Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report. Command and Control, 1966-1968 PDF Download
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Languages : en
Pages : 61
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Book Description
This is a continuing report, dovetailing with CHECO Report, "Command and Control 1965," which was published on 15 December 1966. Since then, approximately 16 CHECO reports have been completed, which encompass every facet of Command and Control in SEA. Thus, this volume will not repeat the detailed information available in other individual reports. Rather, it will provide an overview of this highly complex Command and Control structure. Emphasis will be placed on Command Relationships, with the focus on their historical evolution and the prevailing lines of authority from the Pacific Command (PACOM) to Vietnam and Thailand. When it enhances the overview, this report - will contain brief sketches of pertinent functional components and the elements of centralized direction so essential to the operation of a Command and Control system.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 61
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Book Description
This is a continuing report, dovetailing with CHECO Report, "Command and Control 1965," which was published on 15 December 1966. Since then, approximately 16 CHECO reports have been completed, which encompass every facet of Command and Control in SEA. Thus, this volume will not repeat the detailed information available in other individual reports. Rather, it will provide an overview of this highly complex Command and Control structure. Emphasis will be placed on Command Relationships, with the focus on their historical evolution and the prevailing lines of authority from the Pacific Command (PACOM) to Vietnam and Thailand. When it enhances the overview, this report - will contain brief sketches of pertinent functional components and the elements of centralized direction so essential to the operation of a Command and Control system.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 69
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Book Description
Evolution of the Tactical Air Control System in Southeast Asia, its expansion and refinement, and its relationship to Command and Control in general were addressed in CHECO report, "Control of Air Strikes in SEA, 1961-1966", published on 1 March 1967. Concerned especially with out-country control of airstrikes, this second CHECO report updates Command and Control activities and actions which directly pertain to control and direction of airstrikes, such as Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center orbits, Forward Air Controller capabilities, armed reconnaissance and--insofar as they impinge upon strike control--Rules of Engagement. Specific peripheral elements and in-country procedures pertaining to airstrike control in Southeast Asia have been profiled in other CHECO reports.
Author: John J. Lane
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Command and control systems
Languages : en
Pages : 258
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Book Description
Author: C. W. Thorndale
Publisher: Military Bookshop
ISBN: 9781780398068
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 232
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Book Description
High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1969 study. The War in Southeast Asia in 1967 and 1968 comprised an astounding complexity of conventional and unconventional wars, political and geographic boundaries, Rules of Engagement, areas of operation, command responsibilities, wet and dry seasons, sanctuaries for both sides, and a terrain of mountains, jungles, and flood plains From the Red Chinese Border to the Mekong Delta, the enemy supply lines ran this tangled natural and man-made gauntlet--attacked the whole way by the air interdiction campaign. In North Vietnam, the railroads and bridges on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) target lists were the prime interdiction targets. Interdiction operations in Laos meant attacking the trucks rolling down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, closing the roads with air strikes, and bombing the supplies stockpiled off the Trail. Within South Vietnam, all airstrikes were nominally considered close air support for ground forces Seventh Air Force operations against in-country enemy roads only slowly became an interdiction campaign. The Cambodian government's refusal to sanction U.S. air strikes within its borders put U.S. activities there within the scope of unconventional warfare and outside the conventional interdiction efforts. Despite many natural and man-made variables, "air interdiction" had certain common characteristics, particular tactics, and specific munitions For instance, the Air Force experience in Korea was repeated in SEA when the enemy's heavy antiaircraft artillery (AAA) degraded accurate bombing of roads and railroads. Also, few efficient area denial weapons existed to prevent rapid enemy repair of the bomb cuts made on the roadbeds. This proved true against roads running through Laos into South Vietnam, as well as against railroads around Hanoi.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 68
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In the parlance of artillerymen, a "Short Round" is a shell that falls short of the enemy and inflicts casualties on friendly troops. The expression is so starkly descriptive and brief that it has come to be used as a convenient label for most incidents wherein friendly ordnance causes friendly casualties. This report is concerned with air-delivered Short Rounds--specifically, those involving the fixed-wing aircraft under operational control of the Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). This third CHECO report On "Short Rounds" covers occurrences from June 1968 through May 1969. It emphasizes rates and trends, interesting corollaries, lessons learned, and recent attempts to eliminate Short Rounds. This study also examines several Short Round incidents to illustrate some of the problems encountered by ground commanders, forward air controllers (FACs), and strike aircraft commanders in their joint efforts to conduct close air support. Ground and air commanders at all levels are deeply concerned about the tragic results of Short Round incidents, and Strenuous efforts have been made to reduce the probability of such occurrences. To have achieved absolute immunity from Short Rounds, the ground forces would have had to sacrifice the benefits of air support whenever they were closely engaged with the enemy. These were hard choices to make, but nearly all of the situations dictated accepting the risk of Short Rounds to diminish the certain lethality of hostile fire.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 74
