title Real Earnings Management by Benchmark-Beating Firms by Brooke Beyer. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Brooke Beyer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 54
Get Book Here
Book Description
Prior studies document both an improvement and deterioration in the future operating performance of firms engaging in real earnings management (REM) to meet earnings benchmarks. These results suggest that some firms use REM to signal their favorable prospects, whereas others use REM opportunistically. We hypothesize that firms with less robust information environments, more costly REM, and fewer incentives to meet short-term earnings benchmarks are more likely to engage in REM to signal future performance. Consistent with expectations, we find the positive relation between REM and future profitability is limited to firms that have less robust information environments (measured with stock return volatility, bid/ask spread, and analysts following), more costly REM (measured with market share and financial health), and fewer incentives to meet short-term earnings benchmarks (measured with market-to-book ratio, transient investors, and seasoned equity offering). In supplementary analysis, we note that Bhojraj et al. (2009) restrict their sample to relatively large firms, whereas Gunny's (2010) sample includes both large and small firms. Our analysis indicates that the difference in sample composition explains the differing results. We find that small firms use REM to signal positive future performance, but large firms do not.
Author: Brooke Beyer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 54
Get Book Here
Book Description
Prior studies document both an improvement and deterioration in the future operating performance of firms engaging in real earnings management (REM) to meet earnings benchmarks. These results suggest that some firms use REM to signal their favorable prospects, whereas others use REM opportunistically. We hypothesize that firms with less robust information environments, more costly REM, and fewer incentives to meet short-term earnings benchmarks are more likely to engage in REM to signal future performance. Consistent with expectations, we find the positive relation between REM and future profitability is limited to firms that have less robust information environments (measured with stock return volatility, bid/ask spread, and analysts following), more costly REM (measured with market share and financial health), and fewer incentives to meet short-term earnings benchmarks (measured with market-to-book ratio, transient investors, and seasoned equity offering). In supplementary analysis, we note that Bhojraj et al. (2009) restrict their sample to relatively large firms, whereas Gunny's (2010) sample includes both large and small firms. Our analysis indicates that the difference in sample composition explains the differing results. We find that small firms use REM to signal positive future performance, but large firms do not.
Author: Fanghong Jiao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business forecasting
Languages : en
Pages : 117
Get Book Here
Book Description
Real earnings management (REM) has gained more attention due to its more extensive application than that before the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Analysts' earnings forecast is an important benchmark for both the investors and the managers. Gunny (2010) finds that the signaling of future prospects overcomes the possibility of opportunism in firms that occasionally use REM to meet/closely beat benchmarks. However, the effect of repeatedly using REM to meet/beat earnings benchmarks has not been explored. This paper examines the long-term economic performance (Tobin's Q) of firms that utilize REM to habitually meet/closely beat analysts' earnings forecasts (HabitMBE). The results suggest that in equilibrium, while HabitMBE firms in general enjoy a market premium, HabitMBE firms that use REM repeatedly are penalized by investors, and the market premium disappears. Not surprisingly, I find that HabitMBE firms that have already used REM repeatedly try to curtail its use - a finding that is not found for occasional REM meeting/close beating firms. Another interesting finding of this study is that analysts' downward forecast revision in the long-run has a significantly negative effect on firms' economic performance, which prior studies have not clearly documented.
Author: Ahsan Habib
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Get Book Here
Book Description
Abstract: This paper synthesises a new strand of earnings management research that uses distribution of reported earnings to detect earnings management instead of using discretionary accruals (DACCR), the conventional proxy for earnings management. The theoretical foundation for benchmark beating approach is derived from the 'prospect theory' developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) which shows that losses are more displeasing than the equivalent gain when evaluated from a particular reference point. Three such reference points are identified in the 'benchmark beating' literature, namely (i) avoiding losses; (ii) reporting small increase in earnings; and (iii) meeting or just beating analyst forecasts. Review of the empirical literature shows that there is an unusual discontinuity around zero for earnings level, earnings change and analyst forecasts than expected. Managers use available flexibilities under GAPP like deferred tax expense, tax expense, stock repurchase, restructuring charge reversals etc. to manage earnings for the purpose of achieving earnings thresholds. Research shows that stock-based compensation packages offered to managers is an important motivation for managers to engage in meeting or beating earnings thresholds. However, corporate governance mechanism like shareholder protection constrains managerial ability to meet or beat benchmark. Limitations of 'benchmark beating' literature for standard-setters are identified and some future research directions are provided.
