Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report. Tactical Control Squadron Operations in SEAsia PDF Download
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 78
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In late 1961, when the United States accelerated aid to South Vietnam and Thailand, communications and control facilities were primitive and limited. A rudimentary Air Traffic Control System existed, using high frequency (HF) radio for communications and low frequency beacons for navigational aids. This was sufficient to handle the commercial traffic and existing military traffic. Increased U.S. air involvement, made necessary by the rapidly growing Communist guerrilla activities in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand soon created a need for a comprehensive air request net and Tactical Air Control system (TACS) to control efficiently this increase in military traffic. On 1 October 1961, the 5th Communications and Control Group and the 1st Mobile Communications Squadron were reorganized. The two 5th Communications and Control Squadrons were deactivated and their personnel and equipment became absorbed in the 1st Mobile Communications Squadron, which was then redesignated the 1st Mobile Communications Group under the Air Force Communications Service. The 605th Tactical Control Squadron was deactivated, and the 5th Communications and Control Group became the 5th Tactical Control Group under the Thirteenth Air Force at Clark Air Base, Philippines. The USAF initially inserted TDY units into South Vietnam and Thailand in November 1961, with elements of the 5th and 507th (Shaw AFB, South Carolina) Tactical Control Groups and the 1st Mobile Communications Group (MCG), which had already acquired the sobriquet of "1st Mob." These mobile units consisted basically of navigational aids (navaids) and single channel high frequency radio systems to link the widely spread activities. As the tempo of operations increased and the extent of USAF participation grew to match the increase insurgency activity, these communications systems proved barely adequate for several reasons. The nucleus for a TACS in Southeast Asia had, however, been formed.
Author:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 78
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Book Description
In late 1961, when the United States accelerated aid to South Vietnam and Thailand, communications and control facilities were primitive and limited. A rudimentary Air Traffic Control System existed, using high frequency (HF) radio for communications and low frequency beacons for navigational aids. This was sufficient to handle the commercial traffic and existing military traffic. Increased U.S. air involvement, made necessary by the rapidly growing Communist guerrilla activities in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand soon created a need for a comprehensive air request net and Tactical Air Control system (TACS) to control efficiently this increase in military traffic. On 1 October 1961, the 5th Communications and Control Group and the 1st Mobile Communications Squadron were reorganized. The two 5th Communications and Control Squadrons were deactivated and their personnel and equipment became absorbed in the 1st Mobile Communications Squadron, which was then redesignated the 1st Mobile Communications Group under the Air Force Communications Service. The 605th Tactical Control Squadron was deactivated, and the 5th Communications and Control Group became the 5th Tactical Control Group under the Thirteenth Air Force at Clark Air Base, Philippines. The USAF initially inserted TDY units into South Vietnam and Thailand in November 1961, with elements of the 5th and 507th (Shaw AFB, South Carolina) Tactical Control Groups and the 1st Mobile Communications Group (MCG), which had already acquired the sobriquet of "1st Mob." These mobile units consisted basically of navigational aids (navaids) and single channel high frequency radio systems to link the widely spread activities. As the tempo of operations increased and the extent of USAF participation grew to match the increase insurgency activity, these communications systems proved barely adequate for several reasons. The nucleus for a TACS in Southeast Asia had, however, been formed.
Author: Melvin F. Porter
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ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 167
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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This CHECO report relates the methods employed in introducing the OV-10 aircraft into the Southeast Asia combat functions. The evaluation process of an unbiased COMBAT BRONCO team proved the superiority of OV-10 aircraft operating as a FAC vehicle. The OV-10 unit's organization, deployment, manning, and crew training in their relationship to the Tactical Air Control System are also reviewed. The final chapter outlines the advantages and disadvantages of the OV-10 and presents recommendations which might improve its effectiveness.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 74
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The traditional interpretation of the tactical reconnaissance mission as a highly mobile, self-sufficient operation prepared to "know continuously the enemy's capabilities and location" has been reemphasized by the recent military experience in Southeast Asia. A premium has been placed by several factors on the element of surprise, on detection of an enemy able to conceal himself more effectively than ever before, and on the most rapid possible response to requirements established by ground and air forces. Many axioms guiding reconnaissance organization and operations in the past have been reexamined and questioned in the light of conditions encountered in Southeast Asia. The task of providing "needed intelligence information during all phases and for the full spectrum of conflict" has created special problems yet to be fully resolved. This report reviews the expansion and growth in sophistication of the tactical reconnaissance mission in Southeast Asia (SEA) conducted by the United States Air Force from June 1966 to June 1969, noting at the same time the salient problems involved. Tactical reconnaissance emphasizes flexibility in its organization and operation; it can be deployed in package units or through various combinations of reconnaissance aircraft, sensors, and other detection devices as required by the joint force. The Wing, therefore, constitutes the basic tactical unit, small enough to fulfill mobility requirements and still provide from its own resources all the services of a tactical reconnaissance system. The broad scope of the Wing's mission can be seen in a summary of the work of the 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB).
