Author: Strategic Studies Institute
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781304316806
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This monograph examines the fundamental argument that America's adversaries are shifting more toward irregular methods due to the demonstrated prowess of the U.S. military at conventional warfare. This argument is based on a what one might call a paradoxical logic, not unlike that described by Edward Luttwak in his classic work, Strategy. Among other things, the monograph concludes that few genuine paradoxes exist in war; most principles that appear paradoxical are completely linear. Moreover, those adversarial states and nonstate actors employing irregular methods today were doing so long before the U.S. military demonstrated its superiority at conventional warfare, and will likely continue to do so.
On War
Author: Carl von Clausewitz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 388
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 388
Book Description
Preparing for One War and Getting Another?
Author: Antulio Joseph Echevarria
Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute
ISBN: 1584874635
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
"This monograph examines the fundamental argument that America's adversaries are shifting more toward irregular methods due to the demonstrated prowess of the U.S. military at conventional warfare. This argument is based on what one might call a paradoxical logic, not unlike that described by Edward Luttwak in his classic work, Strategy. Among other things, the monograph concludes that few genuine paradoxes exist in war; most principles that appear paradoxical are completely linear. Moreover, those adversarial states and nonstate actors employing irregular methods today were doing so long before the U.S. military demonstrated its superiority at conventional warfare, and will likely continue to do so." --
Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute
ISBN: 1584874635
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Book Description
"This monograph examines the fundamental argument that America's adversaries are shifting more toward irregular methods due to the demonstrated prowess of the U.S. military at conventional warfare. This argument is based on what one might call a paradoxical logic, not unlike that described by Edward Luttwak in his classic work, Strategy. Among other things, the monograph concludes that few genuine paradoxes exist in war; most principles that appear paradoxical are completely linear. Moreover, those adversarial states and nonstate actors employing irregular methods today were doing so long before the U.S. military demonstrated its superiority at conventional warfare, and will likely continue to do so." --
Preparing for War
Author: J. P. Clark
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674545737
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 351
Book Description
The U.S. Army has always regarded preparing for war as its peacetime role, but how it fulfilled that duty has changed dramatically between the War of 1812 and World War I. J. P. Clark shows how differing personal experiences of war and peace among successive generations of professional soldiers left their mark upon the Army and its ways.
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674545737
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 351
Book Description
The U.S. Army has always regarded preparing for war as its peacetime role, but how it fulfilled that duty has changed dramatically between the War of 1812 and World War I. J. P. Clark shows how differing personal experiences of war and peace among successive generations of professional soldiers left their mark upon the Army and its ways.
Preparing for One War and Getting Another? (Enlarged Edition)
Author: Strategic Studies Institute
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781304316806
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This monograph examines the fundamental argument that America's adversaries are shifting more toward irregular methods due to the demonstrated prowess of the U.S. military at conventional warfare. This argument is based on a what one might call a paradoxical logic, not unlike that described by Edward Luttwak in his classic work, Strategy. Among other things, the monograph concludes that few genuine paradoxes exist in war; most principles that appear paradoxical are completely linear. Moreover, those adversarial states and nonstate actors employing irregular methods today were doing so long before the U.S. military demonstrated its superiority at conventional warfare, and will likely continue to do so.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781304316806
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This monograph examines the fundamental argument that America's adversaries are shifting more toward irregular methods due to the demonstrated prowess of the U.S. military at conventional warfare. This argument is based on a what one might call a paradoxical logic, not unlike that described by Edward Luttwak in his classic work, Strategy. Among other things, the monograph concludes that few genuine paradoxes exist in war; most principles that appear paradoxical are completely linear. Moreover, those adversarial states and nonstate actors employing irregular methods today were doing so long before the U.S. military demonstrated its superiority at conventional warfare, and will likely continue to do so.
Preparing for One War and Getting Another?