Author: Eti Einhorn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Get Book Here
Book Description
Our analysis is rooted in the notion that stockholders can learn about the fundamental value of any particular firm from observing the earnings reports of its rivals. We argue that such intra-industry information transfers, which have been broadly documented in the empirical literature, may motivate managers to alter stockholders' beliefs about the value of their firm not only by manipulating their own earnings report but also by influencing the earnings reports of rival firms. Managers obviously do not have access to the accounting system of peer firms, but they can nevertheless influence the earnings reports of rival firms by distorting real transactions that relate to the product market competition. We demonstrate such managerial behavior, which we refer to as cross-firm real earnings management, and explore its potential consequences and its interrelation with the practice of accounting-based earnings management within an industry setting with imperfect (non-proprietary) accounting information.
Author: Naibuka Uluilakeba Saune
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Benchmarking (Management)
Languages : en
Pages : 328
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author:
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3964875953
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 81
Get Book Here
Book Description
Master's Thesis from the year 2019 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, University of Duisburg-Essen, course: Master Thesis, language: English, abstract: This paper delves into various theories and approaches, aiming to define and differentiate earnings management from related concepts such as fraud, expectation management, and impression management. It explores the goals and incentives driving earnings management, including maximizing or minimizing earnings, beating targets, and smoothing. At the onset of the new millennium, corporate scandals rocked the business world, eroding trust in management, boards of directors, and the accounting profession. In response, regulations and policies aimed at enhancing corporate governance and financial reporting were swiftly implemented. The credibility, clarity, and consistency of financial reporting practices play a pivotal role in enabling investors to make informed decisions. Accurate and fair financial performance representations, as opposed to inflated and misleading figures, are essential for market players, including shareholders and creditors. Investors rely on audited financial reports to guide their investment decisions, underscoring the critical importance of accuracy and reliability in publicly available financial disclosures. Auditors, by reducing the risk of material misstatement, ensure the integrity of the information disclosed in a company's financial statements. Management, with the goal of achieving promised targets and ensuring the company's existence, may engage in earnings management as a strategic contribution to corporate policy. Financial reporting serves as a means to distinguish well-performing companies from their counterparts, facilitating efficient resource allocation and empowering stakeholders to make effective decisions. The disclosed earnings results significantly impact a firm's overall business activities and management decisions, particularly in satisfying analysts' expectations, which can influence equity value. While accounting standards play a role, the quality of financial statements is more influenced by company-specific and institutional factors shaping managers' incentives. These factors lead to financial reporting practices being viewed as the outcome of a cost-benefit assessment.
Author: Basiem Al-Shattarat
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Craig J. Chapman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
Prior research hypothesizes managers strategically time retail price promotions to manage reported earnings. However, the reaction of competitors to such real earnings management behavior is less well studied. Consistent with the prior research, I show evidence that firms use fiscal quarter-end price promotions to accelerate sales inter-temporally in order to meet earnings targets they would otherwise have missed. By analyzing the combination of price promotions and earnings management incentives across the fiscal year, I demonstrate that firms respond more aggressively to the earnings management incentives of their competitors than to their pricing. I further show that price discounts related to earnings management incentives persist in subsequent reporting periods. These results highlight the complexity of corporate behavior in a real earnings management setting and the need to adequately control for competitor response in related research. Furthermore, they imply that firms with earnings management incentives encourage competitive responses, regardless of whether they actually reduce prices themselves. Subsequent text analysis of earnings related conference calls shows frequent examples of statements consistent with firms attempting to signal stable pricing commitments, possibly to discourage this type of competitive response.
Author: Denise Leggett
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
Real Earnings Management (REM) is the manipulation of business activities to meet an earning's threshold. Despite concern that REM activities create real economic costs, research on the relation between REM and subsequent operating performance is inconclusive. In this paper, a two-firm-level method of estimating abnormal discretionary expenditures is developed and a more proactive method of identifying REM activity is implemented. Using firm-level estimates of abnormal expenditures, strong evidence of REM negatively related to subsequent period return on assets and cash flows from operations is found. The results suggest that the inconclusive results in prior research may be in part due to estimating abnormal expenditures using industry-level models.
Author: Ann-Kristin Achleitner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
We examine the effects of family firms on real earnings management (REM) and accrual-based earnings management (ABEM). Using socioemotional wealth (SEW) as a theoretical framework and considering the different implications of REM and ABEM on family firms' transgenerational sustainability, we hypothesize and find for a sample of 402 German listed family firms during 1998-2008, that family firms engage less in REM and exhibit more earnings-decreasing ABEM policies as compared to a sample of 436 non-family firms. We further provide evidence that family firms as compared to non-family firms treat REM and ABEM as substitute rather than complementary tools for earnings management. Overall, our findings suggest that family firms use earnings management activities strategically, avoiding those that inhibit the firm's long-term value (i.e. REM) and engaging in those that help families retain transgenerational control (i.e. ABEM).