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The traditional interpretation of the tactical reconnaissance mission as a highly mobile, self-sufficient operation prepared to "know continuously the enemy's capabilities and location" has been reemphasized by the recent military experience in Southeast Asia. A premium has been placed by several factors on the element of surprise, on detection of an enemy able to conceal himself more effectively than ever before, and on the most rapid possible response to requirements established by ground and air forces. Many axioms guiding reconnaissance organization and operations in the past have been reexamined and questioned in the light of conditions encountered in Southeast Asia. The task of providing "needed intelligence information during all phases and for the full spectrum of conflict" has created special problems yet to be fully resolved. This report reviews the expansion and growth in sophistication of the tactical reconnaissance mission in Southeast Asia (SEA) conducted by the United States Air Force from June 1966 to June 1969, noting at the same time the salient problems involved. Tactical reconnaissance emphasizes flexibility in its organization and operation; it can be deployed in package units or through various combinations of reconnaissance aircraft, sensors, and other detection devices as required by the joint force. The Wing, therefore, constitutes the basic tactical unit, small enough to fulfill mobility requirements and still provide from its own resources all the services of a tactical reconnaissance system. The broad scope of the Wing's mission can be seen in a summary of the work of the 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB).
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 117
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When hostilities began in Southeast Asia, the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service was not fully prepared to enter into armed conflict. The assumption that wartime Search and Rescue (SAR) was an extension of peacetime SAR was in error. This was quickly recognized during the early days of the conflict. In 1964, the only rotary wing aircraft available to be deployed to SEA was the HH-43B assigned to the Local Base Rescue (LBR) units. The amphibious HU-16 and the HC-54 were the only fixed-wing aircraft available. Both these aircraft had a limited rescue and recovery capability. HC-54s, made available as command and control aircraft, were also limited in mission capability. The Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service was forced to take helicopter aircraft from other Air Force missions to provide a partially adequate SAR capability in SEA. Even then it took three years to fully develop and position the required forces. In October 1965, six CH-3C helicopters, modified for combat rescue service, were deployed to SEA. After deployment and additional modifications, they were redesignated the HH-3E (Jolly Green Giant), and became increasingly responsible for the out-country Aircrew Recovery (ACR) mission in Laos, North Vietnam, and the Gulf of Tonkin. Twelve HH-43F (Pedros) were also configured for combat recoveries to augment the HH-43B which had been performing the out-country ACR mission since deployment in October 1964. By January 1967, HH-43 out-country missions had ended. The HC-54s were replaced by the HC-130H/P, a far more suitable aircraft for command and control. Quick access to a downed aircrew member was a crucial element in a successful recovery, but significantly faster helicopters were years away in development. Therefore, longer endurance was vitally necessary to enable the rescue craft to loiter on orbit nearer the areas in which aircraft were likely to be lost.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 78
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In late 1961, when the United States accelerated aid to South Vietnam and Thailand, communications and control facilities were primitive and limited. A rudimentary Air Traffic Control System existed, using high frequency (HF) radio for communications and low frequency beacons for navigational aids. This was sufficient to handle the commercial traffic and existing military traffic. Increased U.S. air involvement, made necessary by the rapidly growing Communist guerrilla activities in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand soon created a need for a comprehensive air request net and Tactical Air Control system (TACS) to control efficiently this increase in military traffic. On 1 October 1961, the 5th Communications and Control Group and the 1st Mobile Communications Squadron were reorganized. The two 5th Communications and Control Squadrons were deactivated and their personnel and equipment became absorbed in the 1st Mobile Communications Squadron, which was then redesignated the 1st Mobile Communications Group under the Air Force Communications Service. The 605th Tactical Control Squadron was deactivated, and the 5th Communications and Control Group became the 5th Tactical Control Group under the Thirteenth Air Force at Clark Air Base, Philippines. The USAF initially inserted TDY units into South Vietnam and Thailand in November 1961, with elements of the 5th and 507th (Shaw AFB, South Carolina) Tactical Control Groups and the 1st Mobile Communications Group (MCG), which had already acquired the sobriquet of "1st Mob." These mobile units consisted basically of navigational aids (navaids) and single channel high frequency radio systems to link the widely spread activities. As the tempo of operations increased and the extent of USAF participation grew to match the increase insurgency activity, these communications systems proved barely adequate for several reasons. The nucleus for a TACS in Southeast Asia had, however, been formed.
Author:
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 167
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Book Description
Author: Robert Frank Futrell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Southeast Asia
Languages : en
Pages : 412
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