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 74
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The purpose of this CHECO report is to explore the most sophisticated means of interservice coordination yet employed in combat operations: The Southeast Asia Tactical Data Systems Interface. The Tactical Data Systems Interface was the computerized bond between the three tactical data systems in Southeast Asia, and, as such, it was a unique experiment in the control of airpower. For the first time, the tactical data systems of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were linked to exchange significant information almost instantaneously. As a result, the control center's Battle Commander had access to a near real time display of air data, which proved of immeasurable value to combat air operations in Southeast Asia from 1968 to 1973. When this report was prepared, most of the senior Seventh Air Force personnel who were experienced and knowledgeable regarding the interface were no longer in Southeast Asia, thus precluding interviews with key staff officers. Reliance was therefore placed on the numerous messages, letters, and unit working papers available on microfilm. However, CHECO's microfilm library does not contain a complete picture of a subject as far-reaching as the Tactical Data Systems Interface. Consequently, it should be emphasized that this monograph is not a final report. This document provides a starting point for exploring the Story of the USAF's role in the Tactical Data Systems Interface, but the reader should recognize that future research will produce data which may yield new perspectives on this subject. This report is in five parts.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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The term "short round," of artillery inception, described a shell which fell short of its target. In Air Force employment, this term is somewhat altered: "A short round incident is defined as the air delivery of ordnance which results in injury or death to friendly military forces or noncombatants." This CHECO report depicts those short rounds delivered by fixed-wing aircraft, specifically those under the operational control of the Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). This report encompasses "short round" incidents reported from January through December 1971. It emphasizes a narrative of each incident with the factors leading up to the incident, the investigating officer's conclusions and recommendations, and the efforts made by commanders to minimize the recurrence of the accidental release of air-delivered ordnance on friendly military forces or noncombatants. A review of the authenticated "short rounds" in CHECO reports of previous years revealed that these incidents basically followed a general pattern of primary and contributing causes: pilot error, poor weather conditions, troop location unknown, weapon system malfunction, wrong target hit due to ground personnel error, poor communications, change in the ground situation, and inaccurate target marking. However, it was also noted that in a troops-in-contact situation the chance of a short round must be weighed against the possibility of heavy losses if close air support is not provided.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 64
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An important by-product of the war in Southeast Asia was USAF experimentation with new aerial tactics ... the use of on-board aircraft in unaccustomed roles ... for broad and varied functions. This report outlines the evolution of the jet Forward Air Controllers (FACs) from their initial experimental flight in mid-1967 to their expansion in the Strike Control and Reconnaissance (SCAR) role two years later. Although usually called Forward Air Controllers, the term "jet FACs" will be used throughout this document to distinguish this mission from that of the slow-moving FAC/SCARs flying O-1, O-2A, and OV-10 aircraft.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 107
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This report describes the evolution of Tactical Electronic Warfare (TEW) operations in Southeast Asia from 1962 to 1968. It addresses the technological or mechanical aspects of electronics equipment only if necessary to clarify tactical air operations. Sensitivity of various electronic activities in SEA limited accessibility to certain types of information. "Tactical Electronic Warfare Operations in SEA" blends together all activities which were a part of the framework of TEW operations in that area. The last chapter summarizes and assesses several significant developments in these operations.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 61
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Book Description
Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.
