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Author: Tom Delreux
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 331955137X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 315
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Book Description
This book assesses the use and limitations of the principal-agent model in a context of increasingly complex political systems such as the European Union. Whilst a number of conceptual, theoretical and methodological challenges need to be addressed, the authors show that the principal-agent model can still provide deeper insights into a wide range of political phenomena. Through an empirical analysis of multiple principal-agent relations in the EU, covering a variety of policy fields and political actors, the volume refines our theoretical understanding of the politics of delegation and discretion in the EU. It will appeal to scholars in interested in EU politics and policy, public administration and governance, and international organisations. The chapter ‘Multiple principals preferences, different types of oversight mechanisms, and agent’s discretion in trade negotiations’ is published open access under a CC BY 4.0 license via link.springer.com.
Author: Tom Delreux
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 331955137X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 315
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book assesses the use and limitations of the principal-agent model in a context of increasingly complex political systems such as the European Union. Whilst a number of conceptual, theoretical and methodological challenges need to be addressed, the authors show that the principal-agent model can still provide deeper insights into a wide range of political phenomena. Through an empirical analysis of multiple principal-agent relations in the EU, covering a variety of policy fields and political actors, the volume refines our theoretical understanding of the politics of delegation and discretion in the EU. It will appeal to scholars in interested in EU politics and policy, public administration and governance, and international organisations. The chapter ‘Multiple principals preferences, different types of oversight mechanisms, and agent’s discretion in trade negotiations’ is published open access under a CC BY 4.0 license via link.springer.com.
Author: M. A. P. Bovens
Publisher: Oxford Handbooks
ISBN: 0199641250
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 737
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Book Description
Drawing on the best scholars in the field from around the world, this handbook showcases conceptual and normative as well as the empirical approaches in public accountability studies.
Author: Edwin Charles Goddard
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Agency (Law)
Languages : en
Pages : 916
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Book Description
Author: Jan-Erik Lane
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134082509
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 333
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Book Description
This book explores, using a set of data from 150 countries, whether there are any evolutionary mechanisms in politics that guide mankind towards the rule of law regime, domestically and globally.
Author: Günter Bamberg
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642750605
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 538
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Book Description
Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.
Author: Jan-Erik Lane
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134199953
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 314
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Book Description
A perspective on the public sector that presents a concise and comprehensive analysis of exactly what it is and how it operates. Governments in any society deliver a large number of services and goods to their populations. To get the job done, they need public management in order to steer resources – employees, money and laws – into policy outputs and outcomes. In well-ordered societies the teams who work for the state work under a rule-of-law framework, known as public administration. This book covers the key issues of: the principal-agent framework and the public sector public principals and their agents the economic reasons of government public organization, incentives and rationality in government the essence of public administration: legality and the rule of law public policy criteria: the Cambridge and Chicago positions public teams and private teams public firms public insurance public management policy Public Administration & Public Management is essential reading for those with professional and research interests in public administration and public management.
Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400829453
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 436
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Book Description
Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Author: John Eatwell
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349202150
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 321
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Book Description
This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Author: Matthias Kiefer, PhD
Publisher: Matthias Kiefer
ISBN:
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Book Description
Purpose– Shareholders and managers can work in a hierarchy in which principals attempt to control the actions of agents to achieve the wealth objective. Alternatively, shareholders and managers can work together as a cooperative team in which shareholders provide financial capital and managers provide human capital. The authors aim to examine the different implications for value creation provided by the two approaches. Design/methodology/approach– By comparing the literature on the value implications of the incomplete contracting framework and control arrangements in principal-agent hierarchies, the authors identify deviations from optimal outcomes and suggest solutions. Findings– The review indicates that a cooperative framework has some advantages over the hierarchical model. The stability of human capital and the relationship between managers and shareholders can be enhanced when shareholders provide capital in increments which vest over time and latitude for renegotiation of agreements is built into contracts. Practical implications– By surrendering control using stock options programmes, managers are free to invest in relationship-specific assets. Shareholders can control the provision of capital by withdrawing investment if insufficient returns are realized, i.e. if stock options do not meet vesting requirements. The market can then be left to do its work. Originality/value– This paper provides an original review of literature on cooperation and hierarchies in the shareholder–manager relationship and proposes solutions to identified deviations from optimal outcomes. Keywords- Agency theory, Corporate governance, M&A, Executive compensation, Contracting theory, Share options policy
Author: Stefan Georg Hunger
Publisher: diplom.de
ISBN: 3832490396
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 97
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Book Description
Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: Utopia, the ideally perfect state in social and moral aspects, the imaginary island represented by Thomas More in 1516 enjoying the greatest degree of perfection in politics and laws, the perfect society, have we already reached it? Several artists and authors who dealt with the subject of geographical design and functional planning of new municipal constructions have elaborated drafts and ideas about future types of society and urbanity as a Utopia of a technological and highly regulated society. This genre of literature culminated in masterpieces such as Fritz Lang s Metropolis (1927), Aldous Huxley s Brave New World (1931) and George Orwell s Nineteen Eigthy-Four (1949). In their visions the modern city provides a lifestyle full of comfort and convenience: push button factories, flyways that put an end to traffic jams, electronically operated high-speed trains and many other inventions that are a vital part of a goal-oriented urban management to ensure maximal efficiency. However, Fritz Lang as well as Huxley and Orwell show that all the convenience and comfort is a thigh costs. The urban habitat is depressing and in its design not aimed at recreation and personal development but at control of each individual. This culminates in the erosion of any kind of individualism. The life on the assembly line de-individualizes the inhabitants, equalizes and transforms them into machines that mechanically perform their work. Moreover, the people are no longer distinguishable, they wear the same clothes, and finally they are as the machines as which they work for... In this light, as a consequence of industrialization and the quest for maximal efficiency, the trepidation emerges whether we are running into a state of deprivation, oppression, and terror. Are we developing towards a Dystopia, a state in which the condition of life is extremely depressing? This is the starting point for a theory of optimal employment of resources, of banishing waste, a quest in pursuit of excellence, without disregarding the focal point, the individual. In fact, among successful managers there are no two identical strategies, management models or packages of techniques. To desperately cling to systems and self proclaimed panacea definitely is the wrong way as it is to call for an ideal rather than an effective manager. As Fredmund Malik (2000) argues that the key to the achievements of effective managers is not their personality but their way [...]
