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Author: William H. Sandholm
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262195879
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 618
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Book Description
Evolutionary game theory studies the behaviour of large populations of strategically interacting agents & is used by economists to predict in settings where traditional assumptions about the rationality of agents & knowledge may be inapplicable.
Author: William H. Sandholm
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262195879
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 618
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Book Description
Evolutionary game theory studies the behaviour of large populations of strategically interacting agents & is used by economists to predict in settings where traditional assumptions about the rationality of agents & knowledge may be inapplicable.
Author: Josef Hofbauer
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521625708
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 356
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Book Description
Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realised how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centred not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioural programmes. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behaviour, and of the closely related interactions between species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions which can alter the basis of their success, i.e. to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms.
Author: Ross Cressman
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262033053
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 346
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Book Description
Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the game in its normal form representation. This book rejects that suggestion, arguing that a game's normal form representation often omits essential information from the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory.
Author: Martin A. Nowak
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674417755
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 390
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Book Description
At a time of unprecedented expansion in the life sciences, evolution is the one theory that transcends all of biology. Any observation of a living system must ultimately be interpreted in the context of its evolution. Evolutionary change is the consequence of mutation and natural selection, which are two concepts that can be described by mathematical equations. Evolutionary Dynamics is concerned with these equations of life. In this book, Martin A. Nowak draws on the languages of biology and mathematics to outline the mathematical principles according to which life evolves. His work introduces readers to the powerful yet simple laws that govern the evolution of living systems, no matter how complicated they might seem. Evolution has become a mathematical theory, Nowak suggests, and any idea of an evolutionary process or mechanism should be studied in the context of the mathematical equations of evolutionary dynamics. His book presents a range of analytical tools that can be used to this end: fitness landscapes, mutation matrices, genomic sequence space, random drift, quasispecies, replicators, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, games in finite and infinite populations, evolutionary graph theory, games on grids, evolutionary kaleidoscopes, fractals, and spatial chaos. Nowak then shows how evolutionary dynamics applies to critical real-world problems, including the progression of viral diseases such as AIDS, the virulence of infectious agents, the unpredictable mutations that lead to cancer, the evolution of altruism, and even the evolution of human language. His book makes a clear and compelling case for understanding every living system—and everything that arises as a consequence of living systems—in terms of evolutionary dynamics.
Author: Martin A. Nowak
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674075536
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 398
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Book Description
According to the reigning competition-driven model of evolution, selfish behaviors that maximize an organism’s reproductive potential offer a fitness advantage over self-sacrificing behaviors—rendering unselfish behavior for the sake of others a mystery that requires extra explanation. Evolution, Games, and God addresses this conundrum by exploring how cooperation, working alongside mutation and natural selection, plays a critical role in populations from microbes to human societies. Inheriting a tendency to cooperate, argue the contributors to this book, may be as beneficial as the self-preserving instincts usually thought to be decisive in evolutionary dynamics. Assembling experts in mathematical biology, history of science, psychology, philosophy, and theology, Martin Nowak and Sarah Coakley take an interdisciplinary approach to the terms “cooperation” and “altruism.” Using game theory, the authors elucidate mechanisms by which cooperation—a form of working together in which one individual benefits at the cost of another—arises through natural selection. They then examine altruism—cooperation which includes the sometimes conscious choice to act sacrificially for the collective good—as a key concept in scientific attempts to explain the origins of morality. Discoveries in cooperation go beyond the spread of genes in a population to include the spread of cultural transformations such as languages, ethics, and religious systems of meaning. The authors resist the presumption that theology and evolutionary theory are inevitably at odds. Rather, in rationally presenting a number of theological interpretations of the phenomena of cooperation and altruism, they find evolutionary explanation and theology to be strongly compatible.
Author: Jörgen W. Weibull
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262731218
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 292
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Book Description
Introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. This text introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries. Because evolutionary game theory is a fast-moving field that is itself branching out and rapidly evolving, Jörgen Weibull has judiciously focused on clarifying and explaining core elements of the theory in an up-to-date, comprehensive, and self-contained treatment. The result is a text for second-year graduate students in economic theory, other social sciences, and evolutionary biology. The book goes beyond filling the gap between texts by Maynard-Smith and Hofbauer and Sigmund that are currently being used in the field. Evolutionary Game Theory will also serve as an introduction for those embarking on research in this area as well as a reference for those already familiar with the field. Weibull provides an overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of game theory, discusses the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how it is relevant to economics.
Author: American Mathematical Society. Short Course
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
ISBN: 0821853260
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 186
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Book Description
This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in computer science, engineering, and control theory. They help to design and control multi-agent systems, often with a large number of agents (for instance, when routing drivers over highway networks or data packets over the Internet). While these fields have traditionally used a top down approach by directly controlling the behaviour of each agent in the system, attention has recently turned to an indirect approach allowing the agents to function independently while providing incentives that lead them to behave in the desired way. Instead of the traditional assumption of equilibrium behaviour, researchers opt increasingly for the evolutionary paradigm and consider the dynamics of behaviour in populations of agents employing simple, myopic decision rules.
Author: John Maynard Smith
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521288842
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 244
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Book Description
This 1982 book is an account of an alternative way of thinking about evolution and the theory of games.
Author: Eric Smith
Publisher: Iop Expanding Physics
ISBN: 9780750311380
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Evolutionary game theory has the potential to provide an integrated framework to model many aspects of evolution, development, and ecology. The reliable use of game models, however, requires an understanding of their behaviour when the number of players becomes very large, resulting in the emergence of thermodynamic limits. This behaviour is controlled by the symmetries that characterize the game, and the approach to the thermodynamic limit is governed by collective fluctuations in the actions of the players. In this book, the authors present methods to derive large-deviations limits for population processes, and apply these to game models illustrating the many roles of symmetry and collective fluctuations in evolutionary dynamics.
Author: William H. Sandholm
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262288613
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 618
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Book Description
A systematic, rigorous, comprehensive, and unified overview of evolutionary game theory. This text offers a systematic, rigorous, and unified presentation of evolutionary game theory, covering the core developments of the theory from its inception in biology in the 1970s through recent advances. Evolutionary game theory, which studies the behavior of large populations of strategically interacting agents, is used by economists to make predictions in settings where traditional assumptions about agents' rationality and knowledge may not be justified. Recently, computer scientists, transportation scientists, engineers, and control theorists have also turned to evolutionary game theory, seeking tools for modeling dynamics in multiagent systems. Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics provides a point of entry into the field for researchers and students in all of these disciplines. The text first considers population games, which provide a simple, powerful model for studying strategic interactions among large numbers of anonymous agents. It then studies the dynamics of behavior in these games. By introducing a general model of myopic strategy revision by individual agents, the text provides foundations for two distinct approaches to aggregate behavior dynamics: the deterministic approach, based on differential equations, and the stochastic approach, based on Markov processes. Key results on local stability, global convergence, stochastic stability, and nonconvergence are developed in detail. Ten substantial appendixes present the mathematical tools needed to work in evolutionary game theory, offering a practical introduction to the methods of dynamic modeling. Accompanying the text are more than 200 color illustrations of the mathematics and theoretical results; many were created using the Dynamo software suite, which is freely available on the author's Web site. Readers are encouraged to use Dynamo to run quick numerical experiments and to create publishable figures for their own research.
