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Author: Steven Gjerstad
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
Abstract: "We develop a model of information processing and strategy choice for participants in a double auction. Sellers in this model form beliefs that an offer will be accepted by some buyer. Similarly, buyers form beliefs that a bid will be accepted. These beliefs are formed on the basis of observed market data, including frequencies of asks, bids, accepted asks, and accepted bids. Then traders choose an action that maximizes their own expected surplus. The trading activity resulting from these beliefs and strategies is sufficient to achieve trasaction prices at competitive equilibrium and complete market efficiency after several periods of trading."
Author: Steven Gjerstad
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 29
Get Book Here
Book Description
Abstract: "We develop a model of information processing and strategy choice for participants in a double auction. Sellers in this model form beliefs that an offer will be accepted by some buyer. Similarly, buyers form beliefs that a bid will be accepted. These beliefs are formed on the basis of observed market data, including frequencies of asks, bids, accepted asks, and accepted bids. Then traders choose an action that maximizes their own expected surplus. The trading activity resulting from these beliefs and strategies is sufficient to achieve trasaction prices at competitive equilibrium and complete market efficiency after several periods of trading."
Author: Steven Gjerstad
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 156
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Book Description
Author: Daniel Friedman
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0429972164
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 426
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Book Description
This book focuses on markets organized as double auctions in which both buyers and sellers can submit bids and asks for standardized units of well-defined commodities and securities. It examines evidence from the laboratory and computer simulations.
Author: Timothy N. Cason
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 54
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Book Description
Author: Abdolkarim Sadrieh
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642589537
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 359
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Book Description
The alternating double auction market institution is presented as a discrete time version of the open outcry market. The game in extensive form is analyzed in an almost perfect information setting, using the concept of subgame perfectness. By applying two new equilibrium selection criteria, a general existence result is obtained for "impatience equilibria" of the game. All such equilibria are shown to have unique properties concerning the traded quantities and prices. The most important results are that the equilibrium prices are independent of the number of traders and are always very close to - if not inside - the range of competitive prices. The latter can be evaluated as game theoretic support for the convergence of prices to the competitive price. The process of price formation is traced by applying the learning direction theory and introducing the "anchor price hypothesis".
Author: Ayman Hindy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Futures market
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
Author: Jimingx Liu
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3540453709
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 383
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Book Description
Among the many changes brought by the Internet is the emergence of electronic commerce over the Web. E-commerce activities, such as the online exchange of information, services, and products, are opening up completely new opportunities for business, at new levels of productivity and profitability. In parallel with the emergence of e-commerce, intelligent software agents as entities capable of independent action in open, unpredictable environments have matured into a promising new technology. Quite naturally, e-commerce agents hold great promise for exploiting the Internet's full potential as an electronic marketplace. The 20 coherently written chapters in this book by leading researchers and professionals present the state of the art in agent-mediated e-commerce. Researchers, professionals, and advanced students interested in e-commerce or agent technology will find this book an indispensable source of information and reference.
Author: Philippe Mathieu
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540285474
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 238
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Book Description
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) is a new discipline of economics, largely grounded on concepts like evolution, auto-organisation and emergence: it intensively uses computer simulations as well as artificial intelligence, mostly based on multi-agents systems. The purpose of this book is to give an up-to date view of the scientific production in the fields of Agent-based Computational Economics (mainly in Market Finance and Game Theory). Based on communications given at AE'2005 (Lille, USTL, France), this book offers a wide panorama of recent advances in ACE (both theoretical and methodological) that will interest academics as well as practitioners.
Author: Simon Jantschgi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 14
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Book Description
We address some open issues regarding the characterization of double auctions. Our model is a two-sided commodity market with either finitely or infinitely many traders. We first unify existing formulations for both finite and infinite markets and generalize the characterization of market clearing in the presence of ties. Second, we define a mechanism that achieves market clearing in any, finite or infinite, market instance and show that it coincides with the k-double auction by Rustichini et al. (1994) in the former case. In particular, it clarifies the consequences of ties in submissions and makes common regularity assumptions obsolete. Finally, we show that the resulting generalized mechanism implements Walrasian competitive equilibrium.
Author: David J. Salant
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262028263
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 199
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Book Description
A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.
