Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report. Southeast Asia Tactical Data Systems Interface PDF Download
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Languages : en
Pages : 74
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Book Description
The purpose of this CHECO report is to explore the most sophisticated means of interservice coordination yet employed in combat operations: The Southeast Asia Tactical Data Systems Interface. The Tactical Data Systems Interface was the computerized bond between the three tactical data systems in Southeast Asia, and, as such, it was a unique experiment in the control of airpower. For the first time, the tactical data systems of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were linked to exchange significant information almost instantaneously. As a result, the control center's Battle Commander had access to a near real time display of air data, which proved of immeasurable value to combat air operations in Southeast Asia from 1968 to 1973. When this report was prepared, most of the senior Seventh Air Force personnel who were experienced and knowledgeable regarding the interface were no longer in Southeast Asia, thus precluding interviews with key staff officers. Reliance was therefore placed on the numerous messages, letters, and unit working papers available on microfilm. However, CHECO's microfilm library does not contain a complete picture of a subject as far-reaching as the Tactical Data Systems Interface. Consequently, it should be emphasized that this monograph is not a final report. This document provides a starting point for exploring the Story of the USAF's role in the Tactical Data Systems Interface, but the reader should recognize that future research will produce data which may yield new perspectives on this subject. This report is in five parts.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 74
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Book Description
The purpose of this CHECO report is to explore the most sophisticated means of interservice coordination yet employed in combat operations: The Southeast Asia Tactical Data Systems Interface. The Tactical Data Systems Interface was the computerized bond between the three tactical data systems in Southeast Asia, and, as such, it was a unique experiment in the control of airpower. For the first time, the tactical data systems of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were linked to exchange significant information almost instantaneously. As a result, the control center's Battle Commander had access to a near real time display of air data, which proved of immeasurable value to combat air operations in Southeast Asia from 1968 to 1973. When this report was prepared, most of the senior Seventh Air Force personnel who were experienced and knowledgeable regarding the interface were no longer in Southeast Asia, thus precluding interviews with key staff officers. Reliance was therefore placed on the numerous messages, letters, and unit working papers available on microfilm. However, CHECO's microfilm library does not contain a complete picture of a subject as far-reaching as the Tactical Data Systems Interface. Consequently, it should be emphasized that this monograph is not a final report. This document provides a starting point for exploring the Story of the USAF's role in the Tactical Data Systems Interface, but the reader should recognize that future research will produce data which may yield new perspectives on this subject. This report is in five parts.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 78
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In late 1961, when the United States accelerated aid to South Vietnam and Thailand, communications and control facilities were primitive and limited. A rudimentary Air Traffic Control System existed, using high frequency (HF) radio for communications and low frequency beacons for navigational aids. This was sufficient to handle the commercial traffic and existing military traffic. Increased U.S. air involvement, made necessary by the rapidly growing Communist guerrilla activities in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand soon created a need for a comprehensive air request net and Tactical Air Control system (TACS) to control efficiently this increase in military traffic. On 1 October 1961, the 5th Communications and Control Group and the 1st Mobile Communications Squadron were reorganized. The two 5th Communications and Control Squadrons were deactivated and their personnel and equipment became absorbed in the 1st Mobile Communications Squadron, which was then redesignated the 1st Mobile Communications Group under the Air Force Communications Service. The 605th Tactical Control Squadron was deactivated, and the 5th Communications and Control Group became the 5th Tactical Control Group under the Thirteenth Air Force at Clark Air Base, Philippines. The USAF initially inserted TDY units into South Vietnam and Thailand in November 1961, with elements of the 5th and 507th (Shaw AFB, South Carolina) Tactical Control Groups and the 1st Mobile Communications Group (MCG), which had already acquired the sobriquet of "1st Mob." These mobile units consisted basically of navigational aids (navaids) and single channel high frequency radio systems to link the widely spread activities. As the tempo of operations increased and the extent of USAF participation grew to match the increase insurgency activity, these communications systems proved barely adequate for several reasons. The nucleus for a TACS in Southeast Asia had, however, been formed.
