Price-Matching Guarantees as Signals of Low Prices PDF Download
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Author: Joydeep Srivastava
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Many retailers offer a price-matching guarantee that promises to pay consumers the difference if they find a lower price elsewhere. This article proposes that the effectiveness of a price-matching guarantee as a signal of low store prices depends on individuals' beliefs about the degree to which other consumers in the market engage in price search, enforce price-matching guarantees, or both. Consistent with signaling theory, results of a survey and two experimental studies demonstrate that market level factors affect consumer beliefs about the extent to which others engage in price search and thereby the effectiveness of price-matching guarantees in lowering perceptions of store prices. The implications of the findings for retail strategy are discussed along with directions for future research.
Author: Joydeep Srivastava
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Many retailers offer a price-matching guarantee that promises to pay consumers the difference if they find a lower price elsewhere. This article proposes that the effectiveness of a price-matching guarantee as a signal of low store prices depends on individuals' beliefs about the degree to which other consumers in the market engage in price search, enforce price-matching guarantees, or both. Consistent with signaling theory, results of a survey and two experimental studies demonstrate that market level factors affect consumer beliefs about the extent to which others engage in price search and thereby the effectiveness of price-matching guarantees in lowering perceptions of store prices. The implications of the findings for retail strategy are discussed along with directions for future research.
Author: Swati Verma
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Marketing
Languages : en
Pages : 156
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Book Description
Retailers offer one of Low Price Guarantees (LPGs) or Price Matching Guarantees (PMGs) to signal their price position in the marketplace. Past literature has assumed that both LPG and PMG work similarly as signals of low prices, and consequently, LPG and PMG have been used interchangeably in both research and practice. In my dissertation, I posit that LPG and PMG send out different price signals, and therefore have different effects on consumers' evaluations. Across four studies, I show that LPGs signal lower prices than PMGs, and so LPGs lead to superior evaluations in pre-purchase scenarios, especially for promotion focused consumers actively seeking the lowest price. However, if post-purchase consumers identify a lower price in the marketplace, implying a signal default, then repurchase intentions are less in the case of LPGs, especially among promotion focused consumers. In initial studies, in pre-purchase scenarios, I show that purchase intentions are higher when LPGs (vs. PMGs) are used, with the effect stronger amongst promotion focused (vs. prevention focused) consumers. In a subsequent study, which examines post-purchase scenario, I show that upon signal default, consumers' repurchase intentions are lower when LPGs (vs. PMGs) had been used, and that these effects are stronger amongst promotion focused (vs. prevention focused) consumers. Finally, I run a study wherein the (very) same participants go through a pre-purchase scenario and a post-purchase scenario in succession, and I replicate the above effects.
Author: Sridhar Moorthy
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Are price-matching guarantees anticompetitive? This paper examines the incentives for price-matching guarantees in markets where information about prices is costly. Under some conditions the conventional explanation of price-matching announcements as facilitating collusion finds support, and is even strengthened. But our model provides an additional explanation for the practice. A price-matching guarantee may be a credible and easily understood means of communicating to uninformed consumers that a firm is low-priced. The credibility of the signal to uninformed consumers is assured by the behaviour of informed consumers. We contrast the testable implications of our model with those of the anticompetitive theories and discuss supportive evidence from an illustrative sample of retailers.
Author: Jennifer Helen Haydock
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Category : Consumer behavior
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Nicholas H. Lurie
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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In 3 experiments, we show that price-matching guarantees affect the process through which consumers translate price information into subjective judgments. In Experiment 1, we find that price-matching guarantees appear to change the standard used in price evaluation by raising consumers' estimates of the lowest and average prices in the market. This leads consumers to perceive products and stores that offer price-matching guarantees as less expensive. In Experiment 2, we show that evaluations of product price information are affected by the presence of a price-matching guarantee only when consumers do not know the range of market prices. In Experiment 3, we extend these findings to show that consumer evaluations of the cost of products in a store, inferred on the basis of store characteristics, are also influenced by the presence of a price-matching guarantee.
Author: Subhasish Dugar
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
This study reports experiments on two competing theories of price-matching guarantees (PMGs). The dominant view (Salop [1986]) in the literature suggests that PMGs can alter pricing incentives of firms and sustain anti-competitive outcome in the market. However, a recent theoretical extension (Hviid and Shaffer [1999]) argues that this anti-competitive outcome can be undermined if buyers incur costs in invoking these guarantees. Therefore, it is natural to wonder how these conclusions stand up empirically. In order to provide empirical evidence on the impact of PMGs on prices, we study a variety of stylized market models that capture the essence of the two theories, obtain testable predictions and lay out the design of the controlled experiment. Results indicate that in the absence of any hassle costs, PMGs can sustain the predicted collusive outcome. On the other hand, the presence of buyers who incur positive hassle costs significantly mitigates, though not fully as theory predicts, the price-facilitating power of PMGs. Our findings indicate that policy makers should heed the potentially anti-competitive effects of PMG related advertisements on prices.
Author: Hong Yuan
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
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Book Description
Price-matching guarantees are commonly used by sellers as promises to match the lowest price for an item that a customer can find elsewhere. In this paper, we use a market experiment approach to examine buyer search as well as sellers' pricing decisions in the presence versus absence of Price-Matching Guarantees. We use student subjects as well as real consumers in an interactive laboratory setting to trade with each other, acting as buyers and sellers. Our findings from two experiments indicate that when searchers' demand is more elastic than non-searchers, PMGs can result in more intense price competition, even when sellers are symmetric. Price-Matching sellers benefit from converting more consumers into searchers who buy a larger quantity at a lower price. The lower (average) market prices also benefit buyers. These implications should be of great interest to researchers, practitioners, and public policymakers.
Author: Luís M. B. Cabral
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer behavior
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
On May 27, 2015, the Shell network of gas stations in Germany introduced a Price Matching Guarantee (PMG) available to its card-carrying members. In the ensuing weeks, a series of attempts at tacit collusion took place, typically with stations increasing prices at around 12 noon by 3 cents. In this paper, we argue that the juxtaposition of these two events is not a mere coincidence. We first present a theoretical model to argue that a PMG can be a collusion enacting practice. We then test various predictions of our theoretical model. Our source of identification is geographical variation in the presence of Shell stations (the chain that enacted the PMG) as well consumer demographics. Our empirical tests are consistent with the theoretical predictions, showing effects that are both statistically and economically significant.
Author: Shiou Shieh
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ISBN:
Category : Price indexes
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Author: Subhasish Dugar
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Price-matching guarantees have been alleged to sustain collusive prices in a homogenous product market. Theories in this literature also suggest that there exists multiple equilibria (i.e., a set of price equilibria between the competitive and the monopoly price) when all sellers adopt these guarantees in such a market. Theoretical prediction in this case fails to pin down the actual behavior of players a priori. This paper illustrates the essential role of controlled experiment in testing the collusive theory of price matching guarantees and thereby shedding light on the embedded equilibrium selection problem. In particular, this paper studies two highly stylized market models, obtains testable predictions and lays out the design of the controlled experiment. Results indicate that these guarantees facilitate collusion among sellers and thus solve the equilibrium selection problem considerably.