Author: Antulio J Echevarria II
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781081795245
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Book Description
This monograph examines the fundamental argument that America's adversaries are shifting more toward irregular methods due to the demonstrated prowess of the U.S. military at conventional warfare. This argument is based on what one might call a paradoxical logic, not unlike that described by Edward Luttwak in his classic work, Strategy. Among other things, the monograph concludes that few genuine paradoxes exist in war; most principles that appear paradoxical are completely linear. Moreover, those adversarial states and nonstate actors employing irregular methods today were doing so long before the U.S. military demonstrated its superiority at conventional warfare, and will likely continue to do so.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781081795245
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Book Description
This monograph examines the fundamental argument that America's adversaries are shifting more toward irregular methods due to the demonstrated prowess of the U.S. military at conventional warfare. This argument is based on what one might call a paradoxical logic, not unlike that described by Edward Luttwak in his classic work, Strategy. Among other things, the monograph concludes that few genuine paradoxes exist in war; most principles that appear paradoxical are completely linear. Moreover, those adversarial states and nonstate actors employing irregular methods today were doing so long before the U.S. military demonstrated its superiority at conventional warfare, and will likely continue to do so.
Battlefield of the Future - 21st Century Warfare Issues
Author: Lawrence Grinter
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781478361886
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Book Description
This is a book about strategy and war fighting. It contains 11 essays which examine topics such as military operations against a well-armed rogue state, the potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states, the revolutionary potential of information warfare, the lethal possibilities of biological warfare and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military affairs. The purpose of the book is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies and threat that will confront U.S. national security decision makers in the twenty-first century.
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781478361886
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Book Description
This is a book about strategy and war fighting. It contains 11 essays which examine topics such as military operations against a well-armed rogue state, the potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states, the revolutionary potential of information warfare, the lethal possibilities of biological warfare and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military affairs. The purpose of the book is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies and threat that will confront U.S. national security decision makers in the twenty-first century.
Future War
Author: Robert H. Latiff
Publisher: Vintage
ISBN: 1101971800
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 210
Book Description
An urgent, prescient, and expert look at how future technology will change virtually every aspect of war as we know it and how we can respond to the serious national security challenges ahead. Future war is almost here: battles fought in cyberspace; biologically enhanced soldiers; autonomous systems that can process information and strike violently before a human being can blink. A leading expert on the place of technology in war and intelligence, Robert H. Latiff, now teaching at the University of Notre Dame, has spent a career in the military researching and developing new combat technologies, observing the cost of our unquestioning embrace of innovation. At its best, advanced technology acts faster than ever to save the lives of soldiers; at its worst, the deployment of insufficiently considered new technology can have devastating unintended or long-term consequences. The question of whether we can is followed, all too infrequently, by the question of whether we should. In Future War, Latiff maps out the changing ways of war and the weapons technologies we will use to fight them, seeking to describe the ramifications of those changes and what it will mean in the future to be a soldier. He also recognizes that the fortunes of a nation are inextricably linked with its national defense, and how its citizens understand the importance of when, how, and according to what rules we fight. What will war mean to the average American? Are our leaders sufficiently sensitized to the implications of the new ways of fighting? How are the attitudes of individuals and civilian institutions shaped by the wars we fight and the means we use to fight them? And, of key importance: How will soldiers themselves think about war and their roles within it? The evolving, complex world of conflict and technology demands that we pay more attention to the issues that will confront us, before it is too late to control them. Decrying what he describes as a "broken" relationship between the military and the public it serves, Latiff issues a bold wake-up call to military planners and weapons technologists, decision makers, and the nation as a whole as we prepare for a very different future.