Author: John J. Lane
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Command and control systems
Languages : en
Pages : 258
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Book Description
Author: Tyler W Morton
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 168247481X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 328
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Book Description
From Kites to Cold War tells the story of the evolution of manned airborne reconnaissance. Long a desire of military commanders, the ability to see the terrain ahead and gain foreknowledge of enemy intent was realized when Chinese airmen mounted kites to surveil their surroundings. Kite technology was slow to spread, and by the late nineteenth century European nations had developed the balloon and airship to conduct this mission. By 1918, it was obvious that the airplane had become the reconnaissance platform of the future. Used successfully by many nations during the Great War, aircraft technology and capability experienced its most rapid evolutionary period during World War II. Entering the war with just basic airborne imagery capabilities, by V-E and V-J days, air power pioneers greatly improved imagery collection and developed sophisticated airborne signals intelligence collection capabilities. The United States and other nations put these capabilities to use as the Cold War immediately followed. Flying near the periphery of and sometimes directly over the Soviet Union, airborne reconnaissance provided the intelligence necessary to stay one step ahead of the Soviets throughout the Cold War.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 74
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The traditional interpretation of the tactical reconnaissance mission as a highly mobile, self-sufficient operation prepared to "know continuously the enemy's capabilities and location" has been reemphasized by the recent military experience in Southeast Asia. A premium has been placed by several factors on the element of surprise, on detection of an enemy able to conceal himself more effectively than ever before, and on the most rapid possible response to requirements established by ground and air forces. Many axioms guiding reconnaissance organization and operations in the past have been reexamined and questioned in the light of conditions encountered in Southeast Asia. The task of providing "needed intelligence information during all phases and for the full spectrum of conflict" has created special problems yet to be fully resolved. This report reviews the expansion and growth in sophistication of the tactical reconnaissance mission in Southeast Asia (SEA) conducted by the United States Air Force from June 1966 to June 1969, noting at the same time the salient problems involved. Tactical reconnaissance emphasizes flexibility in its organization and operation; it can be deployed in package units or through various combinations of reconnaissance aircraft, sensors, and other detection devices as required by the joint force. The Wing, therefore, constitutes the basic tactical unit, small enough to fulfill mobility requirements and still provide from its own resources all the services of a tactical reconnaissance system. The broad scope of the Wing's mission can be seen in a summary of the work of the 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB).
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 83
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Seventh Air Force experienced simultaneous pressures to centralize its reconnaissance-intelligence resources for the air war in the North and to decentralize them for the ground war in the South. This paradox bred unorthodox offspring: a photo lab without lab technicians; a recce tech I squadron without permanent quarters; a squadron photo lab 270 miles from the squadron. This report recounts the measured acquiescence by Seventh Air Force to decentralization, and the compelling reasons of 7AF for going slow in implementing TAC RISE. With TAC RISE as the backdrop, the organization and function of the seven reconnaissance photo labs in SEA come into better perspective and illuminate the Army/Air Force systems for requesting, processing, and distributing reconnaissance film.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 130
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Book Description
Beginning with a single C-47 Gooneybird in 1961, the USAF reconnaissance effort in Southeast Asia (SEA) has steadily expanded to keep pace with the increasing U.S. military role in the conflict. While the two previous CHECO reports on this subject examined USAF SEA tactical air reconnaissance from 1961 through June 1969, this report describes new equipment, technology, tactics, the relocation and deactivation of principal units, and the modernization of the VNAF aerial reconnaissance program. Although this report deals only with USAF efforts, the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine forces have been important elements of tactical reconnaissance in SEA.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Book Description
The term "short round," of artillery inception, described a shell which fell short of its target. In Air Force employment, this term is somewhat altered: "A short round incident is defined as the air delivery of ordnance which results in injury or death to friendly military forces or noncombatants." This CHECO report depicts those short rounds delivered by fixed-wing aircraft, specifically those under the operational control of the Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). This report encompasses "short round" incidents reported from January through December 1971. It emphasizes a narrative of each incident with the factors leading up to the incident, the investigating officer's conclusions and recommendations, and the efforts made by commanders to minimize the recurrence of the accidental release of air-delivered ordnance on friendly military forces or noncombatants. A review of the authenticated "short rounds" in CHECO reports of previous years revealed that these incidents basically followed a general pattern of primary and contributing causes: pilot error, poor weather conditions, troop location unknown, weapon system malfunction, wrong target hit due to ground personnel error, poor communications, change in the ground situation, and inaccurate target marking. However, it was also noted that in a troops-in-contact situation the chance of a short round must be weighed against the possibility of heavy losses if close air support is not provided.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 107
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This report describes the evolution of Tactical Electronic Warfare (TEW) operations in Southeast Asia from 1962 to 1968. It addresses the technological or mechanical aspects of electronics equipment only if necessary to clarify tactical air operations. Sensitivity of various electronic activities in SEA limited accessibility to certain types of information. "Tactical Electronic Warfare Operations in SEA" blends together all activities which were a part of the framework of TEW operations in that area. The last chapter summarizes and assesses several significant developments in these operations.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
The scenario of Operation HICKORY called for a multipronged assault into the DMZ, with forces of the 3rd Marine Division and Vietnamese Army (ARVN) units striking north into the heart of the lowland area, and a Marine landing force sweeping in from the eastern coast. Air support for the Marine units, including the landing force (SLF Alpha), was to be provided by the Marine tactical air arm, while close support for ARVN forces was to be provided by the 7AF TACS. On the day prior to the operation, the TACS was to provide USAF aircraft for preparatory strikes immediately north of the DMZ, with the Marines conducting air strikes inside the zone. The TACS was to provide continuous suppression strikes north of the attacking forces throughout the course of the operation. Obviously, in a multi-force operation of this nature, joint planning and close coordination were key tactical prerequisities. In the early phases of Operation HICKORY, however, several situations arose which indicated an inadequacy in-joint planning. Breakdowns in the system of-coordination on air requirements, on at least two occasions, jeopardized friendly forces. Had airpower been applied under a system of centralized control, it is likely these breakdowns could have-been avoided.
