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Author: David Roth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Pricing
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Author: David Roth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Pricing
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Author: David Easley
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Louis Phlips
Publisher: Luxembourg : Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 84
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Author: Shilpi Bhattacharya
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
The assumption on which much of antitrust law is based is that firms are rational, profit maximizers. Yet, the large firms of today prefer to grow aggressively by sacrificing profits. This paper argues that it is time for antitrust law to reconsider the assumption of profit maximization, particularly for conduct like predatory pricing where it plays a central role. Such reconsideration requires a careful study of firm behaviour. The object of this paper is to conduct such a study. Inspired by the work of scholars from the 'Carnegie School' this paper explores how the view of the firm as boundedly rational could help to enrich the understanding of predatory pricing in antitrust law as it readies for the digital age. A key insight of the Carnegie School was that firms should be studied through individual observation. Accordingly this paper conducts case studies of specific contexts of predatory pricing in order to observe and better understand firm behaviour in these contexts. This paper also emphasizes the importance of insights from the discipline of strategic management in business studies to predatory pricing law. This paper finds that predatory pricing is often a boundedly rational response to competition. This begs reconsideration of concepts such as recoupment and cost thresholds in predatory pricing law that assume firm rationality. This paper concludes with suggestions about how predatory pricing law may be shaped by insights from management studies.
Author: Leo Hirai
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Predatory pricing
Languages : en
Pages : 164
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Author: William S. Comanor
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Author: James A. Dalton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
John McGee's 1958 paper, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ) Case, has had an astonishing influence on both antitrust policy in the United States and economic lore. McGee argued that predatory pricing is irrational and his analysis of the Standard Oil Company Matter, decided in 1911, led him to conclude that the Record in this case does not show that Standard Oil engaged in predatory pricing. This single publication appears to serve as a foundation of the U.S. Supreme Court's position on the issue of predatory pricing, as well as the assertion by many economists that predatory pricing is irrational and rarely occurs.Numerous arguments have been advanced during the past 25 years that predatory pricing can be a rational strategy. As to McGee's empirical findings, there has been no re-examination of the Record of the Standard Oil case to determine the validity of his finding that the trial Record does not support the claim that Standard Oil engaged in predatory pricing.We examined this Record and have found that the trial Record contains considerable evidence of predatory pricing by Standard Oil. Therefore, the Record does not support McGee's conclusion that Standard Oil did not engage in predatory pricing. Thus, the decisions of the Supreme Court in recent years, as well as the opinions of many economists, concerning predatory pricing are not consistent with either current theory or the empirical record.
Author: Sandeep Vaheesan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
Empirical research has found evidence of predatory pricing in a number of industries. Leading firms in airlines, coffee, oil, shipping, sugar, telecommunications, and tobacco have used deep, temporary price cuts to weaken their competitors and preserve or enhance their long-run market power. Even though studies dating back to the 1970s have shown that predatory pricing is a rational and not uncommon strategy, the Supreme Court has asserted that “predatory pricing is rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.” On this basis, the Court has established a pro-monopolist and anti-consumer test for predatory pricing claims.Incorporating the empirical findings, the proposed test for predation aims to strike a better balance between the two risks for all legal rules -- false positives (condemning innocent defendants for predatory pricing) and false negatives (acquitting defendants that engaged in predation). To establish a presumption of predation, plaintiffs would have to satisfy market structure and price-cost tests. Defendants would then have the opportunity to rebut this presumption through the showing of credible procompetitive justifications for their pricing practices. This test would create a wide safe harbor for vigorous price competition but also deter aggressive price discounting that reduces competition and harms consumers in the medium and long run.
Author: Bruce H. Kobayashi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 160
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Author: Patrick Bolton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper proposes a new legal rule on predatory pricing based on strategic analysis. The Supreme Court's decision in Brooke with its emphasis on closely analyzing the scheme of predation and recoupment calls for such an analysis. At the same time economic development over the last 20 years of a rigorous analysis of predatory pricing provides the tools required to achieve a more effective legal policy. Economics can now explain when predation can be rational, or in Brooke's terms when it can enable profitable recoupment, casting new light on earlier examples of predatory pricing. The further challenge for legal analysis is to develop workable legal rules to guide enforcement agency policy and judicial decisions. To accomplish this we propose a structured rule of reason, including a fully specified efficiencies defense. Under such an approach enforcement would focus on cases where market structure and conduct makes predation plausible and where anticompetitive effects have occurred, or are dangerously probable. Equally important, the finding of predation would be subject to an efficiencies justification where below-cost pricing is necessary to achieve significant efficiencies, including dynamic efficiencies.