Publisher: Vintage
ISBN: 1101971800
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 210
Book Description
An urgent, prescient, and expert look at how future technology will change virtually every aspect of war as we know it and how we can respond to the serious national security challenges ahead. Future war is almost here: battles fought in cyberspace; biologically enhanced soldiers; autonomous systems that can process information and strike violently before a human being can blink. A leading expert on the place of technology in war and intelligence, Robert H. Latiff, now teaching at the University of Notre Dame, has spent a career in the military researching and developing new combat technologies, observing the cost of our unquestioning embrace of innovation. At its best, advanced technology acts faster than ever to save the lives of soldiers; at its worst, the deployment of insufficiently considered new technology can have devastating unintended or long-term consequences. The question of whether we can is followed, all too infrequently, by the question of whether we should. In Future War, Latiff maps out the changing ways of war and the weapons technologies we will use to fight them, seeking to describe the ramifications of those changes and what it will mean in the future to be a soldier. He also recognizes that the fortunes of a nation are inextricably linked with its national defense, and how its citizens understand the importance of when, how, and according to what rules we fight. What will war mean to the average American? Are our leaders sufficiently sensitized to the implications of the new ways of fighting? How are the attitudes of individuals and civilian institutions shaped by the wars we fight and the means we use to fight them? And, of key importance: How will soldiers themselves think about war and their roles within it? The evolving, complex world of conflict and technology demands that we pay more attention to the issues that will confront us, before it is too late to control them. Decrying what he describes as a "broken" relationship between the military and the public it serves, Latiff issues a bold wake-up call to military planners and weapons technologists, decision makers, and the nation as a whole as we prepare for a very different future.
Mars Adapting
Author: Francis Hoffman
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1682475905
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Book Description
As Clausewitz observed, “In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect.” The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit’s skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice. Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately.
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1682475905
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Book Description
As Clausewitz observed, “In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect.” The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit’s skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice. Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately.
The 33 Strategies Of War
Author: Robert Greene
Publisher: Profile Books
ISBN: 1847651429
Category : Self-Help
Languages : en
Pages : 496
Book Description
Sun Tzu better watch his back' New York Magazine 'An Art of War-style book of tough guy maxims to live by' Evening Standard Spanning world civilizations, synthesizing dozens of political, philosophical, and religious texts and thousands of years of violent conflict, The 33 Strategies of War is the I-Ching of conflict, the contemporary companion to Sun Tzu's The Art of War. Abundantly illustrated with examples from history, from powerful world leaders like Napoleon and Margaret Thatcher, to Shaka the Zulu and Hannibal, each of the thirty-three chapters outlines a strategy to help you win life's wars. Learn proactive methods that require you to maintain initiative and negotiate from positions of strength, or defensive strategies that allow you to respond to dangerous situations and avoid unwinnable wars. Great warriors of battlefields and boardrooms alike demonstrate prudence, agility, balance and calm, and a keen understanding that the rational and resourceful always defeat the panicked. An indispensable book, The 33 Strategies of War provides you with all the advice you need to gain and maintain the upper hand.
Publisher: Profile Books
ISBN: 1847651429
Category : Self-Help
Languages : en
Pages : 496
Book Description
Sun Tzu better watch his back' New York Magazine 'An Art of War-style book of tough guy maxims to live by' Evening Standard Spanning world civilizations, synthesizing dozens of political, philosophical, and religious texts and thousands of years of violent conflict, The 33 Strategies of War is the I-Ching of conflict, the contemporary companion to Sun Tzu's The Art of War. Abundantly illustrated with examples from history, from powerful world leaders like Napoleon and Margaret Thatcher, to Shaka the Zulu and Hannibal, each of the thirty-three chapters outlines a strategy to help you win life's wars. Learn proactive methods that require you to maintain initiative and negotiate from positions of strength, or defensive strategies that allow you to respond to dangerous situations and avoid unwinnable wars. Great warriors of battlefields and boardrooms alike demonstrate prudence, agility, balance and calm, and a keen understanding that the rational and resourceful always defeat the panicked. An indispensable book, The 33 Strategies of War provides you with all the advice you need to gain and maintain the upper hand.
Japan’s Decision For War In 1941: Some Enduring Lessons
Author: Dr. Jeffrey Record
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252961
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 105
Book Description
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252961
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 105
Book Description
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.